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Informality might be the rule rather than the exception in politics. Behind the 
scenes and alongside official procedures seems to be where many important deci-
sions are being made. This has become evident not least during the crisis of the 
Eurozone. For example, since the EU treaty (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 125) pro-
hibits member states from bailing out countries with excessive debt, the member 
states agreed first to emergency bailout measures outside the EU’s official proce-
dures. Some argue that the European Central Bank transgressed its mandate by 
announcing its commitment to purchase sovereign debt from troubled Eurozone 
members in the secondary market. In fact, the list of examples where important 
decision makers eschewed or bent the formal rules during the current crisis is 
endless.
But informality is not just a phenomenon of the Eurozone crisis. When 
I embarked on my doctoral studies in Berlin—the EU was still in good order—
I was bothered by the incongruence between theory and reality in the analysis 
of decision making in the European Union (EU). Those in the policy world who 
made a living detailing how the EU worked in practice rarely offered an expla-
nation of why this was the case. Yet those in the academic world who offered 
explanations of the EU’s official rules and procedures often seemed to miss how 
decision making in the EU worked in reality. Indeed, then as now, many schol-
ars ignore actual decision-making practices, even or especially if these do not 
quite conform to the formal rules, or consider them as negligible or as statistical 
noise that defies any systematic description and explanation. As a result, we know 
little about why decision makers sometimes stick to formal rules and at other 
times seek a way around them. Where and why do these practices of informal 
governance exist? Why are they more prevalent in some institutional settings and 
issue areas than in others? Is informal governance a good or a bad thing?
To me, the mystified doctoral student, this discrepancy between formal rules 
and informal practices was most consequential in the case of the EU’s Council 
presidency, a position held consecutively by each member government for six 
months. Barely mentioned in the treaties, the Council presidency was an institu-
tion that many agreed informally enjoyed substantial authority in the legisla-
tive process. Yet most models of legislative bargaining in the EU neglected this 
institution.
xii      PREFACE
Puzzled and confused, I arrived at Princeton. I thought I was on to something 
really interesting. I just couldn’t explain why. Hoping for an epiphany, I took a 
couple of classes in different subfields and disciplines. I got even more confused. 
Hoping for confirmation that I had indeed discovered an important puzzle, 
I talked to my advisers. “You doctoral students today,” Andy Moravcsik exclaimed, 
“studying these boring tiny instances while there is a whole world of informal 
practices out there.” I was overwhelmed. Wouldn’t studying more informal prac-
tices only compound my confusion?
I never had an epiphany. I did follow Andy’s advice, however, and went to 
Brussels and searched numerous archives to discover more instances where the 
EU’s formal procedures said one thing and governments did something else. To 
get a better picture of what was going on, I constructed a stylized model of the 
EU’s legislative process and defined the behavior one would expect from gov-
ernments and supranational actors if decision making were governed solely 
by formal rules. I then compared this behavior to the practices on the ground 
and called the discrepancy “informal governance.” The result of this exercise 
was remarkable. I found a whole web of informal governance around the EU’s 
legislative process. More important, these practices, although stable over time, 
appeared to vary systematically across issue areas. The Council presidency, which 
prompted this project, turned out to be just the tip of a massive iceberg of infor-
mal governance. As I got a better picture of the patterns of formal and informal 
governance, the many things I had learned in class and what I knew about the 
EU slowly fell into place.
The central argument of this book is that informal governance provides added 
flexibility—a flexibility that states use to resolve potentially disruptive conflicts 
that their cooperation at the interstate level suddenly stirs up at the domestic level.
The logic is the following. Although it is clear, for example, that an EU-wide 
regulation of lightbulbs creates not only winners but also losers that have to bear 
the burden of adjusting to the new law, who benefits and who loses, the extent of 
these adjustment costs as well as when these costs accrue, is not always entirely 
predictable. Suddenly confronted with unexpected costs, a domestic group 
mobilizes against this regulation to an extent that its government is pressured 
into delaying, obstructing, or even openly defying it. I call this problem political 
uncertainty.
Political uncertainty is a problem for everyone, because when states defy the 
law then the very basis of cooperation, namely stable expectations about one 
another’s commitment, seems potentially brittle. To keep this basis for the EU’s 
smooth operation intact, states collectively depart from the rules that allow for 
imposing costs on one another in order to accommodate governments under 
exceedingly strong domestic pressure: they concede just enough to restore such 
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governments’ incentive to cooperate. Because it allows for changing the tim-
ing, extent, and distribution of adjustment costs, informal governance per-
mits states to manipulate one another’s domestic politics of collective action in 
a way that keeps domestic interests aligned in favor of cooperation. It makes 
 cooperation work.
Although confined to economic integration within the EU, the theory devel-
oped in this book sheds important light on current events and other interna-
tional organizations as well. Consider again the Eurozone crisis. The book is 
about how frequent disruptions to the domestic politics of collective action 
lead to the routine use of informal governance through which governments 
sustain a very high level of cooperation. In the current crisis the Eurozone 
members are dealing with unprecedented shocks on a massive scale to their 
highly interdependent economies. However, the challenge that policymakers 
face in both situations is similar: the defection of one of them, be it in the 
form of obstruction, delay, outright noncompliance, or exit from the Eurozone, 
hurts everyone because it undermines the credibility of the institution itself. 
Accordingly, the Eurozone members are not only concerned about the direct 
economic consequences of the crisis. They are also concerned that, for example, 
a Greek exit from the Eurozone or the reintroduction of national currencies in 
another country will cast doubt on the Eurozone’s very stability, damage the 
euro’s credibility, and thus harm all of them (Financial Times 2012b). The EU 
member governments consequently resort to informal governance practices 
when sticking to formal procedures would not prevent such scenarios from 
becoming reality.
Thus, just as the governments in this book depart from formal rules in day-
to-day EU politics in order to avert excessive domestic mobilization against EU 
laws, so leaders in the current crisis use informal governance to prevent crisis-
ridden governments from caving in to oppositional domestic forces. The result 
is a nerve-racking balancing act in which, for example, creditors and EU institu-
tions vociferously insist that debtors follow the rules and duly implement the 
conditions tied to bailouts; yet there is often no alternative for creditors but to 
create just enough informal wiggle room regarding the timing and amount of 
debt payments to prevent the debtor governments from losing important votes 
and caving in to domestic pressure for exit (Financial Times 2012a).
In light of the scarcity of information, ambiguous statements, and ongoing 
nature of events, it is too early to make strong claims about the member states’ 
strategies, or to speculate about how and whether the crisis will end. What can 
be said with some confidence, however, is that in a few years’ time, when the dust 
has settled and documents are released, the EU’s monetary union and its crisis 
will be a fruitful area for research on informal governance.
xiv      PREFACE
This book sheds light on other international organizations as well. Especially 
in the inherently dynamic realm of international trade, any organization with 
the authority to impose a decision on a member state may generate unexpected 
costs for, say, American shrimp fishers or German toy companies that suddenly 
prompt these groups to mobilize against it. As I discuss in the conclusion, this 
theory might well account for certain informal practices in other international 
organizations. Furthermore, by arguing that informal governance helps sustain 
cooperation by making institutions more responsive to those whom they affect 
most, this theory has some interesting and perhaps counterintuitive implications 
for normative debates on the democratic deficit in European and global gover-
nance.
Therefore, this book speaks not only to students of the EU but also to those 
interested in international organizations and law, the intersection of domestic 
and international politics, and normative aspects of European and global gover-
nance. I hope to bridge two gaps in current scholarship.
A first gap exists between students of international relations and students 
of comparative politics. In a world of complex interdependence, in which state 
borders become more and more porous, the distinction between both subfields 
has become increasingly anachronistic, especially in Europe, the world’s most 
interdependent region. Paradoxically, the divide seems to be particularly pro-
nounced in EU studies, where a division of labor has evolved between interna-
tional relations scholars explaining the EU’s treaty revisions and comparativists 
studying the EU’s day-to-day politics (Hix and Hoyland 2011, 2; see also Pol-
lack 2005). Thus, the first group is concerned with the endogenous aspect of EU 
institutions and asks why these institutions exist and take the form they do. The 
second group then takes EU institutions as exogenous and studies how they con-
strain individual choices and interaction among the legislative actors. I employ 
aspects of both approaches to show when, how, and why the member states col-
lectively seize informal control of the EU institutions in order to mitigate their 
effect on the domestic distribution of the costs and benefits of economic inte-
gration. As a result, I hope to demonstrate how theories from both subfields can 
be usefully combined to shed more light on the complex ways in which domestic 
and international politics interact.
A second gap exists between scholars who study practices in their institution of 
choice in minute detail, and those who seek to theorize about the bigger picture. 
The first group often neglects to justify the significance of their work for broader 
debates in political science and other fields, while the second group tends to 
ignore the fact that there are real limits to the applicability of general theories to a 
specific institution. Regarding the EU, one example mentioned in this book is the 
effort to identify stable patterns in preferences and coalitions in the few data that 
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exist on voting in the Council of Ministers, just as scholars try to identify such 
patterns in other international organizations or national parliaments. Instead, 
I argue in chapter 4, it is more interesting to ask why there is so little data and why 
exactly it is so difficult to find any such patterns in the EU context. One should 
not be afraid that questions like this about the EU’s idiosyncrasies separate EU 
studies from broader debates in political science. In fact, this is how broader 
debates evolve and general theories are developed. After all, science progresses 
through the discovery and study of anomalies (Lakatos 1970), not through the 
replication of existing studies. It requires a back and forth between “soaking and 
poking” (observing actual practices) and the interpretation of actual practices 
in light of general theories (Greif 2006, chapter 11). I am sure there will be EU 
experts who think that this book’s bird’s-eye view on more than fifty years of EU 
politics misses important details, while others will be left wondering how the 
theory might be applied beyond the case of the EU. I hope that, at the very least, 
this book stimulates further debate about these questions. More than that, I hope 
that it inspires scholars outside just as much as inside Europe to engage with what 
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I make my way through the corridors of the Justus Lipsius Building, the mon-
strous Brussels headquarters of the EU’s main decision-making body, the Council 
of Ministers. Sitting in front of me is a senior Council official, fittingly wearing an 
elegant, yet inconspicuous, dark gray suit. I make some small talk and ask what he 
and his colleagues think about the public quarrels between the then French presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy and the German chancellor Angela Merkel. “Quarrels among 
the heads of state don’t affect what we are doing,” he dismisses the question with a 
smile. “In these corridors, it’s an unsuspicious regulation of the definition of wine 
that gives us sleepless nights.” Why, I ask, does the Council care so much about such 
a technicality? Because technicalities, he explains, often really upset some people 
who then suddenly make a big fuss of it. This is what keeps the Council busy. “There 
will never be a decision against a government that faces strong problems selling or 
implementing it at home. In these cases, we always try to find a compromise.”
The EU’s achievements are beyond doubt.1 Its member states are far more 
integrated than just a few decades ago and more so than any other group of 
sovereign countries in the world. When I was a child and visited my grand aunt 
in the Netherlands, we would fill up our family car to the roof with tea and cof-
fee to take home, since these products were far more expensive in Germany than 
just a few miles away across the Dutch border. Today, I can buy tea or coffee 
anywhere in Europe for nearly the same price. I work abroad and travel within 
most of Europe without having to show my passport or exchange money. This 
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personal experience is borne out by hard evidence. Among most EU member 
states prices for tradable goods have converged to reach a level that is similar to 
the level of price convergence within the United States (Rogers 2007, 791). This 
is because the abolition of tariffs and the harmonization of domestic regula-
tions within the EU have made it far easier to trade across borders. Europe has 
consequently become the world’s leading trader. About 40 per cent of all world 
exports originate from an EU country, two-thirds of which are traded among the 
EU’s member states (World Trade Organization 2011). Not least, the crisis of the 
Eurozone has made it blatantly obvious that the European economies are deeply 
interdependent. This depth of economic integration among sovereign countries 
is unparalleled in world politics.
To explain how Europe has been able to achieve this extraordinary depth of 
economic integration over more than five decades, many observers point to the 
EU’s formal rules that delegate substantial authority to supranational  institutions 
such as the European Commission, and that permit governments in the EU to act 
collectively by majority vote. The EU, like other international organizations, is 
based on international treaties that spell out the objectives and the rules of coop-
eration. Its ambitious, open-ended goal of genuine economic integration without 
any barriers to the free circulation of goods, persons, capital, and services, how-
ever, demanded a vast stream of further laws. Therefore, unlike most international 
organizations, at the heart of the EU is a legislative process that is set up to ensure 
that, in making laws, the member states achieve their ambitious objective. At every 
stage in this process there is consequently the possibility of imposing a decision 
on one or more governments and, thus, of advancing economic integration even 
against the governments’ shortsighted interests. To some, these strong suprana-
tional features imply that the EU has been “constitutionalized” (Stein 1981; Man-
cini 1989, 596) and has evolved beyond an ordinary international organization to 
become more akin to the political systems of its member states (Hix 1994, 12).2
If this analysis of the EU is correct, then the chapter-opening anecdote makes 
little sense. The EU’s formal rules permit it to impose an integration- advancing 
decision on one or more governments that respond to domestic pressure to 
oppose it. However, it is customary among the member states to refrain from 
overruling one another in precisely those situations the rules were designed for. 
There are more examples, described in the remainder of this book, where the 
treaty says one thing, and governments do the opposite. For example, nearly every 
textbook tells us that an independent supranational bureaucracy, the  European 
Commission, enjoys a monopoly on setting the legislative agenda so that it may 
propose legal acts that promise to advance integration in the best possible way. 
Yet in most cases the Commission is only acting on requests from national lead-
ers, who are therefore the true agenda setters.
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It is not only that some governments and supranational institutions 
 occasionally fail to follow the formal rules to the letter. In fact, they have adopted 
a number of practices that seem to contradict the formal rules’ very purpose. 
Moreover, these practices appear to vary systematically across issue areas, yet 
remain remarkably stable within them regardless of major events. In short, a 
plethora of informal practices, nowhere mentioned in the treaties, operate paral-
lel to the formal rules and yet differ from them substantially. I will henceforth 
refer to these practices as informal governance.
The EU has achieved a remarkable depth of economic integration. If this is 
not primarily due to its formal rules, how then has the EU managed to accom-
plish this? Why do states carefully design formal rules only to depart from them 
incessantly? What makes the EU work in reality? These are the questions this 
book seeks to answer. In doing so, it proposes a new way of thinking about 
 international organizations more broadly.
Why Informal Governance? The Argument 
in Brief
Using the example of the European Union, this book develops a more general 
theory of informal governance in international organizations. At its core is the 
argument that practices of informal governance are the result of a norm of dis-
cretion among governments that adds flexibility to the formal rules. This norm 
is an implicit understanding among governments that departures from the rules 
are necessary when EU-level decisions threaten to stir up potentially disrup-
tive conflicts at the domestic level. Informal governance, therefore, allows the 
 member states to manipulate one another’s politics of collective action in such 
a way that domestic interests remain persistently aligned in favor of integration. 
Put differently, informal governance sustains the EU’s legitimacy by continually 
re-embedding the EU in the societal interests it is based on. The combination of 
formal rules and informal governance consequently permits a level of economic 
integration that the member states would otherwise not be able to maintain.
This argument about the critical importance of informal governance for the 
functioning of the EU sets this book apart from dominant conceptions that tend 
to equate the EU solely with its codified rules. Simon Hix (1998, 41), for example, 
defines the EU as an ordinary political system, the first and foremost characteris-
tics of which “are the formal rules of collective decision-making, the ‘government’ 
of the EU.” Conceiving of the EU as a highly advanced international organization, 
Andrew Moravcsik (1998, 1) studies European integration solely by looking at 
the intergovernmental bargains that result in formal treaty changes. This book, in 
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contrast, maintains that informal governance is critical for our understanding of 
the EU and, indeed, of what “makes cooperation work” the moment that hands 
have been shaken and the official treaties enter into force. In other words, the 
study of informal governance is not simply a more detailed perspective on how the 
European Union works day to day. Crucially, informal governance is the reason 
why it works and persists at all. The book evaluates this theory throughout the 
history of EU lawmaking, from the EU’s beginnings in the late 1950s until today. 
The findings also apply to international organizations more broadly.
Why is it necessary to add informal flexibility to the formal rules? Rules enable 
cooperation when states suspect that a cooperating partner might renege on its 
pledge to adjust its policy. By constraining the behavior of otherwise  opportunistic 
governments, rules bolster the credibility of commitments to cooperation and 
thus allow states to form stable expectations about one another’s behavior.
However, precisely because states design these rules under conditions of 
 uncertainty, underlying patterns of societal interdependence may change and 
alter the domestic distribution of the immediate costs and benefits of coopera-
tion in ways that could not have been foreseen. Situations are consequently bound 
to arise in which following the rules to the letter, even if beneficial for society as 
a whole, suddenly requires costly adjustments by a single group. Facing excessive 
adjustment costs, domestic groups have an incentive to overcome initial barriers 
to mobilization and pressure their government into defying the rule in question 
in spite of punitive sanctions. The unpredictability of this domestic pressure for 
protection is one example of what we henceforth refer to as political uncertainty.
The chapter-opening example about the regulation of wine is instructive. In 
response to a diminishing wine consumption in Europe and a surge in imports of 
wine from North and South America the Commission was tasked to present a pro-
posal on the reform of the common wine market that, among other things, would 
increase the competitiveness of European producers. According to the formal rules, 
the Council would, on a proposal from the Commission and after consultation 
with the European Parliament, adopt the regulation by majority vote. The south-
ern wine-producing states preferred a strict definition that would protect the sec-
tor from imports of wine from the Americas that contained artificial by-products. 
Northern wine-importing states, in contrast, preferred a broader and arguably more 
consumer-friendly definition that would open the European market for imports.
In 2007, the Commission submitted a proposal that preserved the interests 
of northern wine-importing countries and, it argued, the European consumer 
as well. In line with rules by the International Wine Organization, it defined the 
term “wine” broadly as a product obtained in the Community from harvested 
grapes. This broad definition nevertheless excluded “Ebbelwoi” (literally “apple 
wine,” also known as Äppler or Stöffsche), a traditional cider-like alcoholic drink 
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made from apples that is produced in the German State of Hesse. The definition 
implied that Ebbelwoi makers would have to rename the product, which threat-
ened to damage the drink’s recognition value and standing as a cultural asset. In 
other words, the wine definition threatened to impose unexpected, concentrated 
adjustment costs on a single domestic group.
The proposal instantaneously prompted the Hessian Ebbelwoi producers to 
lobby the regional and federal government to fight the Commission proposal 
tooth and nail. Although this remote and localized adjustment shock seems of 
little importance to the federal government, domestic politics made it at this 
point highly susceptible to the Ebbelwoi lobby. The Commission proposal was 
published during a charged election campaign for the regional Hesse Landtag, 
which was of great significance to the composition of the Federal Council and, 
thus, of federal German politics at large. It, therefore, also caused unexpected 
media coverage, in which all parties outdid one another in complaining about 
Brussels’ “regulatory madness.” There were even somewhat serious calls to pull 
the state of Hesse out of the EU.
When situations like this turn into domestic pressure to defy the law in ques-
tion, this is bad news not just for the government under pressure or for its most 
important trading partner. The defiance of an EU law—whether in the form 
of outright noncompliance, delayed transposition of EU law into national law, 
or the simple obstruction of cooperation—is detrimental for all cooperating 
 partners at the same time.
Why? Because the defiance of rules, the principal function of which is to 
 substantiate states’ beliefs in one another’s commitment to cooperation, shatters 
formerly stable expectations about this ordering function. It diminishes the very 
value of the institution itself. Not only the potential noncompliers but all gov-
ernments who benefit from the institution’s smooth functioning are better off 
 adding situational flexibility to the formal rules—a flexibility that averts domes-
tic conflicts from disrupting cooperation among EU member states.
Political uncertainty consequently generates a demand for an informal norm 
of discretion that prescribes that governments should be accommodated when 
they are facing unmanageable domestic pressure to defy the rules. The norm 
manifests itself in collective departures from the formal rules—that is, in  informal 
governance—as governments accommodate a partner in trouble with a view to 
reducing the excessive concentration of adjustment costs that stirs up domestic 
pressure. In our “Ebbelwoi” example, the Council of Ministers refrained from 
overruling the German delegation and referred the Commission proposal to an 
informal committee of government representatives, which ultimately accommo-
dated the German complaints without insisting on a quid pro quo. The Ebbelwoi 
lives on with the name wine.
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Situations like this are daily fare in the EU, which raises the question of why 
the member states don’t just legalize the norm or revise the rules to accommo-
date these situations. Why does the norm of discretion remain implicit? Simply 
put, the norm of discretion resolves precisely those conflicts that erupt when 
legal rules and principles reach their limits.
To be sure, just because rules are codified does not mean that actors have to 
follow them to the letter. Rules may be interpreted broadly and according to a 
number of different principles (Dworkin 1977, chap. 2). Informal  governance as 
collective departures from what the rules stipulate does not necessarily involve 
violations of legal rules (Kennedy 2009, 56). However, the rule of law does require 
that legal principles be applied consistently in the interpretation of legal rules. 
This is why legalization reaches its limits when dealing with political uncertainty. 
Because the nature and extent of domestic demands for protection cannot be 
anticipated and remains ambiguous over time, no legal principle could ever 
determine when it is justified to accommodate a government that is tempted 
to defy the law for domestic political reasons. Institutional stability requires ad 
hoc decisions as to whether an imminent damage to the commitment justifies 
such concessions. The rule of law does not provide a consistent answer in these 
moments. The informal norm of discretion, however, mandates a variable, politi-
cal interpretation of legal rules
Another conundrum follows. If the norm remains implicit and is not inter-
preted according to legal but according to political standards, where are its 
 limits? The whole point of rules is to stabilize expectations and underwrite com-
mitments, and so departures from these rules might create ambiguity about the 
rules’ scope of application that undermines their very purpose. To resolve this 
tension between the formal rules’ ordering function and informal flexibility, 
EU member states delegate adjudicatory authority to an entity they can trust. 
Since the norm of discretion allows for the interpretation of rules according to 
political rather than legal standards, its use cannot be policed by actors strictly 
pledged to the rule of law.3 The book argues that the decision whether formal 
rules apply or whether informal governance is pertinent rests with a govern-
ment that, while having an incentive to preserve the institution, has nothing 
else to gain from accommodating a cooperating partner in trouble. All member 
states are consequently able to trust its recommendation and add flexibility to 
the formal rules without undermining the credibility of the commitment that 
these rules embody.
Against this background, the argument can be made that the EU has been 
able to achieve and uphold its level of economic integration not only because of 
its intrusive supranational institutions. Crucially, the EU has been able to sustain 
this level because a norm of discretion adds situational flexibility in the event that 
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its supranational features cause potentially disruptive conflicts at the  domestic 
level. Formal and informal institutional elements complement each other to 
underpin a level of economic integration that neither formal rules nor informal 
norms alone could sustain.4
Furthermore, the argument implies that instead of impeding accountabil-
ity, informal governance serves to include in the political process the voices of 
those actors who are most affected by a decision at the EU level. It thus miti-
gates  excessive distributive effects that the EU might otherwise cause at the level 
of its member states. Somewhat counterintuitively, then, the book concludes 
that informal governance practices in the legislative process improve the EU’s 
legitimacy by making it more responsive to those who are most affected by 
EU-level decisions.
Contributions to the Literature
In arguing that informal governance renders high levels of cooperation 
 sustainable, this book engages various bodies of literature. It has significant 
implications for at least two fields in particular: the literature on EU integra-
tion and politics, on the one hand, and studies in International Relations on 
institutional design, delegation, and the nexus between domestic politics and 
international politics, on the other.
Most immediately, the argument that informal governance allows states to 
assume collective control of the EU ties the book to a debate in EU studies about 
the autonomy of supranational institutions. Intergovernmentalists argue that 
supranational institutions are mere instruments, designed by states to help them 
pursue their common interests. The autonomy of supranational bureaucrats, 
parliamentarians, and judges reflects, not transcends, member states’ preferences 
(Garrett 1995, 174–76; Moravcsik 1998, 492).
Neofunctionalists, in contrast, regard supranational institutions as largely 
independent actors with substantial freedom to act on their own terms.5 This 
school of thought argues that supranational actors constantly exploit unforeseen 
control gaps in order to enhance their autonomy at the member states’ expense 
(Farrell and Héritier 2007)6 as evidenced by the surprising rise to power of the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (Hix 2002; Alter 1998). 
The next chapter discusses this literature in more detail.
For now, it is sufficient to note that the debate has made little headway 
because of the difficulty of predicting where unforeseen control gaps might 
emerge. Scholars in the neofunctionalist tradition tend to cite cases that sup-
port the argument that supranational institutions enhance their autonomy, yet 
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they remain unable to generalize from these examples. Intergovernmentalists 
point out that  supranational activism necessarily remains in the realm of what 
the member states are willing to tolerate (Caporaso 2007, 394–404; Garrett 1995, 
180; Moravcsik 1998, 492), yet they are unable to delineate these limits clearly.
This book, therefore, contributes to this debate between intergovernmentalists 
and neofunctionalists by formulating testable propositions about the  absolute 
limits of supranational autonomy—that is, about why and how  governments 
assume collective control of their supranational institutions. It argues that this 
limit is reached when EU-level decisions threaten to stir up excessive  domestic 
opposition against them. Empirically, it demonstrates that tacit governmen-
tal control is, in fact, more far-reaching than one might suspect in light of the 
numerous studies on supranational autonomy.
Consequently, the argument that informal governance is pervasive in EU  politics 
also has significant implications for analyses of the interinstitutional balance of 
power and the dynamics of decision making within the EU. It implies that its offi-
cial procedures do not affect lawmaking in the EU in the same way that political 
systems affect lawmaking in the EU member states, and that decision outcomes 
cannot be predicted merely from knowledge of those procedures and the legislative 
actors’ preferences. The conclusion elaborates on this topic in more detail.
The theory of informal governance is developed against the background of a 
burgeoning debate in international political economy, law, and economics about 
cooperation in a dynamic environment. The dilemma states face is the following: 
when states have reason to doubt one another’s commitment to cooperation, 
rigid rules are superior to broad discretion in that they enhance the credibility 
of commitments and, thus, enable states to form stable expectations about one 
another’s future behavior. In times of crisis, however, rigid rules may impede 
actions that are suddenly necessary in order to sustain cooperation. How, then, 
do institutions attain the right balance between rigidity and flexibility?
This book extends beyond this literature in three regards. First, where most 
studies explore how formal flexibility mechanisms might solve the aforemen-
tioned dilemma, this book addresses the real crux of the problem, namely how 
states maintain cooperation in potentially disruptive situations that are simply 
not predictable in detail and where, therefore, formal flexibility mechanisms turn 
out to be inadequate. Second, and related, where the rational design literature 
considers formal and informal rules as substitutes by exploring under what con-
ditions states prefer the one to the other, this book explores the synergies between 
formal and informal institutional elements in the provision of flexibility.7 Third, 
this book focuses on the demand for flexibility in the stage of lawmaking within 
a set of rigid rules—the EU’s legislative procedure—where most studies tend to 
focus on the stage of enforcement.
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Why do so many students of international organization prefer to focus on 
the formal rules instead of the informal elements of institutions? This tendency 
is inherent in the rational design research agenda in International Relations and 
other disciplines, which defines institutions as “explicit arrangements negotiated 
among international actors” (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 762, italics 
added). From this perspective, states are believed to design institutions so as to 
prepare for future contingencies, just like architects factor the risk of earthquakes 
into the design of quakeproof buildings. Once an agreement enters into force, 
its strategic environment—that is, its members’ interests in cooperation—is 
assumed to remain largely stable or vary within known parameters. The institu-
tion’s quakeproof character implies that it suffices to look at its formal frame-
work in order to understand how this institution works. As a result, formal rules 
take analytical precedence over those that are implicit. Although informal rules 
may well emerge when states deliberately leave some aspects of their  agreement 
incomplete, informal institutional elements are, by assumption, of lesser rele-
vance than the institution’s formal scaffolding for understanding its purpose and 
effects. In short, the assumption that an institution’s environment is largely static 
implies that formal rules enjoy analytical priority over informal institutional 
elements.
This book relaxes this assumption to present a dynamic theory of coopera-
tion, in which informal institutional elements gain center stage. Granted, the 
assumption that states’ interests in cooperation are static and their variation 
by and large predictable may be appropriate in some areas such as security or 
human rights (Koremenos 2005, 555). In the realm of international economics, 
however, patterns of economic interdependence are inherently dynamic and dif-
ficult to predict due to the development of new technologies, changing consumer 
preferences, and multiple other shocks in supply and demand. These shocks may 
translate into unexpected changes in domestic preferences for cooperation that 
suddenly cut the ground from under the institution. In other words, the real 
crux of the dilemma between rigidity and flexibility is that precisely where rigid 
rules are most needed and beneficial, they may be most difficult to sustain in the 
context of a dynamic environment.
The consequences of viewing institutional environments as inherently 
dynamic instead of static are significant. Situations are then bound to arise in 
which states suddenly face incentives to break their commitment in spite of puni-
tive sanctions. In these situations, informal governance helps restore states’ inter-
est in adhering to the institution and, therefore, maintaining cooperation in the 
long run. This implies that formal rules no longer enjoy analytical priority, since 
the informal norm of discretion is imperative for understanding not just how 
cooperation works but more fundamentally why cooperation lasts.8 Accordingly, 
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formal and informal institutional elements should not be studied independently 
of each other as, for example, substitutes for certain institutional functions 
(Abbott and Snidal 2000, 445). They may also complement each other to make 
cooperation work in ways that neither formal rules nor informal norms alone 
permit.9
To link the above discussion to the debate about supranational autonomy 
in the EU, consider how a dynamic perspective on cooperation alters stan-
dard principal-agent analyses of international organization. In this view, gov-
ernments first strike an agreement on cooperation and subsequently delegate 
the implementation of the substantive bargain to an international organiza-
tion. The act of  delegation reifies governments and institutions as actors in a 
 principal-agent  relationship. This relationship poses many problems, since the 
agent faces  incentives to slack off or to act autonomously and in unintended ways 
(Hawkins et al. 2006, 9–11).10 Studies employing the principal-agent approach 
commonly analyze how the design of control mechanisms such as appointment 
procedures, budgetary control, and hearings allows the member states (the prin-
cipals) to keep the international organization (the agent) in check (McCubbins 
and Schwartz 1984).11
A dynamic perspective points to an additional but potentially more severe 
agency problem that arises when this relationship is placed in a context where 
the principal’s preferences are mutable. In this case, states need not be concerned 
about the agent overstepping its discretion. On the contrary, situations may 
 suddenly arise where an agent needs to be prevented from doing exactly what it is 
supposed to do when its action otherwise provoke forces that threaten to disrupt 
cooperation or, conversely, when the agents needs to be pushed to act in  situations 
that are not covered by its mandate. In all these situations, informal governance 
allows states to control their agent beyond what is officially possible. In the EU, it 
allows the member states to prevent otherwise autonomous supranational agents 
from imposing excessive domestic adjustment costs on one another.
How to Identify Informal Governance
If formal rules are an inaccurate description of the real game that actors play, 
how can we identify the actual rules? How can we evaluate the proposition that 
the EU’s legislative process is governed by a mix of formal rules and an informal 
norm of discretion when informal institutional elements are by definition dif-
ficult to observe?
Because informal elements cannot be directly observed, existing studies on 
this subject suffer from a potential “selection bias” (King, Keohane, and Verba 
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1994, 129). If we do not know how to identify informal rules, we cannot know 
whether a study considers all or merely a small and perhaps biased subset of 
informal institutional elements. This is a methodological, not a definitional 
problem. Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier (2007, 242n1), for example, define 
informal rules broadly as rules that are not subject to third-party dispute resolu-
tion. Thomas Christiansen and Simona Piattoni (2003, 7) specify informal gov-
ernance as networks in which voluntary exchange is governed by unwritten rules. 
Although both projects demonstrate the pervasiveness of informal practices in 
the EU, they are less useful than they might be because they leave open how 
informal institutional elements can be identified empirically.
To avoid this potential selection bias, this book bases its analysis on the 
game-theoretic notion of institutions as equilibria. The principal advantage 
of this approach is that it allows scholars to trace an institution where all its 
 elements, formal or informal, become visible, namely at the level of behavior 
(Greif 2006, 358).
Equilibrium is a situation in which no actor would want to change her  behavior 
in interaction with others. In game-theoretic parlance, actors have no incentive 
to deviate unilaterally from their strategy. For instance, in a country where every-
one drives on the left-hand side of the road, no (rational) driver would single-
handedly deviate from this practice. Institutions can be part of these situations: 
they are in equilibrium when following the rules is each actor’s best response to 
other actors’ rule-following behavior. Given what everybody else is doing, no one 
is better off violating the rules.12 Thus, regular behavior, or practices, allows us 
to make inferences about the institution that induces it. The focus on practices 
consequently enables us to avoid the aforementioned selection bias by mapping 
the entire universe of practices in the EU, including those that might contradict 
our theory.
For this purpose, the first section of the book (chapters 2 through 5) constructs 
a stylized model of the EU’s legislative procedure as it is set forth in the Treaty of 
Rome and subsequent treaty revisions, adds plausible assumptions about actors’ 
preferences and information, and then deduces the practices that the codified 
legislative procedure can be expected to generate in a stable environment. These 
rule-following practices are referred to as formal governance. Informal governance 
is then defined as systematic collective practices that differ from this standard.
An overview of all practices of formal governance and informal governance 
within the EU is only the first step to proving the existence of the institutional 
elements that induce them. The reason is that multiple equilibria and, thus, 
 multiple institutions, rules, and practices can in principle be sustained under a 
“long shadow of the future.” Driving on the left is just as much an equilibrium 
as driving on the right. If it is possible that one and the same situation results 
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in  different equilibria, each of which is associated with different observable 
 practices, then it is potentially possible that every practice we observe is in fact 
the result of a different equilibrium other than the one espoused by the theory 
(Greif 2006, 355–56).13 This implies that there are, in theory, potential alternative 
explanations for each and every practice of informal governance that we observe.
To deal with the problem that there are potential alternative explanations 
for the identified informal governance practices other than the informal norm 
of discretion, it is, as a next step, necessary to multiply our theory’s observable 
implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 223–28). Even though differ-
ent theories might account for one and the same observable practice, it is less 
likely that more than one theory explains precisely the same set of observations. 
 Chapter 1 therefore specifies states’ interests in devising an informal norm of 
discretion, and argues that this norm is associated with two visible practices. The 
first section of this book, chapters 2 through 5, evaluates the first hypothesis that 
the informal norm manifests itself in practices of informal governance in issue 
areas where political uncertainty is high, whereas formal governance prevails in 
areas of relatively low political uncertainty. However, the norm is prone to abuse 
insofar as governments might demand accommodation in order to avert strong 
domestic pressure when, in reality, they are perfectly able to manage this domes-
tic conflict. The second section of this book, chapters 6 through 8, evaluates the 
second hypothesis that, in response to this problem of moral hazard, govern-
ments delegate the authority to adjudicate on ambiguous demands for added 
discretion to a trustworthy EU member government.
Fortunately, the theorem about multiple equilibria also facilitates the analysis. 
When one and the same situation may result in entirely different institutional 
equilibria, it follows that all institutions that exist must be to some extent his-
torically contingent and particular to the specific context in which they emerged 
(Greif 2006, 353). In other words, all institutions are always to a certain degree 
unique. This makes it possible to exclude a few alternative explanations by speci-
fying the theory’s implications for the particular empirical context to which it is 
applied. For example, the EU’s legislative process is based on an original set of rules 
that cannot be found in any other international organization or domestic politi-
cal system. Thus, chapters 2 through 5 specify the first hypothesis about informal 
governance for the context of the EU’s legislative procedure. The chapters define 
and trace six distinct practices of informal governance that arise in parallel to 
the EU’s peculiar rules on agenda setting, voting, and implementation. Similarly, 
chapters 6 through 8 specify the second hypothesis about  adjudication for the 
EU’s specific context. They argue that although the economic literature proposes 
a variety of institutional solutions to the problem of moral hazard, some of them 
are simply impracticable in the EU. The EU member states therefore adapted an 
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existing formal institution, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
(the Council presidency), so it could wield adjudicatory authority.
Summing up, the fact that informal institutional elements are not directly 
observable need not prevent us from evaluating our theory empirically. For this 
purpose, the empirical analysis rests on the game-theoretic notion of institutions 
as equilibria that allow us to trace institutions, formal or informal, indirectly 
through the observable, regular practices they generate. The principal advan-
tage of this analytical decision is that it avoids the potential selection bias that 
plagues existing studies that focus on a mere subset of informal rules, because 
approaching institutions analytically as equilibria allows for the mapping of the 
entire universe of formal and informal governance within the EU. Although this 
approach brings about new obstacles, the book seeks to meet them through the 
multiplication of testable implications, the specification of these implications 
within the institutional context of the EU, and their evaluation in light of alter-
native explanations.
Data on Informal Governance
A set of competing hypotheses tested with an unbiased set of observations is only 
as convincing as the data used for this purpose. Finding reliable data, however, is 
particularly challenging in the case of informal governance. First,  collective depar-
tures from formal rules often remain undocumented, since there are few stan-
dards for coding and collecting this information. A good example is the plethora 
of government expert committees that assist the official institutions in the prepa-
ration, negotiation, and implementation of legal acts. Despite several attempts to 
systematize and record these committees, their number, function, and working 
methods still remain obscure. Second, some important cases of interest receive 
little media attention because informal governance effectively depoliticizes deci-
sion making that would otherwise generate strong conflict and media interest at 
the domestic level. As a result, negotiation of individual legal acts—like the wine 
market directive—can only be documented in cases where governments fail to 
extinguish the spark of a conflict and put out the fire at a later point.
The scarcity of primary data means we also need to be careful in the use of sec-
ondary analyses. The lack of secondary studies about certain practices cannot be 
interpreted as the absence of informal governance. Some practices might simply 
be too uncontroversial or obscure to attract scholarly attention. More impor-
tant, especially in politically contested and emotionally charged issues such as 
European integration, the scarcity of primary data can lead to the creation and 
reification of myths in secondary analyses (Lustick 1996, 605).
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To cope with the problems of scarce and unreliable data, the book draws, 
where possible, on newly collected archival material, which in the EU is available 
after a blocking period of thirty years.14 Particularly useful in this regard are the 
Council of Ministers’ internal reviews of their own working methods, in which 
government representatives and Council officials identify and discuss their prac-
tices in light of possible alternatives.
In order to increase the intersubjective validity of these data, the strongest 
primary source is identified and its content cross-checked with other sources 
from actors with other viewpoints. For example, reports about informal practices 
by a Council official are considered more reliable when confirmed by similar 
statements of Commission officials. Contemporary public lectures, memoirs, 
and commentaries from politicians and officials are treated with a grain of salt, 
because they might underplay or exaggerate the presence of informal governance 
to prove a political point. The adequacy of the data and the uncertainty involved 
with using them are reported throughout the analysis.
Scope of the Analysis: What Is Left Out
A few caveats are in order about what the book will and can cover. Although the 
theory claims broad applicability, a more general test of its validity in other inter-
national organizations is far beyond the scope of this book. Apart from the fact 
that empirical testing is a laborious task, a cross-organizational analysis is com-
plicated by the fact that inferences vary with the formal institutional framework 
under study. The conclusion to this book addresses the issue of generalizability in 
more detail, arguing that an informal norm of discretion should occur in other 
international organizations, especially when these institutions are highly legalized, 
beneficial, and governments are vulnerable to varying domestic pressure. The con-
clusion also takes up the question of how informal governance relates to power.
Within the European Union, the focus of this book is confined to the  making 
of EU laws within its rigid legislative procedure. It deliberately neglects law 
enforcement through the European Court of Justice and domestic courts. A critic 
might argue that this focus exaggerates the significance of informal governance, 
since the extraordinary strength of the EU’s legal system renders noncompliance 
almost impossible. It is true, as discussed in chapter 2, that the European Court 
of Justice has the opportunities, means, and motives to act to a large degree inde-
pendently from the member states (Weiler 1991). Admittedly, a closer look at the 
enforcement stage could have provided greater insights into the EU’s substantive 
impact on the domestic level. Yet its neglect does not bias my conclusions con-
cerning the existence of an informal norm of discretion.
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The EU’s legal system is, just like the EU as a whole, based on a delicate 
 consensus among governments about its extraordinary usefulness. A defiance 
of the European Court of Justice by a member state or a national court would, 
therefore, have disastrous consequences in that it would cast doubts about the 
system’s effectiveness.15 Knowing that an effective system is more useful to them 
than an ineffective one, the member states have added incentives to nip acts of 
noncompliance in the bud. If anything, the effectiveness of the EU’s legal sys-
tem, therefore, implies that it is even more necessary to exercise flexibility at 
the stage of lawmaking in order to prevent states from withholding compliance 
at a later stage. The transposition rate of EU laws into national law, which lies 
at a  remarkably high 99 percent, further testifies to the fact that there is some-
thing about the legal acts that makes it so easy for the member states to comply 
with them.
The book also excludes a few EU policies from the analysis. As Giandomenico 
Majone (1994) argued so brilliantly, the EU’s defining characteristic is its focus on 
the definition of regulations for its single market. Accordingly, the book primar-
ily deals with so-called regulatory policies, which grew out of the former Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) and deal directly with economic integration. 
These policies include, for example, the realization of the “four freedoms” (the 
free circulation of goods, capital, services, and labor), the common commercial 
policy, parts of the common agricultural policy,16 as well as “flanking policies” 
regarding competition, the environment, consumer protection, and so forth.
Excluded from the analysis, therefore, are the budgetary process, Justice and 
Home Affairs, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the latter two of 
which in the early 1990s emerged in parallel to the regulatory policies and outside 
their legal framework. A pragmatic reason for the exclusion is that these poli-
cies are governed by a different set of formal rules and the analysis would have 
required an entirely different research design. This does not introduce bias, since 
the theory may not apply to these policies to begin with. As mentioned before, 
political uncertainty describes situations where the concentration, timing, and 
extent of domestic adjustment costs cannot be predicted in their entirety. This 
uncertainty gives rise to the informal norm of discretion, which results in infor-
mal governance practices. The book shows how informal governance occurs 
when there is high political uncertainty, and how it recedes in the background 
when other variables reduce the amount of political uncertainty. In matters of 
foreign policy and security, however, domestic preferences are more stable and 
predictable than those in the economic realm, which is why the rules governing 
these policies are, by and large, less rigid and therefore less capable of imposing 
decisions that potentially stir up the domestic conflict.17 To be sure, this does 
not imply that these excluded policies are expected to feature formal instead of 
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informal governance. It means that the theory does not apply in these issue areas 
and, therefore, makes no predictions to that effect.
Also, the EU’s monetary policy, the so-called Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), had to be left out, because its relative novelty makes it impossible to col-
lect archival data about informal practices that would permit an adequate test 
of the theory. This is unfortunate, because monetary policy is a prime example 
of the dilemma between rigidity and stability. In normal times, rigid rules about 
monetary policy are superior to broad discretion, because they prevent the infla-
tionary bias that arises when markets expect governments to abuse their discre-
tion to have a  monetary stimulus increase output and employment beyond the 
natural level (Kydland and Prescott 1977). In times of crisis, however, it may 
suddenly be necessary to depart from rigid, official commitments in order to 
stabilize the economy (Lohmann 1992). Unfortunately, the crisis has arrived in 
recent years in the EU in the form of housing bubbles and unsustainable sov-
ereign debt. It is cold comfort that this policy will therefore become a fruitful 
ground for future research on informal governance.
Themes and Organization of the Book
The book is written so that both experts as well as people without previous 
knowledge about the EU can read it. The glossary provides definitions for EU-
specific vocabulary. Chapter 1 develops the theory of informal governance in 
a genera lizable manner and distinguishes it from rival theories. It predicts the 
use of informal governance on the one hand, and adjudicatory authority on 
the other.
These two hypotheses are considered separately. Chapters 2 to 5 focus on 
the claim that an informal norm of discretion manifests itself in practices of 
informal governance, and that these practices vary systematically with the 
extent of political uncertainty over time and across issue areas. For that pur-
pose, chapter 2 introduces the reader to the EU’s official legislative procedure 
and describes how, in this context, one can discriminate between practices of 
formal and informal governance. Against this background, it specifies the first 
hypothesis about informal governance by developing six further testable impli-
cations about the presentation of formal and informal governance in the con-
text of this legislative procedure.
The subsequent three chapters trace these implications for agenda setting 
(chapter 3), voting (chapter 4) and implementation (chapter 5) in EU decision 
making in four time periods from 1958 until today. The result is what might 
be called a large-N qualitative analysis of more than fifty observations, each of 
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which is a mini case study about a specific practice of informal governance. For 
example, the mini case study on voting behavior from 1958 until 1970 constitutes 
a single observation. This large-N qualitative approach, though time consuming, 
has a major advantage compared to either quantitative analyses or qualitative 
single case studies. Instead of showing mere correlation, it allows us to focus on 
the operation of the causal mechanism and consider the context and idiosyncra-
sies of the case, while still accounting for the big picture of general trends in the 
full range of cases (Fortna 2004, 54–56). The analysis reveals that, in line with the 
theory’s expectations, informal governance emerged almost immediately after 
the inception of the Community in all three stages of the legislative  procedure, 
varied largely with the level of political uncertainty across policy areas, and 
remained remarkably stable thereafter.
Chapters 6 to 8 trace the second hypothesis that the member states delegate 
the authority to adjudicate on ambiguous demands for informal governance to 
a trustworthy government. The beginning of chapter 6 specifies this hypothesis 
again for the specific context of the EU, arguing that the government holding the 
office of the president of the EU’s Council of Ministers is, under certain circum-
stances, able to wield adjudicatory authority.
The two subsequent chapters trace the testable implications of this argu-
ment. Chapter 7 demonstrates that the presidency assumed its adjudicatory 
authority in close parallel to the emergence of other practices of informal 
governance. Chapter 8 shows how the presidency allows the member states to 
discriminate in practice between legitimate and exaggerated demands for flex-
ibility. It does so by taking a closer look at the negotiations of the controversial 
Working Time Directive, which was marked by ambiguous claims on the part 
of the British government that it faced unmanageable domestic recalcitrance 
against this law.
The conclusion to this book summarizes the findings and discusses their impli-
cations for the fields of EU studies and international organization. It also explores 
how the argument that informal governance makes the EU more responsive to 
varying societal interests sheds new light on normative debates about the EU’s 
democratic deficit, which typically regard the EU as far removed from citizen 





Institutions serve a purpose for their members. To withhold 
 compliance, thus to weaken them, means losing something valuable. 
Members have an incentive to care about institutional preservation 
and, as a result, institutions have force.
—Peter Gourevitch
Why do governments carefully design formal rules, and then jointly act in ways 
that seemingly contradict the rules’ purpose? What do practices of informal gov-
ernance tell us about why and how international organizations work?
In this chapter I present a theory of informal governance. At its core is the 
argument that uncertainty about future political pressure against cooperation 
generates a demand for what might be called a norm of discretion among govern-
ments. This norm states that governments that face unexpectedly strong domes-
tic pressure for defection ought to be accommodated when their noncompliance 
threatens to diminish the overall value of the institution. The norm antecedes 
formal rules in that it adds flexibility to the formal institutional design when 
member states need to resolve unexpected and potentially disruptive conflicts 
that their cooperation may suddenly generate at the domestic level. It manifests 
itself in practices of informal governance as governments collectively circumvent 
formal rules in order to exercise added discretion.
Because the norm emphasizes what has been called the “liberal” insight in 
International Relations—that for international institutions to be effective, they 
constantly have to be reembedded in the interests and values of the member 
states’ societies—it will henceforth be referred to as Liberal Regime Theory.
This chapter introduces the theory in five steps. The first step explains why 
states choose to cooperate within a formal institutional framework. The second 
discusses why these formal rules may suddenly prove inadequate and require 
added situational discretion. The third explains why this situational flexibil-
ity is provided by means of informal governance, rather than through formal 
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 mechanisms. The fourth discusses how, given that demands for added flexibility 
might be ambiguous, the member states delegate the authority to assess whether 
formal rules or informal governance apply in a specific situation to a trustworthy 
government. The final step considers alternative views and two rival explanations 
for informal governance—power-based institutionalism and classical regime 
theory—and explains how these theories can be tested against each other.
Why States Demand Formal Institutions
In situations of interdependence, where the realization of an actor’s interests 
is dependent on another actor’s behavior, institutions can help ensure that 
actors capture gains from cooperation. A key aspect to understanding how 
institutions operate is uncertainty about the future. If one suspects a cooperat-
ing partner will renege on the promise to reciprocate in the mutual adjustment 
of policies, cooperation becomes untenable even when keeping your promise 
today promises great payoffs tomorrow and even more the day after or, in Robert 
Axelrod’s terminology, when cooperation takes place under “a long shadow of 
the future” (Weingast 2002, 672; Axelrod 1984).
This problem is particularly acute if we allow for state preferences chang-
ing over time. Following public choice theory, domestic political support 
determines the welfare of incumbent politicians. Governments consequently 
choose the policy that maximizes their political support measured as the 
weighted sum of electoral support for welfare gains (e.g., lower consumer 
prices in response to economic liberalization) and rents from interest groups 
in exchange for protection from change (e.g., protection from more competi-
tive foreign imports) (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 836). Rents in that con-
text are resources spent in order to increase one’s share of existing wealth, 
instead of using these resources to create wealth, and they can range from 
illegal bribes, campaign contributions, to public endorsements of incumbents 
or other forms of political support.
The politicians’ opportunism subjects a government to constant pressure from 
various social groups to pursue the policy that most closely matches their diverse 
interests. The strength and composition of this pressure depends on a variety of 
factors that affect actors’ economic opportunities, the politics of their collective 
action, and the responsiveness of political institutions to special interests. In any 
case, its result is time-inconsistent preferences as governments respond to changes 
in public demands for economic integration or special interests’ demands for 
protection from market forces. The fact that governments know that each of 
them is tempted to give in to varying societal demands renders their pledges to 
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cooperate with one another dubious. Cooperation becomes untenable and all 
governments consequently end up worse off.
For governments to reap joint welfare gains under conditions of time- 
inconsistent preferences, they need to bolster the credibility of their  commitments. 
In other words, for a government to begin making adjustments to cooperation, 
it needs reassurance that their cooperating partners will stick to their part of 
the bargain too. They do this by means of formal institutional rules that reduce 
uncertainty about one another’s future behavior. Precise rules that specify con-
duct in contingent situations enable states to discriminate more clearly between 
what constitutes cooperative behavior and what can be considered a violation of 
the agreement. These rules lend credence to commitments to cooperate, because 
they enable the monitoring of compliance and the punishment of defection 
(Abbott et al. 2000, 412–15). Rules that delegate authority to international orga-
nizations to make and enforce common policies enhance the credibility of com-
mitments as well. They insulate decision makers from domestic ad hoc pressure 
(Hawkins et al. 2006, 18–19), and they limit the range of policy instruments 
available to governments to renege on cooperation.1 The codification of these 
rules signals this commitment widely beyond the circle of cooperating govern-
ments to markets and third states, which allows these actors to plan ahead and 
allocate resources more efficiently.2
Both types of formal rules—those that specify conduct and those that dele-
gate authority to international organizations—align otherwise time-inconsistent 
preference ex ante in favor of cooperation. Crucially, common knowledge about 
the rules’ effects allows all states to form stable expectations about one anoth-
er’s future behavior and, thus, to engage in cooperation at the outset. Because it 
removes governments’ temptations to defy the rules unilaterally, the institution 
can be said to be in equilibrium.
Why States Demand Flexibility
Lacking a monopoly of violence, international institutions have to be self-
enforcing to be sustainable. An institution’s effect therefore has to be such as 
to constantly reproduce states’ interests in adhering to it. Yet exactly because 
governments are unable to predict what societal groups will want and lobby 
for in the future, which gives rise to a demand for formal commitment, they 
are also unable to predict how precisely their institution will affect the future 
patterns of their societal interdependence.3 As Ken Shepsle (1989, 141) puts 
it, “What can be anticipated in advance is that there will be unforeseen con-
tingencies.” This gives reason to doubt that international institutions have a 
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lasting, independent effect on state behavior. Once they are set up, institutions 
experience changes in their environment that may suddenly alter their effect 
on the costs and benefits of international cooperation both among and within 
countries. The reasons for this environmental change are manifold, complex 
and not predictable in their entirety. They range from technological innova-
tion, shifts in consumer preferences and other shocks to supply and demand, 
to broader changes in political institutions. Therefore, once an institution has 
begun operation, situations inevitably arise in which a strict adherence to the 
formal rules, even if beneficial for the society as a whole, generates a distribu-
tional shock in which a segment of society bears much of a country’s costs of 
adjusting to cooperation.
In situations like these, where a domestic group suddenly shoulders the 
concentrated adjustment costs of economic integration, formal rules fail to 
 reproduce states’ interest in adhering to them. The reason lies in the politics of 
collective action. Groups who incur concentrated losses have political advantages 
over larger groups with diffuse benefits—like the general public—since the mar-
ginal gains from collective action are much higher for members of small groups 
than for members of large ones (Olson 1965, chaps. 1 and 6). A domestic group 
that suddenly faces concentrated costs from cooperation therefore unexpectedly 
overcomes initial barriers to mobilization.
Now, recall that governments are expected to adopt policies that maximize 
their domestic political support. When groups unexpectedly mobilize to voice 
their interests in the political arena, they are increasingly able to affect their 
government’s policy toward delaying, obstructing, or even openly withholding 
compliance with international law or the decisions of international organiza-
tions.4 This problem is henceforth referred to as political uncertainty (Downs 
and Rocke 1995, 130; Rosendorff and Milner 2001, 831; Howse and Teitel 
2010, 132–33).5
Crucially, political uncertainty is problematic not just because the sudden 
defiance of a formal commitment means that the defiant government and its 
cooperating partner forego the potential gains of cooperation.6 More impor-
tant than that, an unexpected noncompliance with the formal rules is costly 
for all member states, because unauthorized defection creates doubts about the 
credibility of states’ commitment to cooperation. As established above, it is the 
 credibility of one another’s commitment to cooperation that motivates govern-
ments to make adjustments to cooperation to begin with. Unauthorized defec-
tion consequently sets off a process that all governments would rather avoid: 
the credibility of mutual commitments sustains damage, the stability of states’ 
expectations about one another’s future behavior crumbles, and mutually ben-
eficial cooperation unravels. The institution is no longer in equilibrium, since 
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governments are increasingly motivated unilaterally to defy the rules. It is worth 
citing the chapter-opening quote by Peter Gourevitch on this topic at length:
The power of an institution arises not just, or even principally, from 
its capacity to use physical force. Rather, it emerges from the benefits 
members derive from participation in them. Institutions do things 
for members that they cannot obtain without them. Members acquire 
incentives to preserve institutions. The test of the power of an institu-
tion is thus its utility, not its coercive force. Institutions serve a pur-
pose for their members. To withhold compliance, thus to weaken them, 
means losing something valuable. Members have an incentive to care 
about institutional preservation and, as a result, institutions have force. 
(Gourevitch 1999, 138)
Put differently, because unauthorized defection, be it in the form of delay, 
obstruction, or outright noncompliance, damages the general value of the insti-
tution, all governments have an incentive to prevent it. If all of them attach high 
value to the international institution, they prefer to add situational flexibility to 
the formal rules in order to prevent or resolve situations in which governments 
are tempted to defy an agreement even in the face of punitive sanction. This flex-
ibility allows them to uphold a highly beneficial level of cooperation that they 
would otherwise not be able to sustain.
Why Flexibility Remains Informal
Why would governments refrain from codifying the use of flexibility in these 
situations? Some institutions do officially authorize departures from formal rules 
in the event of unforeseen developments. For example, Article XIX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) authorizes temporary protection when 
“as a result of unforeseen developments” a sudden surge in imports causes or 
threatens “serious injury to domestic producers.” Also, the EU treaties contain a 
number of derogations on grounds of public morality, public order and safety, 
and the like (e.g., Article 36, Treaty of Lisbon).
However, none of these formal measures captures the situations that consti-
tute the aforementioned threat to the institution’s balance. Such a threat arises 
not because public goods are in jeopardy, per se, or because domestic groups 
require temporary protection from exogenous shocks.7 It is rooted in political 
factors that are endogenous to the domestic situation (Pelc 2009, 354). Thus, the 
same import surge can prompt unmanageable political pressure in one country, 
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while in another country domestic producers adjust to it smoothly. Damage to 
the institution is imminent—and flexibility, therefore, is pertinent—only in the 
first scenario.
In short, flexibility is necessary not on grounds of economic efficiency, or 
equity, or because a public good is considered worth protecting. States find it 
necessary to provide flexibility when the imminent damage to the value of the 
international institution is considered more severe than the collective bending of 
rules for political reasons.
The political roots of political uncertainty explain why governments refrain 
from codifying the provision of flexibility in these situations. Putting into writ-
ing mechanisms that allow for the provision of flexibility for domestic political 
reasons quite simply contradicts the purpose of the institution’s formal rules and, 
more generally, of the rule of law itself.
Although legal rules may be interpreted broadly and according to a number of 
different legal principles, the rule of law does require that these legal principles be 
applied consistently. Accordingly, the rule of law reaches its limits when it comes 
to the demand for flexibility for domestic political reasons, which are so mani-
fold and peculiar to the domestic situation so that no single legal norm could 
ever capture them.8 Similarly, supranational actors that are pledged to the rule 
of law cannot use their room for maneuver for concessions to governments that 
are tempted to defy the law for mere domestic political reasons. Even if they had 
broad discretion, they are required to use it in a consistent manner. The informal 
norm of discretion, however, allows for a variable, political interpretation of for-
mal rules’ applicability.
Moreover, the codification of reasons and situations that justify the suspen-
sion of the formal rules might generate the behavior that the formal rules are 
supposed to prevent in the first place. More so than informal norms, codified 
rules convey to private actors that they will receive protection in the event that 
they demand it loudly enough. These actors can consequently be expected to 
mobilize in anticipation of receiving concessions where they would otherwise 
have adjusted to cooperation (Goldstein and Martin 2000, 622; Kohler and 
Moore 2001, 53; Pelc 2010, 636; Sykes 1991, 259).9
If formal flexibility mechanisms are inadequate to deal with the problem of 
political uncertainty, is it possible to provide flexibility tacitly? Let’s assume that 
the conditions that prompt domestic pressure are perfectly obvious to all coop-
erating actors. In this situation, as discussed above, all governments prefer to 
prevent a cooperating partner from caving in to unmanageable pressure, even 
without an explicit quid pro quo, because its unauthorized defection damages 
the overall value of their institution. Thus, governments have an incentive to 
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provide flexibility without being legally obliged to do so, because it serves to 
 sustain a level of highly beneficial economic integration that would otherwise 
prove impossible to uphold (Bagwell and Staiger 1990).10
There are a variety of ways to prevent or mitigate a distributional shock that 
would prompt domestic pressure (Pelc 2011). For example, governments can diffuse 
adjustment costs that are concentrated on a small group over a larger group (e.g., 
through compensation), they can diffuse it over time (e.g., by phasing in regulation), 
or they can delay the occurrence of adjustment costs until they are less politically 
susceptible to domestic pressure (e.g., until after an election). At any rate, the provi-
sion of these various kinds of flexibility will manifest itself in practices of informal 
governance as governments collectively depart from the formal rules in order to 
accommodate cooperating partners under strong domestic political pressure.
How Governments Sustain the Norm of Discretion
In reality, the conditions that demand flexibility may not be entirely unequiv-
ocal. Emerging under conditions of political uncertainty, the norm of discre-
tion is necessarily vague and requires a great deal of judgment to be operational 
(Obstfeld 1997). Informality adds ambiguity, since uncodified agreements are 
more open to misconceptions and reinterpretation than their codified counter-
parts (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 422). If, moreover, states are not fully informed 
about one another’s domestic situation, they have an incentive to exaggerate 
the need for informal governance when it benefits them. This causes a classic 
problem of moral hazard, in that the norm’s vagueness and the lack of infor-
mation might tempt governments to demand flexibility when they are, in fact, 
perfectly able to keep their commitment.
Consider the example of fire insurance: the outbreak of a fire may be largely 
uncontrollable, but the probability is somewhat influenced by carelessness and, 
obviously, arson. If the cause of a fire is difficult to observe, complete cover-
age then induces the insured to behave more carelessly or, in the extreme case, 
to set fire to a house in order to receive the insurance sum (Arrow 1963, 961). 
Similarly, without information about a government’s actual temptation to cave 
in to domestic pressure, governments face an incentive to exploit the norm of 
discretion by demanding flexibility merely to reap political support at home at 
the expense of their cooperating partners.
If the informal norm of discretion is prone to abuse, the provision of flex-
ibility through informal governance might, in fact, undermine cooperation. 
Recall that it is the purpose of formal rules to enhance the credibility of com-
mitments and, thus, to stabilize states’ expectations about one another’s future 
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cooperative behavior. Collective departures from formal rules under  ambiguous 
 circumstances undermine this very purpose. Doubts about the justification for 
the use of informal governance in a specific case nurse more general doubts 
about the credibility of states’ commitments to cooperation that gradually erode 
the stability of their expectations. To resolve this tension between the formal 
rules’ credibility and informal flexibility, governments need to find a way to dis-
criminate between false and legitimate demands for informal governance.
The economic literature suggests two solutions to this problem of moral 
hazard: incomplete coverage and observation (Shavell 1979). The idea behind 
incomplete coverage is to make the insured bear a proportion of the costs of the 
loss in order to prevent abuse of the policy. Medical patients, therefore, are often 
required to contribute to the treatment of conditions that are partly caused by 
an unhealthy lifestyle.
The same rationale lies behind suggestions regarding the optimal design of 
legal escape clauses. George Downs and Peter Rocke (1995, 77), for example, 
propose to establish sanctions for noncompliance that are “low enough to allow 
politicians to break the agreement when interest group benefits are great,” but 
also “high enough” to commit states to obey the agreement most of the time.11 
However, this solution seems infeasible for our purposes. By definition, political 
uncertainty lies beyond what states can know at the time of institutional cre-
ation. A preset penalty or level of sanction that, similar to incomplete coverage, 
is designed to prevent an abuse of the norm will necessarily prove inadequate.
The second solution, observation, seems more promising. The idea here is 
to collect situational information in order to discriminate between false and 
legitimate insurance claims. In the case of car insurance, for instance, insur-
ance  companies often send experts on-site in order to investigate the cause of an 
accident. Similarly, Peter Rosendorff (2005, 391) suggests that the World Trade 
Organization’s legal tribunal, the Appellate Body, performs precisely this infor-
mation-providing role when it assesses the legitimacy of a country’s use of the 
GATT escape clause.12
Though appropriate in the particular case of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO),13 this legal solution for the problem of moral hazard is once again inad-
equate for our purposes. Recall that the norm of discretion applies where the rule 
of law reaches its limits, because it allows for the interpretation of rules accord-
ing to political rather than legal standards. In other words, governments need 
to know whether an imminent damage to the institution justifies the accom-
modation of a government that is prone to defect for domestic political reasons. 
Institutional actors, like legal bodies that derive their authority from their pledge 
to enforce the rule of law, would jeopardize their reputation by recommending 
the use of informal governance.
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To sustain the norm of discretion, therefore, governments require a political 
equivalent to the WTO’s Appellate Body to adjudicate on ambiguous demands 
for flexibility. Its judgment then has to be based on situational information about 
a particular government’s actual temptation to cave in to domestic pressure. By 
rendering informative judgments about the actual demand for informal gover-
nance, such a body enables states to depart from the formal rules without under-
mining the credibility of the commitment that these rules embody. As a result, 
formal rules and the informal norm of discretion may complement one another 
to sustain a level of  economic integration that neither formal rules nor the infor-
mal norm alone permit.14
Testable Implications
So far, we have argued that political uncertainty generates a demand for an 
informal norm of discretion to add flexibility to the formal rules—a flexibil-
ity that serves to resolve potentially disruptive conflicts that cooperation may 
suddenly generate at the domestic level. Although this norm is invisible by 
nature, it generates two aspects that can be observed. First, the norm mani-
fests itself in practices of informal governance as governments collectively 
depart from the formal rules in order to accommodate a government that faces 
unmanageable domestic pressure. Second, to prevent moral hazard, govern-
ments delegate the authority to adjudicate on demands for informal gover-
nance to a trustworthy political actor. We can specify these implications and 
evaluate them in light of rival explanations.
Variation in Informal Governance
If political uncertainty generates a demand for a norm of discretion that manifests 
itself in practices of informal governance, then these practices will vary system-
atically with the extent of political uncertainty over time and across issue areas. 
Thus, governments can be expected to adopt practices of informal governance 
where political uncertainty is high and, conversely, to follow formal rules more 
frequently where political uncertainty is low. But under what circumstances is 
political uncertainty high, and where is it low?
Political uncertainty is not very tractable for two reasons. The first is that 
when institutions are designed to reduce uncertainty, uncertainty does not 
 materialize in any other way except through the institution itself.15 This opens 
the door wide for the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, which is to explain the 
emergence of an institution on the basis of its function, when it actually emerged 
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for entirely adventitious reasons. The other reason is particular to the problem 
at hand. Political uncertainty lies by definition beyond what governments know 
at the time of institutional creation, which means that it is generally difficult to 
develop an exact measure of political uncertainty.
Since it is impossible to measure political uncertainty directly, we need to find 
a proxy for this variable that allows the theory to be subjected to a proper test.16 In 
our case, a proxy for political uncertainty is available in the form of welfare provi-
sions. Recall that the threat to the commitment occurs when a group experiences 
unexpected adjustment costs, because these costs induce the group to overcome 
initial barriers to mobilization and pressure its government for protection. Politi-
cal uncertainty, therefore, depends also on the determinants of collective action.
As mentioned above, the literature on collective action emphasizes that small 
groups are more likely to mobilize than large groups, since a member’s mar-
ginal utility of mobilization is much higher in the former than in the latter case 
(Olson 1965). Concentrated adjustment costs are therefore more likely to gen-
erate domestic recalcitrance than diffuse costs borne by the society as a whole. 
Welfare provisions, however, comprise publicly funded social insurance such as 
health or unemployment insurance that disperse unforeseen costs incurred by 
individuals (e.g., in the event of unemployment, ill health) over a larger group 
of people (e.g., the taxpayers). It follows that their presence reduces a group’s 
propensity to mobilize in the event of a distributional shock by lowering group 
members’ marginal utility of collective action.17 Welfare provisions may be used 
as a proxy for political uncertainty because even though their existence affects 
the level of political uncertainty across countries or issue areas, they them-
selves vary largely independently of this variable.18 All else being equal, political 
uncertainty and, therefore, the demand for the norm of discretion is conse-
quently relatively lower in the presence of welfare provisions than where welfare 
provisions are absent. Informal governance will vary accordingly.
The way in which welfare provisions affect the level of political uncertainty 
is depicted in the following figure. Governments formulate their policy as a 
weighted sum of electoral support for welfare gains from liberalization and of 
rents from special interests in return for protection. This equation changes (bot-
tom part of the figure) when a distributional shock upsets the domestic politics 
of collective action at home. As the left-hand side of the figure shows, formal 
rules may then suddenly fail to align governments’ incentives to stick to their 
commitment. The result is a demand for an informal norm of discretion that 
nips situations like this in the bud. The right-hand side shows how welfare provi-
sions buffer the effect of distributional shocks on the politics of collective action 
at home. The politics of collective action at the domestic level and, thus, future 
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Chapter 2 specifies this hypothesis for the empirical context of the EU. 
It argues that political uncertainty must be considered particularly low in 
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, which is deliberately designed to pro-
tect European farmers from unexpected adjustment costs. The design of this 
policy makes it easier to predict the timing and extent of farmers’ pressure 
than it is to predict the pressure of relevant groups in any other sector. The 
demand for the norm of discretion and practices of informal governance vary 
accordingly.
Coping with Moral Hazard
Since the norm of discretion is vague and prone to abuse, states need to find a 
way collectively to discriminate between false and legitimate demands for infor-
mal governance. As explained above, most conventional solutions to this moral 
hazard problem, such as penalties or legal adjudication, are inadequate for our 
purposes. The most promising solution consists of delegating the authority to 
adjudicate on ambiguous demands for informal governance to a trustworthy 
political body.
What kind of political body is required to elicit the kind of information that is 
necessary for governments to discriminate between false and legitimate demands 
for discretion? Obviously, this arrangement does not work when the political 
body consists of governments that demand informal governance (the claimants), 
since their incentive to exaggerate the need for accommodation gives rise to the 
problem of moral hazard in the first place. For the same reason, adjudicatory 
authority cannot lie with governments that stand to gain from the accommoda-
tion of a cooperating partner, since both governments have an incentive to col-
lude. The delay of an unpopular decision or exemptions for certain sectors, for 
example, may reduce the domestic pressure on one government and, at the same 
time, be politically advantageous for other governments as well. In this case, it 
would be difficult for everyone else to trust the judgment of a government that 
stands to gain from delaying a decision.
The authority to adjudicate on ambiguous demands for flexibility, there-
fore, has to lie with a government that does not personally benefit from 
accommodating its cooperating partner. Its judgment can be trusted, because 
the only reason for this government to recommend the use of informal gov-
ernance must be that it seeks to prevent damage to the commitment (Calvert 
1985, 552).19
The point here is not that this government itself collects information 
about the domestic pressure that the claimant is facing. Rather, its adjudica-
tory authority induces other actors with a stake in the outcome to increase the 
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level of  information in order to prevent the adjudicator from rendering a false 
 judgment.20 This arrangement is consequently able to prevent moral hazard and 
sustain both the norm of discretion and the institution at large.
Considering the institutional context of the EU, chapter 6 in this book spells 
out this theory in more detail and argues that the member states adapted the 
existing institution of the EU Council presidency, a position rotating among 
member states on a six-month interval, to enable it to perform this adjudicatory 
function.
Alternative Explanations for Informal Governance
In addition to multiplying the theory’s testable implications and specifying 
them for the institutional context of the EU, the findings can be further cor-
roborated when they are contrasted with the implications of two alternative 
explanations for informal governance. The first alternative explanation says that 
informal governance is the result of powerful states unilaterally escaping from 
their commitment. The second holds that informal governance serves to reduce 
the relative costs of transaction among states. Finally, I will look at three further 
perspectives on informal governance that complement rather than contradict 
these theories.
Power-Based Institutionalism
Randall Stone provides an elegant power-based explanation for practices of infor-
mal governance, which emphasizes that institutional design is mainly a matter of 
balancing power and interests. At its root is the following commitment problem: 
because large states typically have more viable outside options to institutionalized 
cooperation that at a given point they may be tempted to exercise, the argument 
goes, small states offer large states a deal that keeps them on board in the long 
run.21 In exchange for more favorable formal voting rights, small states agree 
to tolerate practices of informal governance through which large states shake 
off institutional constraints when they consider their vital interests jeopardized. 
Small states, in turn, set a cost that will be imposed each time the dominant state 
uses informal governance to override a policy (Stone 2011, 33–34).
What distinguishes the two approaches is an emphasis on different disrup-
tive forces, the relative importance of which varies with the strategic situation. 
In both cases, power is determined by the countries’ asymmetric interdepen-
dence (Keohane and Nye 1977, chap. 1). The power-based approach describes 
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a  situation of asymmetric interdependence, in which a large state is less depen-
dent on the cooperation of small states than the other way around. To sus-
tain cooperation, small states therefore accommodate the large one when this 
state is tempted to pursue its interests outside of the international organization 
(Voeten 2001). The domestic-politics approach adds institutions to the equa-
tion. If the pursuit of one state’s interests depends on other states’ cooperation, 
all states have an incentive to sustain their common institution’s capacity to 
induce compliance with its rules. They consequently accommodate a partner 
whose unauthorized defection threatens to dash beliefs in this effectiveness 
and, as a result, threatens to trigger the erosion of cooperation. In this situation, 
power is the capacity to unsettle stable expectations. Thus, informal gover-
nance should also occur in situations of symmetry, especially if the institution 
is very beneficial for all members, and governments are susceptible to changes 
in domestic pressure.
Chapter 2 discusses how power-based institutionalism applies to the EU’s 
empirical context. This theory expects the small and large member states to 
strike these deals in issue areas that are predictably of high sensitivity to large 
states. The chapter argues, in line with EU historiography, that informal gov-
ernance should occur in the Common Agricultural Policy, which is a policy of 
predictable sensitivity that has caused almost every major crisis in the history of 
European integration. With regard to the second hypothesis about adjudication, 
power-based institutionalism does not expect large states to subject their use of 
informal governance to the judgment of another government holding the EU 
Council presidency.
Classical Regime Theory
From the perspective of classical regime theory, institutions enable cooperation 
by reducing the relative costs of transactions in, for instance, the exchange goods 
and services or—in the political context—support.22 Money, for example, mas-
sively reduces the costs of exchanges that traders would otherwise incur in a 
barter economy.
Institutions become inefficient when exogenous factors alter the transaction 
costs after formal rules have entered into force. In this case, states are expected 
to restore efficiency by adapting the formal rules through additional informal 
institutional elements. All states use these elements because they serve to reduce 
frictions in state interaction that are caused by the use of formal rules.
The main difference between classical regime theory and Liberal Regime The-
ory is that each theory emphasizes different types of cooperation problems, and 
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formal or informal institutions. Although the term “transaction costs” is  arguably 
vague (Gilligan 2009, 61), studies that build on this classical approach typically 
focus on the costs that arise among states at the systemic level. International 
institutions reduce the costs in state interaction through the centralization of, 
for example, dispute resolution or the collection of policy-relevant expertise and 
other types of information (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 771–72). Lib-
eral Regime Theory, in contrast, emphasizes solutions to cooperation problems 
that are rooted in state-society interaction. Rather than centralizing resources, 
informal governance primarily adds flexibility in order to sustain commitments 
to cooperation where governments would otherwise respond to domestic pres-
sure to defy cooperation.
A second difference follows. Since informal governance from the perspective 
of classical regime theory does not suspend commitments, there is no need to 
avert moral hazard by making its use conditional on the payment of a cost or 
on adjudication. Informal institutional elements are effective by virtue of their 
efficiency-enhancing effect.
Applying the theory to the institutional context of the EU, I argue in 
chapter 2, in line with EU historiography, that the transaction costs in state 
interaction increased heavily with a leap in day-to-day legislative activity 
in the late 1960s and the first enlargement of the Community in the early 
1970s. To restore the efficiency of decision making, Jonas Tallberg (2006, 4) 
argues, member states centralized agenda setting and brokerage power in the 
hands of the Council presidency. Since these developments affected all issue 
areas in the same way, classical regime theory predicts a significant variation 
in informal governance over time rather than across issue areas. With regard 
to the second hypothesis, classical regime theory expects governments hold-
ing the presidency to command authority by virtue of its asymmetric con-
trol of procedures and information, and not because other governments 
trust its judgment.
Supranational Autonomy, Experimentation, and
Nonstrategic Interaction
Three further explanations might be adduced to account for the phenomenon 
of informal governance. Historical institutionalism maintains that informal 
governance is an unintended consequence of cooperation that tends to result in 
greater supranational autonomy. Another perspective maintains that informal 
governance reflects constant institutional innovation and experimentation in 
the search for best practices. Finally, sociological and constructivist approaches 
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regard informal norms among governments as the result of socialization and 
deliberation in dense institutional settings. Although these views of informal 
governance as the outcome of supranational autonomy, experimentation, and 
nonstrategic interaction greatly contribute to our understanding of policy mak-
ing in the EU, they often relate to different phenomena and are on closer inspec-
tion largely indeterminate.
Historical institutionalism is an umbrella approach for theories that 
focus on institutional effects that transpire over time (Hall and Taylor 1996, 
938–42; Mahoney and Thelan 2010). Based on the premise that modern soci-
eties are complex and cooperation among them fraught with uncertainty, it 
emphasizes that institutions are bound to have effects that were not intended 
at the time of institutional creation. Furthermore, historical institutionalists 
tend to be skeptical about states’ capacity to respond to these situations. Paul 
Pierson (1996, 135; 2000, 261), for instance, argues that short time horizons, 
distributional conflicts or institutional barriers to reform, among other things, 
make it difficult for governments collectively to reform an institution when it 
would otherwise produce initially undesired consequences.
Students of the EU subsequently used this insight to make sense of various 
unforeseen institutional developments. For example, Karen Alter (1998, 139–40; 
see also Burley and Mattli 1993; Weiler 1991) argues that because judges of the 
European Court of Justice have longer time horizons than EU governments, they 
could formulate bold legal doctrines with significant long-term consequences 
without provoking governments to gang up against them. Simon Hix (2002, 
271) argues that the European Parliament advanced to a genuine co-legislator, 
because it reinterpreted the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht in its favor and threatened 
to block important legislation unless the member states codified this new inter-
pretation.23 In this vein, informal governance arises from reinterpretations of 
formal rules that result in further supranational autonomy. Given that these gaps 
in the member states’ control of supranational actors are unintended and, hence, 
rather difficult to predict, the most coherent implication one might derive from 
this perspective is that there will be no systematic patterns in the occurrence of 
informal governance.
Again on the basis of the premise about the complexity of modern gover-
nance, others emphasize that informal governance reflects the willingness of EU 
bureaucrats and governments to experiment with new procedures and policy 
instruments. Adrienne Héritier (1999) argues that the Commission frequently 
adopts innovative strategies of “subterfuge” in instances where following the for-
mal rules would otherwise result in deadlock. Similarly, Charles Sabel and Jona-
than Zeitlin (2008, 271–78) describe the EU as an experimentalist architecture 
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that is characterized by peer review and deliberation about best practices. The 
constant search for better ways to meet common objectives implies permanent 
institutional revision, which only creates the impression of informalism.
For sociological institutionalists and constructivist scholars, informal gover-
nance reflects the fact that decision makers in the EU transcend a strategic mode of 
interaction. Conceiving of institutions as social environments instead of mere sets of 
rules, sociological institutionalists emphasize that governments often develop and 
follow shared norms and expectations as a result of their socialization into a new 
institutional context (March and Olsen 1998, 947). Jeffrey Lewis (2005, 939–43; see 
also Hurd 1999, 380; Wendt 1999, 44) finds that the dense institutional context of 
the EU’s Council of Ministers led government representatives to internalize group 
norms that have become part of an “expanded  conception of the self.” Informal 
norms such as the reflex to adopt decisions by consensus instead of majority voting 
are not simply grounded in the governments’ strategic calculation. They evolve and 
persist because the actions they suggest are considered appropriate or legitimate.24 
Given that norms evolve in densely institutionalized contexts independently of 
the interests represented across policies, this approach would not expect any issue-
specific systematic variation in patterns of informal governance practices.
Because the three perspectives on informal governance as supranational 
autonomy, experimentation, or nonstrategic interaction rarely specify scope 
conditions and testable propositions, it is often difficult to evaluate them against 
rival theories and generalize from their findings. Where a perspective does make 
a prediction about informal governance patterns, they are at a first glance not 
borne out by evidence. I therefore decided to refrain from a systematic evaluation 
of these three approaches. Nevertheless, each chapter in the empirical analysis of 
this study will report to what extent the observed practices of informal gover-
nance can be considered consistent with any of these alternative views.
Formal institutions are necessary for states to reap gains from cooperation. By 
reducing uncertainty about the credibility of states’ commitments, formal rules 
enable cooperation by allowing states and private actors to form stable expecta-
tions about each other’s future behavior. Yet precisely because we cannot know 
what the future holds, institutions are bound to face situations where formal 
rules fail to reproduce states’ interest in adhering to them. Specifically, following 
the letter of the law, even if it is beneficial for a society as a whole, may generate 
concentrated adjustment costs for a domestic group that induce it to pressure its 
government into defection. Since noncompliance not only generates deadweight 
costs but, more important, undermines the credibility of mutual commitments 
to cooperation, all governments have an incentive to prevent it.
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Uncertainty about future domestic demands for protection consequently 
generates a demand for a norm of discretion, which states that governments 
should accommodate cooperating partners when they are tempted to defy the 
letter of the law. The norm adds situational flexibility to the formal institutional 
design—a flexibility that allows the member states to resolve unexpected and 
potentially disruptive conflicts at the domestic level that a uniform application 
of legal norms may generate. It consequently affords governments the ability to 
permanently align domestic interests in favor of cooperation.
The theory has two implications that can be observed. First, the norm mani-
fests itself in practices of informal governance in parallel to formal rules as gov-
ernments collectively exercise discretion. Second, because the norm is prone to 
abuse by its members, the authority to adjudicate whether informal flexibility is 
pertinent or formal rules apply is delegated to a political body that has no incen-
tive to collude with the claimant. These hypotheses and its rival explanations are 
summarized in the following table. The remainder of this study specifies and 
evaluates them for the empirical context of the EU. 
TABLE 1 Summary of general hypotheses
IMPLICATION
THEORY
LIBERAL REGIME POWER-BASED INSTITUTIONALISM CLASSICAL REGIME
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FORMAL AND  INFORMAL  GOVERNANCE 
IN THE  EUROPEAN UNION
[Tacit understandings] are hard to identify with confidence. By their 
very nature, implicit agreements leave little trace.
—Charles Lipson
Uncertainty about domestic demands for cooperation—political uncertainty—
leads to the emergence of an informal norm of discretion that adds situational 
flexibility to the formal institutional design, to enable governments to resolve 
potentially disruptive conflicts at the domestic level. The purpose of this and 
the following three chapters is to show that, therefore, this informal norm varies 
systematically with the extent of political uncertainty.
Informal institutional elements are, as the chapter-opening quote suggests, 
difficult to identify with confidence. How, then, do we trace the informal norm 
of discretion in the context of the European Union? The previous chapters 
argued that any institutional element, formal or informal, is visible at the level 
of behavior. The informal norm of discretion consequently manifests itself in 
practices informal governance—namely, departures from the kind of behav-
ior we would expect to observe under formal rules. In the context of the EU, 
this implies departures from the behavior we would expect to observe if the 
legislative game were exclusively governed by the treaty rules. The first sec-
tion of this chapter therefore briefly describes the EU’s origins and objectives, 
and identifies three stages of decision making—agenda setting, voting, and 
implementation—as the key elements of its legislative procedure, the so-called 
Community Method.
Drawing on prominent formal analyses of these rules, and using plau-
sible assumptions about the legislative actors’ preferences and information, 
the second section constructs a stylized model of the Community Method 
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in equilibrium. On the basis of this model, it is possible to deduce a set of 
ideal-typical practices of formal governance—namely, practices that actors 
would adopt in agenda  setting, voting, and implementation if the legislative 
game were solely dictated by formal rules. According to our theory, however, 
governments collectively depart from the formal rules in order to exercise 
tacit discretion. Our legislative actors should therefore feature practices of 
informal governance, or collective practices that differ from the standard of 
formal governance.
Given these definitions of what formal and informal governance mean in the 
context of the EU’s Community Method, the third section specifies the predic-
tions of Liberal Regime Theory and its rivals regarding the variation of informal 
governance over time, the variation of informal governance across issue areas, 
and the emergence of conflicts among the legislative actors. This set of compet-
ing predictions sets the stage for the empirical analysis in the following three 
chapters, which contrast the previously defined practices of formal governance in 
agenda setting (chapter 3), voting (chapter 4), and implementation (chapter 5) to 
the practices we observe in reality.
The Origins and Objectives of the 
Community Method
The roots of today’s twenty-eight member-state European Union lie in the 
European Economic Community, which France, Germany, Italy, and the Ben-
elux countries established with the 1957 Treaty of Rome.1 At its core was the 
objective of establishing a common market that consisted of policies governing 
agriculture, transport, and competition, and the free circulation of goods, capital, 
services, and labor (the “four freedoms”).
The commitment was taken a step further with the 1987 Single European 
Act, which amended the Treaty of Rome with a pledge by the now twelve mem-
ber states to establish a single market, an area in which the free circulation of 
the four factors of production would be as easy among the member states as 
within them.2
The EU’s expansion to other policy areas notwithstanding, the pursuit of deep 
market integration has always been the EU’s core objective. Its implementation 
promised to subject governments to ad hoc societal pressures for and against the 
project, because it required the removal (by means of elimination or harmoniza-
tion) of deeply entrenched nontariff trade impediments, such as incompatible 
domestic regulations, subsidies, and taxes.
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Since the Treaty of Rome and all subsequent treaties amending this treaty 
remained imprecise about how to achieve the objective of deep economic inte-
gration, its realization necessitated a series of future individual decisions. In light 
of the fact that the removal of the various nontariff barriers was certain to gen-
erate conflicts within and among the member states, the formal rules entailed 
several ways to bolster the credibility of the member states’ commitments in the 
event of changing (“time-inconsistent”) domestic preferences and interest group 
pressure. The EU governments delegated extraordinary rule-making and imple-
mentation power to supranational institutions that were insulated from ad hoc 
pressure, and they pooled their sovereignty by surrendering their national vetoes 
on individual decisions.
The result is an original legislative procedure, the so-called Community 
Method, which brings together government ministers (the Council), an inde-
pendent bureaucracy (the Commission), and the European Parliament. The 
European Court of Justice is supposed to enforce these rules and the secondary 
legislation made within them. Today, the Community Method governs almost 
invariably all policies that relate to economic integration. It produces various 
types of EU laws, the most important of which are directives (to be implemented 
through national law) and regulations (which do not require any implementing 
measures).













FIGURE 2 The Community Method (1957)
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A number of formal changes have shaped the scope and workings of the leg-
islative process over the years. One of the first important formal changes was 
the extension of the use of majority voting in the Council through the Single 
European Act (1987) to cover important aspects of the internal market. The 
 Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1993), negotiated right after German 
unification and during the first Yugoslav Wars, launched the Economic and Mon-
etary Union and added two intergovernmental policies—Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs—outside the existing European 
Community procedures.
Arguably, one of the most significant changes came with the treaties of 
Amsterdam (1999) and Nice (2003), which promoted the European Parliament 
to a co-legislator and prepared the institutional framework for the accession 
of a dozen and more new member states. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009), sought to simplify the EU’s institutional structure and inter alia 
provided for a uniform application of the Community Method (today known 
as the Ordinary Legislative Procedure) to almost all policy areas. None of these 
changes undermined the fact that the legislative process commits the member 
states to continual economic integration, since each stage has always entailed 
the possibility of imposing an outcome on one or more recalcitrant states.
Formal Agenda-Setting Rules
The Commission initiates the legislative procedure with a proposal for a legal act. 
Its exclusive right of initiative on matters covered by the treaty (Article 149, Treaty 
of Rome)3 and those intended to realize its objectives (Article 235) gave the Com-
mission an essentially political and extraordinarily strong role. The Commission 
is able to choose one among many feasible proposals for a legal act and, except 
where the treaty specifies a deadline, it is entirely free to determine the timing of 
its submission. It can therefore bar proposals from the agenda that are less suited 
to achieve the objective of deep economic integration.
Furthermore, it can publish proposals when the constellation of government 
preferences favors their immediate adoption, and it can change or withdraw 
them when this constellation becomes less favorable. The Commission was, from 
the outset, aware of its power. Walter Hallstein, the first president of the Com-
mission, remarks:
[A Commission proposal] is an eminently political act. For one, it is 
political because the Commission may choose among different feasible 
solutions. Considering what a majority under the terms of the treaty 
can just accept, it chooses in complete independence a solution that best 
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approximates the Community interest. It is also a political act because 
the Commission determines the point of time of a decision: What was 
unthinkable yesterday might suddenly be possible today. (Hallstein 1965)
In performing its “eminently political” role, the Commission is supposed to be 
completely independent and “neither seek nor take instructions from any govern-
ment” (Article 157). For that purpose, it is endowed with an administrative appa-
ratus of permanent civil servants, headed by a Commission president and a col-
lege of at least one commissioner per member state. Commission officials hoped 
this independent supranational bureaucracy would acquire unrivaled expertise on 
Community matters that would also boost the Commission’s “informal” agenda-
setting power as, according to Hallstein, the “persuasiveness of a proposal [stems 
from the] quality of its rationale” (cited in Oppermann 1979, 441–46).4
Formal Voting Rules
After official submission, the Council decides whether to adopt the  Commission 
proposal or change it through amendments. Formal voting rules strongly 
privilege the first option and thus greatly augment the Commission’s agenda- 
setting power.
Whereas a qualified majority vote (entailing additional criteria beyond a mere 
majority of member states) is sufficient for immediate adoption of a legal act, the 
Council needs to attain unanimity in order to alter the legislative proposal against 
the will of the Commission (Article 148).5 This is an extraordinarily restrictive 
rule for the amendment of proposals, one that represents an even greater protec-
tion for the agenda setter’s proposal than that provided for most U.S. congres-
sional legislation (Pollack 2003b, 85).
A European Parliamentary Assembly (renamed the European Parliament), 
which initially consisted of delegates of national parliaments, was to be consulted 
before adoption (Article 137).6 Since 1979, EU citizens directly elect its mem-
bers, who organize themselves in loose Europe-wide party groups. Gradually, 
the European Parliament has been promoted to co-legislator status, with formal 
veto power over Council decisions, and its legislative power has been extended to 
more and more policy areas.
These formal rules enhance the credibility of mutual commitments in vari-
ous ways. First, governments can overrule one or more states that are reluctant 
to deepen economic integration. Second, the rules bolster the Commission’s 
agenda-setting power, since it is able to disregard the opinions of a recalcitrant 
minority of states in drawing up its legislative proposals.
The involvement and gradual empowerment of the European Parliament 
arguably defies this functional explanation of the Community’s institutional 
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design. Its promotion is probably best explained as an attempt to remedy the 
“democratic deficit” of the European Union (Rittberger 2005, 4–7). Yet this need 
not concern us at this point, since the European Parliament’s formal powers in 
combination with its preference for deeper integration never undermined the 
legislative procedure’s function as a commitment to the Community’s objectives.
Formal Implementation Rules
In addition to the Commission’s political role in the preparation and negotia-
tion of legislation, it was also slated for the management of EU policies (Article 
155). For a few policies, such as competition, the common commercial policy, 
transport, and agriculture, the Treaty of Rome directly conferred executive 
powers on the Commission. In other areas, the Council retained the option to 
delegate the implementation to the Commission or other actors with various 
degrees of discretion.
This ambiguity regarding the identity of the implementing actor turned 
out to be a constant source of tension between the institutions and was aggra-
vated through the Single European Act, which stipulated (Article 145) that the 
Council shall “confer on the Commission . . . powers for the implementation 
of the rules which the Council lays down” and, in the same breath, stated 
that the “Council may also reserve the right . . . to exercise directly implement-
ing powers itself.” However, the Treaty of Rome provided no means for the 
Council to withdraw or change effective measures. Only the Single European 
Act codified without specifying established law that the Council may “impose 
certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these powers.”
It is hardly possible to formulate laws in such a way that they can be applied 
without ambiguity, and this ambiguity provides ample opportunities for gov-
ernments to manipulate the implementation of policies in order to cater to 
powerful domestic interests. The delegation of implementation to an agent 
that is shielded from ad hoc influence therefore bolsters the credibility of gov-
ernments’ pledges, by preventing a false or uneven application of policies on 
the ground.
Enforcement
A Court of Justice was supposed to ensure that, in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the treaty, “the law is observed” (Article 164).7 Regarding the enforcement 
of secondary law, this initially implied that the European Court of Justice, similar 
to other international tribunals, resolved disputes about the interpretation of EU 
law and adjudicated on the legality of infringement proceedings (Commission 
actions against a member state it considers to be failing to fulfill its obligations 
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under EU rules). In that respect, Articles 169 and 170 stated that if the  Commission 
or a member state believes another member state has failed to implement EU law, 
the matter is brought before the Court of Justice after the Commission has issued 
a reasoned opinion on it. It was not until 1993 that the member states sought to 
give this procedure more teeth. The new Article 143 of the Treaty of Maastricht 
allowed the Commission to take noncompliant states back to the Court to have 
them fined (Chalmers, Davies, and Monti 2010, chap. 8).
In addition to these provisions on centralized monitoring and enforcement, 
a second, more decentralized way developed on the basis of two landmark judg-
ments (Weiler 1991). The doctrine of direct effect, introduced in 1963, stated that 
clear and precise Community norms must be regarded as the law of the land in 
their sphere of application (European Court of Justice 1963). This implied that 
Community law immediately bestows rights and obligations on individual citizens, 
and thus when a country fails to bestow these rights, individuals can seek to invoke 
them before national courts. The Court complemented direct effect in 1964 with 
the doctrine of supremacy, which stated that Community law trumps conflicting 
national law whether enacted before or after this norm was established (European 
Court of Justice 1964). In other words, national legislatures cannot enact laws that 
contradict a Community norm and must repeal those already passed.
Together, these rulings enabled individuals to bring their government before 
national courts if it failed to transpose EU law or enacted conflicting law. The 
European Court of Justice itself is able to shape these decisions, since Article 177 
of the Rome Treaty permits national courts to request a preliminary Court ruling 
when confronted with questions about Community law (Chalmers, Davies, and 
Monti 2010, chap. 7). The effectiveness of this original procedure consequently 
depends on a variety of factors, primarily the willingness of individuals to litigate 
the rights under EU law, of national courts to refer cases to the European Court 
of Justice, and of the governments to comply with a judgment.8
Nonetheless, the decentralized enforcement of EU law enhanced the credibility of 
states’ commitment to economic integration compared to other international orga-
nizations. This has been cited as the reason why the member states were ultimately 
willing to accept the doctrines on which this system builds (Garrett 1995, 176).
Formal and Informal Governance in Lawmaking
Now that we have described the formal rules on the making and enforcement of 
EU law, and the ways they serve to bolster the credibility of states’ commitment 
to economic integration, we are a step closer to defining the practices of formal 
and informal governance in lawmaking in this institutional context.
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Recall that a set of rules can be said to be in equilibrium when no actor 
has an incentive to deviate from his or her rule-following behavior. In equi-
librium, the rules of the Community Method will therefore induce a num-
ber of observable, regular practices of formal governance in the stages of 
agenda setting, voting, and implementation. Informal governance refers 
to collective practices that differ from this standard. Formal and informal 
governance, then, constitute the two endpoints of a continuous dependent 
variable that measures the regularity with which the legislative actors depart 
from formal rules.
What practices actors adopt also depends on what actors want and what 
actors know when they interact with one another. We can make two empiri-
cally plausible assumptions about actors’ preferences and information. First, 
and in line with the bulk of the literature in EU studies, it is assumed that the 
predominant policy dimension represents the depth of integration where the 
status quo is shallow economic integration (e.g., conflicting domestic regula-
tions).9 The treaty itself aims to change the status quo through the deepening 
of economic integration. The European Parliament and the Commission, which 
are pledged to help attain this objective, consequently favor deeper integration 
than the Council.
Second, we assume that the three institutional actors (Council, Commission, 
European Parliament) are well informed about one another’s preferences. In 
game-theoretical parlance, the legislative actors have nearly complete informa-
tion about one another’s location on the policy scale. Although less common 
in international bargaining, the assumption of nearly complete information is 
plausible and often used in the context of the EU, where the main institutional 
actors are, in fact, composed of many interconnected individual actors. An exam-
ple is the members of the European Parliament, all of whom have to agree (often 
in public) on a common position before entering the next stage of the legislative 
process (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 280).10
Formal and Informal Governance in Agenda Setting
The first set of formal rules on agenda setting endows the Commission with 
an exclusive right of initiative. These rules allow for the selection of one out 
of many feasible legislative proposals while keeping rival proposals from the 
agenda. These rules permit an optimal implementation of the treaty’s objec-
tives if (a) the Commission’s monopoly of initiative in fact remains unrivaled, 
(b) the Commission’s independence is not compromised, and (c) the constel-
lation of state preferences at the time of decision is conducive to the adoption 
of progressive acts.
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What practices do these three aspects imply for the EU’s legislative actors? The 
first aspect of agenda setting, the monopoly of initiative, is particularly important 
when there is the possibility that rival coalitions might repeal an effective policy 
through new legislation. It is a well-known result in legislative studies that when 
a policy with multiple dimensions is to be adopted by majority voting, it gener-
ates more than one winning coalition and thereby many potential outcomes. 
Policies are consequently inherently unstable, since an alternative  majority can 
always overturn them through new legislation (McKelvey 1976). Equally impor-
tant in our case is the possibility that governments, which are under varying pres-
sures from domestic groups, will change their preferences over time and form 
alternative majority coalitions to replace existing legislation. The Commission’s 
 monopoly of initiative therefore stabilizes EU policies, because it enables the 
Commission to bar rival policy initiatives from the legislative agenda.11
The rules imply that we should observe the Commission selectively withhold-
ing governmental initiatives from the agenda. Why? Even though the Commis-
sion has the monopoly of initiative, governments under domestic pressure will 
still suggest alternatives in order to signal their effort to the pressuring groups. 
Of these various initiatives, we can expect the Commission to endorse only those 
that promise an optimal implementation of the treaty objectives.
Thus, formal governance in agenda setting can be defined as a practice by which 
the Commission selectively bars some governmental initiatives from the legisla-
tive agenda. Conversely, informal governance is a practice where the Commis-
sion customarily endorses governmental proposals. Whether the Commission 
endorses governmental initiatives selectively or as a matter of course should be 
indicated by the sequence of moves before the official submission of a proposal.
The monopoly of initiative results in an optimal implementation of the treaty 
only if the agenda setter, in contrast to governments, does not behave opportunisti-
cally. For that purpose, it needs to be immune to private or governmental ad hoc 
pressure from within or outside. The Commission was well aware of this respon-
sibility. As Jean Monnet, the spiritual father of the Community Method and first 
president of the High Authority (the Commission’s predecessor), explained:
The independence of the Authority vis-à-vis governments and the sec-
tional interests concerned is a precondition for the emergence of a com-
mon point of view which could be taken neither by governments nor by 
private interests. It is clear that to entrust the Authority to a Committee 
of governmental delegates or to a Council made up of representatives 
of governments, employers and workers, would amount to returning 
to our present methods, those very methods which do not enable us to 
settle our problems. (Monnet 1950)
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The second aspect of agenda setting, the independence from ad hoc pressure, 
implies that the Commission should not have to rely on the information and 
ideas of rival actors to be able to come up with quality legislative proposals.12 This 
need not imply that the Commission’s expertise is superior to everyone else’s. 
However, the Commission needs to be free to decide whom to ask for policy-
relevant expertise, and it should be able to draw on a capable administration in 
order to process this information.
In short, formal governance is a practice by which the Commission draws on 
independent expertise and a capable administration. Informal governance is a 
practice that compromises this precondition for the Commission’s indepen-
dence. Whether the Commission is sufficiently equipped to remain independent 
should be reflected in its internal organization.
The final aspect of agenda setting concerns timing. Since government 
preferences may change over time, there are times that are more or less 
conducive to the advancement of economic integration. John Kingdon 
(1995, 203) refers to favorable times as “policy windows,” that is, “opportunities 
for advocates to push their pet solutions.” The delegation of the power over 
timing to the Commission therefore enhances states’ commitment to pursuing 
economic integration, since its capacity to change, withdraw, and resubmit 
legislative proposals also allows it to await circumstances that are most favor-
able to attaining this objective.
Why is this important for our case? The control of the timing of a decision 
not only allows waiting for a favorable constellation of preferences among gov-
ernments. It may also affect the constellation of domestic interests when, for 
example, the delay of a decision mitigates the concentration of adjustment costs 
by giving domestic groups more time to adjust. It may also make a difference 
regarding a government’s susceptibility to domestic pressure (e.g., before an elec-
tion). In short, to exercise informal discretion, governments need to be able to 
control the timing of a decision.
Formal governance can hence be considered a practice where the  Commission’s 
publication of a proposal results in its swift adoption, while informal governance 
is a practice whereby governments control the time span between the publica-
tion and the adoption of a proposal. The duration of moves in-between the 
 submission of a proposal and the conclusion of negotiations indicates this con-
trol of time.
Formal and Informal Governance in Voting
The second set of formal rules concerns the adoption or amendment of  legislative 
proposals by the Council and, more recently, the European Parliament. The rules 
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stipulate that governments adopt the Commission proposal with a  qualified 
majority. They can change it only when they are able to attain unanimous 
 support for the amendment. In other words, it is much easier for governments 
to adopt the Commission’s legislative proposal than to change it. This rule on 
majority decision making commits governments to advancing economic inte-
gration, because it allows a majority to impose outcomes on more conservative 
governments. What practices do these rules imply for the legislative actors?
One might argue that majority voting provides the opportunity for political 
exchange over time or across jurisdictions. In other words, a majority can spare 
minorities that feel intensely about an issue in exchange for political support 
on an issue they strongly care about. The result of this hypothetical “vote trade” 
would be a unanimous agreement on both issues.
However, vote trading of this sort is difficult to enforce in practice, particu-
larly in the context of the EU. Precisely because governments are opportunistic, 
which is why majority voting at the EU level is necessary in the first place, they 
will find it difficult to trust others to stick to their part of the deal at a later 
point in time. The exchange of support across policy areas seems improbable too 
(Weingast and Marshall 1988, 135).13 Recall that changes to a Commission pro-
posal require unanimity in the Council. Political exchanges across jurisdiction 
are therefore only possible when there happen to be opportunities to reciprocate 
political support on another issue to all governments that are necessary to build a 
unanimous vote. Unsurprisingly, empirical examples of vote trading across juris-
dictions in the EU are rare (Mattila and Lane 2001, 46–48).
Given that vote trading across policy areas and over time is unlikely to take place 
in the EU, the voting rules can be expected to induce majorities to call votes in order 
to capture their gains. These votes should also take place openly, since this allows the 
minority to blame the outcome on “Brussels” in order to escape a domestic backlash.14 
Formal governance is therefore a practice where governments cast votes  frequently 
and openly, while informal governance is a practice where governments collectively 
refrain from voting in order to accommodate a government in the minority. This 
should be reflected in qualitative and quantitative Council voting data.
The second feature of this stage is the involvement of the European Parlia-
ment in decision making on a wide variety of issues. Members of the European 
Parliament have a strong incentive to bring deliberations out into the open to gain 
the electoral support of their constituencies and, more generally, to  justify their 
existence. Formal governance can therefore be considered a practice by which the 
European Parliament avails itself of opportunities to have public debates. Public 
debates, however, may jeopardize the provision of flexibility, since they may raise 
concerns among various domestic groups that the accommodation of a govern-
ment ultimately takes place at their expense. Informal governance can therefore 
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be regarded as a practice by which legislative actors avoid publicity in decision 
making. These practices should be reflected in the actual use of plenum debates.
Formal and Informal Governance in Implementation
The formal rules regarding the implementation of legal acts are more  ambiguous 
than those of the previous two stages. Initially, the treaty in a few areas directly 
conferred implementation power on the Commission. The treaty was more 
ambiguous in the remaining areas, where the Council was free to delegate this 
task also to national administrations. Various treaty changes and case law did 
little to clarify the ambivalence about the identity and discretion of implement-
ing actors. What practices do these ambiguous rules imply for the legislative and 
implementing actors?
Modern societies cannot function without bureaucracies. The complexity 
of issues and the time and resources needed to address them leave legislative 
actors no choice but to delegate some responsibility to an agent. Once they 
delegate, however, they face a potential loss of control over the issue they have 
delegated (Huber and Shipan 2008). The act of delegation, therefore, usually 
entails two decisions, first a decision about the identity of the agent, and second 
about the agent’s discretion, that is, her room for maneuver, which is a func-
tion of various control mechanisms (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). 
Although national administrations have extensive expertise about implemen-
tation obstacles in their own country, they tend to be less insulated from politi-
cal influence from within the member state. There is, therefore, the risk that 
decentralized implementation results in disparate sets of policies that defy the 
purpose of an EU-wide law. Conversely, pledged to the rule of law, the Commis-
sion is primarily concerned about the timely and consistent implementation of 
legal acts across countries.
According to Fabio Franchino (2007, chaps. 4 and 7), both the Commission 
and the European Parliament favor centralized implementation and, in addition, 
ample discretion for the Commission. The same research shows that the Council 
prefers centralized implementation when it adopts a legal act by majority voting 
instead of a consensus, since a majority vote makes it more likely that those that 
have been overruled will defect (Franchino 2007, 174).
Since formal governance implies the frequent recourse to majority voting in the 
previous, legislative, stage, formal governance in the implementation stage must be 
considered a practice by which governments frequently centralize implementation 
powers in the hands of the Commission and provide it with broad discretion.
However, the Commission is less familiar than its member-state governments 
with local implementation obstacles. Centralized implementation therefore 
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TABLE 2 Indicators and data for informal and formal governance
STAGE FORMAL GOVERNANCE INFORMAL GOVERNANCE TYPE OF DATA
AGENDA SETTING
The Commission 
 selectively bars 
 governmental initiatives 
from the agenda.
The Commission  generally 
endorses governmental 
proposals.
Sequence of moves 
before the official 
 submission of a 
proposal.
The Commission draws 
on independent policy 
expertise.
The independence of the 
expertise the Com-




The Commission controls 
the timing of decision 
making.
Governments have 
 collective control 
of the timing.
Duration of moves 
between official 
 submission and 
adoption of a 
legislative proposal.
VOTING
Voting takes place 
 frequently and openly.
Parliament brings decision 
making out in the open.
Governments refrain from 
voting.
The legislative actors 
eschew publicity in 
 decision making.
Voting data.




The Council delegates 
implementation powers 
and wide discretion to 
the Commission.
Governments delegate to 
national administrations 
and narrow the Commis-
sion’s discretion.
Identity and discretion 
of implementing 
agent.
harbors the risk of generating distributive shocks at the local level, in which 
case  governments will seek to flexibly restrict the discretion of the Commis-
sion. Furthermore, if consensus decision making instead of voting prevailed 
in the  previous stage, there is less risk that governments will purposefully fail 
to  implement the legal act. As a result, the member states will be more relaxed 
about  leaving implementation up to national administrations instead of del-
egating it to the  Commission. Thus, informal governance in implementation 
denotes  decentralized implementation and, where the treaty provides for cen-
tralized implementation, the flexible restriction of the Commission’s discretion 
(Franchino 2007, 167, 175). This should be indicated in data on the implement-
ing agent chosen by the Council and its discretion before and after delegation.
We have seen that the Community Method in equilibrium generates six practices 
of formal governance. Informal governance is defined as the mirror image of 
formal governance: collective practices that differ from this standard. Formal and 
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informal governance constitute the two endpoints of a continuous dependent 
variable. These practices and the indicators used to identify them are summa-
rized in the following table. 
By specifying what formal and informal governance means in the context of 
the EU’s Community Method, this section multiplied the number of observa-
tions for our empirical analysis. Instead of merely predicting collective  departures 
from the formal legislative procedure, Liberal Regime Theory and its rivals now 
have to make specific predictions about informal governance practices in agenda 
setting, voting, and implementation.
The number of observations is further multiplied by splitting the domain up 
into five different time periods separated by treaty revisions.15 For our purposes, 
these periods can be considered semi-independent observations, because each 
treaty revision provided the opportunity to codify the practices of informal gov-
ernance that emerged in the meantime (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 221–23). 
In fact, almost every single treaty revision since the Treaty of Rome specifically 
envisaged the simplification of decision making through the formalization and 
consolidation of rules (De Witte 2002).
With a focus on six different practices of formal and informal governance in 
two types of issue areas in five time periods, the result of the multiplication exer-
cise is a large-N data set of more than fifty observations, all of which constitute 
qualitative mini case studies of decision-making practices in a certain time period.
Testable Implications and Alternative 
Explanations
Having defined the meaning of formal and informal governance in the con-
text of the EU’s Community Method, we are now able to proceed to speci-
fying the testable implications of Liberal Regime Theory and its rivals. To 
repeat, the theory argues that governments depart from formal rules in order 
to resolve conflicts at the domestic level. For power-based institutionalism, 
informal governance is a means for dominant states to escape formal com-
mitments when their vital interests are at stake. For classical regime theorists, 
informal governance results from states’ attempts to reduce increased trans-
action costs.
Liberal Regime Theory
According to Liberal Regime Theory, informal governance serves to resolve 
potentially disruptive conflicts that states’ cooperation may generate at the 
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domestic level. We referred to the propensity for such unexpected domes-
tic pressure for defection as political uncertainty. The theory expects practices 
of  formal and informal governance to vary systematically with the extent of 
 political uncertainty. But how does political uncertainty vary in the context of 
the  European Union?
As argued in the previous chapter, it is impossible to measure political uncer-
tainty directly, let alone to quantify it. If governments cannot specify future 
domestic pressure at the point of institutional creation, it seems implausible that 
scholars would be able to do so.
However, drawing on insights from collective action theory, we argued that 
welfare provisions that provide social security serve as an arguably crude proxy 
for this variable. Since political uncertainty refers to situations in which govern-
ments are facing unexpectedly strong pressure from a domestic group to defy a 
legal act, it follows that one important determinant of this pressure is a group’s 
propensity to mobilize in response to imminent adjustment costs. This propen-
sity is itself a function of the presence or absence of welfare provisions: by dis-
persing unexpected costs over a larger group, these measures lower the group 
members’ marginal utility of mobilization. If we keep other factors constant, 
such as the size of the distributional shock a group is facing and governments’ 
susceptibility to domestic pressure, welfare provisions independently reduce the 
propensity for unexpected domestic pressure for defection. Political uncertainty 
is therefore high in the absence, and low in the presence, of welfare provisions.
The fact that welfare provisions affect political uncertainty implies that infor-
mal governance can be expected to vary systematically across issue areas in the 
EU. Although most policies at the EU level increasingly subject national markets 
to Europe-wide competition, the Common Agricultural Policy, by comparison, 
stands out as an issue area that by means of high external tariffs, fixed and guar-
anteed prices, and direct subsidies deliberately protects European farmers from 
the structural pressures of the global economy.
According to the Treaty of Rome, one of the principal objectives of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy was “to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged 
in agriculture” (Article 39 (1b) Treaty of Rome). Continuing existing national 
policies at the EU level, the member states subsequently agreed on a Europe-wide 
market organization that, by means of fixed and guaranteed prices, provided a 
higher and secure income for a specific segment of society, the European farmers.
The establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy, as Elmar Rieger 
(2005, 161) remarks, consequently reflected “defensive, basically anti-market, 
national strategies of economic modernization, attaching small farmers’ loyalty 
to rebuilding democracies, with welfare-functions transferred to the European 
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level.” Although the Common Agricultural Policy occasionally affects groups 
other than farmers (for instance the apple wine producers mentioned in the 
 introductory example), it does, more than other policies, absorb potential shocks 
to the farmers’ livelihood that would suddenly stir up this sector’s domestic 
 politics of collective action.
To be clear, this is not to argue that farmers never mobilize against this pol-
icy. On the contrary, they protest vociferously when changes to the agricultural 
policy affect their subsistence. The principal point is that this mobilization is 
rarely unexpected. It is, on average, more predictable than the domestic pressure 
in other sectors and, therefore, manageable in the framework of the formal rules.
Because agriculture is a quite technical field that has attracted little political 
science research, it is worth elaborating on this point in a bit more detail. A 
critic might argue that the Common Agricultural Policy has undergone sub-
stantive reforms in the last two decades, in response to spiraling costs and 
the dumping of excessive production (“milk lakes”) in the 1980s, the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis (“mad cow disease”) in the 1990s, 
pressure to comply with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), and the accession of more than ten rural Eastern European 
countries in the 2000s.16
Though it is true that various reforms removed or replaced some of the shock 
absorbers that European farmers historically enjoyed, it should be noted that the 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy nevertheless kept intact the safety-
net function of this policy. After an interim period where direct income support 
served as a compensation for reduced fixed prices, the system now aims at sta-
bilizing income independent of production. The Common Agricultural Policy 
therefore still entails aspects of social security that to some extent protect the 
rural sector from the competitive forces of the market, which distinguishes it 
qualitatively from all other economic policies in the EU that do not envisage this 
kind of protection (Garzon 2006, 180–81).17
Applied to the empirical context of the EU, Liberal Regime Theory there-
fore generates three specific implications that can be tested. First, informal 
 governance in agenda setting, voting, and implementation is most pronounced 
in most EU policies where political uncertainty is high, while formal governance 
dominates in the Common Agricultural Policy, a policy of comparatively low 
political uncertainty. Second, since the market-creating policies of the EU have 
always been qualitatively distinct from the Common Agricultural Policy, the dif-
ference between agricultural and nonagricultural policies across the spectrum of 
economic policies can also be expected to remain stable over time. Finally, since 
the theory expects all governments to prefer the mix of formal and  informal 
 governance to a purely formal setup, the use of informal governance should 
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 create conflicts between institutional actors and the national governments, but 
not among the governments themselves.
Power-Based Institutionalism
Power-based institutionalism argues that it is difficult for large states to commit 
to cooperation, since they are more likely than small states to face opportunities 
to pursue their interests outside of a formal institutional framework. Anticipat-
ing this challenge to the institution, small states offer to acquiesce to large states’ 
informally assuming control of the international organization on important 
matters in exchange for more favorable formal voting rights on less sensitive 
issues (Stone 2011, 14).
Thus, two criteria must be met for informal governance to arise. First, the pat-
terns of interdependence among the member states are highly asymmetric—that 
is, some small states are far more dependent on the cooperation of a larger state 
than the other way around. Second, a policy area that fulfills the first criterion 
must be of predictable sensitivity for the large state.
What policy areas in the European Union can we expect small and large states 
to strike a deal about informal governance? There are various policy areas in 
which asymmetries among the member states are more pronounced than else-
where. For example, the United Kingdom with London as one of the world’s larg-
est financial centers can be considered powerful in the trade of financial products. 
On matters of monetary policy, Germany is beyond doubt the most powerful 
state in the Eurozone. France with its powerful agricultural sector has dominated 
intra-European trade in a wide variety of agricultural products.18 Among these 
issue areas, there is one where individual decisions have been predictably sensi-
tive from the outset of European integration. The Common Agricultural Policy 
was, from the outset, of particular significance to France, which is home to a 
powerful farm lobby.
Asserting that the Common Agricultural Policy, relative to other policy areas 
that are dominated by a large state, is certain to be of special importance to 
France is admittedly a crude measure of a policy’s sensitivity. Yet it is entirely in 
line with the historiography of the EU. Some students of European integration 
contend that agriculture stands out as the single most important determinant 
of French EU policy (Moravcsik 2000a, 2000b). But one does not have to go 
as far as that in order to acknowledge the fact that agriculture has always been 
of predictable sensitivity to France and spawned most major intergovernmental 
disputes from the beginning of European integration until today.19 As we shall 
see in chapters 3 and 4, it was, after all, a proposal for the extension of majority 
voting to agricultural issues that in 1965 prompted French president Charles De 
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Gaulle to threaten to renege on France’s commitment and withdraw from the 
Communities (Teasdale 1993, 567–68).
Also, applying power-based institutionalism to the EU, Stone argues that 
the “veto culture” that supposedly resulted from this crisis in the Common 
 Agricultural Policy “suited powerful countries, because it channeled decision 
making into informal intergovernmental bargaining, where they could most eas-
ily exercise their leverage” (Stone 2011, 105; Golub 2006, 280–82).
In sum, applied to the EU’s empirical context, power-based institutional-
ism generates several implications that can be tested. First, informal  governance 
arises in issue areas that are of predictable sensitivity to a large state. There is only 
one issue area that appears to meet these criteria, and this issue area is agricul-
ture. It is here that power-based institutionalism would expect France to strike 
a deal with smaller member states on the use of informal governance. Formal 
governance should be more pronounced in the remaining issue areas. Thus, 
power-based institutionalism, compared to Liberal Regime Theory, predicts the 
opposite issue-specific variation in informal governance.
Second, the issue-specific variation in informal governance varies, if at all, 
only slightly over time. Although historians argue that the veto culture in the 
Council subsided with the conclusion of the Single European Act and as other 
agrarian-oriented countries acceded to the EU, the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy has remained a highly sensitive policy area for France. Informal governance 
should therefore remain more pronounced on agricultural matters than any-
where else.
Finally, the use of informal governance should provoke disputes between small 
and large states about its legitimacy. Formed under the condition of uncertainty, 
the precise boundary between formal rules and informal governance necessarily 
remains vague and difficult to ascertain. Consequently, there will be ambigu-
ous situations in which the use of informal governance is fraught with tension 
between large and small states.
Classical Regime Theory
For classical regime theory, institutions enable cooperation by reducing the rela-
tive costs of transactions. Institutions become inefficient when exogenous factors 
alter the transaction costs after formal rules have entered into force. In this case, 
states are expected to restore efficiency by adapting the formal rules through 
additional informal institutional elements. All states use these elements because 
they serve to reduce frictions in state interaction that are caused by the use of for-
mal rules. Accordingly, classical regime theory predicts that informal governance 
varies systematically with the rise of transaction costs in legislative interaction. 
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But what are transaction costs in the context of the Community Method, and 
where did they rise after the formal rules had entered into effect?
Two factors, in particular, may strain legislative institutions and generate a 
demand for informal rules to restore the efficiency of decision making. First, 
the addition of new policies eats up decision-making time and results in legisla-
tive bottlenecks (Cox 2008, 143). Second, the addition of new actors increases the 
complexity of decision making (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 27; Winham 1977). 
In line with this theory, it has been argued that transaction costs in EU legislation 
rose markedly with a leap in legislative activity and the accession of new coun-
tries in consecutive rounds of enlargement.
Applying classical regime theory to the EU, Jonas Tallberg (2006, 59) argues 
that the complexity of the decision-making environment increased heavily in 
response to an expansion of Council business and an increased number of bar-
gaining partners. In fact, as we shall see in more detail in  chapter 4, the Council’s 
legislative activity leaped dramatically in nearly all issue areas in the ten-year 
period from the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s. The number of actors increased 
for the first time in 1973 when the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark 
acceded to the then European Community. A southern enlargement took place 
between 1981 and 1986 with the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain. These 
countries were followed by Sweden, Finland, and Austria in 1995. The “big bang” 
enlargement with the accession of twelve Eastern and South European countries 
took place between 2004 and 2007.








Formal governance in 
issue areas of low 






in issue areas of 
 predictable  sensitivity 
to large states. 






None None Informal governance in 
response to increas-
ing legislative  activity 
and enlargement.
CONFLICTS Between supranational 
actors and the mem-
ber states.
Between large and 
small member states.
None
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In the context of the European Union, classical regime theory therefore expects 
practices of informal governance to vary over time rather than across issue areas. 
Specifically, the theory predicts the emergence of informal governance from the 
mid-1960s until the first enlargement in 1973. Further informal practices can be 
expected to arise with further accession rounds. Since they enhance the general 
efficiency of decision making, the adoption of these practices should not lead to 
any major conflicts among states or between states and institutional actors. 
A Look Ahead to Subsequent Chapters
The following three chapters test these different predictions regarding the 
variation of informal governance over time, the variation of informal gov-
ernance across issue areas, and the emergence of conflicts by contrasting the 
aforementioned six practices of formal governance in agenda setting (chap-
ter 3), voting (chapter 4), and implementation (chapter 5) to the practices we 
observe in reality. The focus is on decision making in issue areas that deal with 
economic integration from 1958 until the entering into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009.
To foreshadow the findings: the look beyond the treaty rules demonstrates 
that the formal legislative procedure is surrounded by practices of informal gov-
ernance, most of which, in fact, constitute elusive “emergency brakes” through 
which the governments collectively mitigate the formal rules’ effects at the 
domestic level.
Formal governance in agenda setting is defined as practices by which the 
Commission selectively bars rival legislative proposals from the agenda, draws on 
independent policy expertise, and controls the timing of decision making. How-
ever, a look at the development of practices in agenda setting in chapter 3 reveals 
that the member states quickly diverged from these practices to obtain collective 
control of the legislative agenda. The Commission was less and less able to bar 
alternatives to its legislative proposals from the agenda, especially because the 
European Council, an institution consisting of the heads of state and government 
(chiefs of government) that existed outside the formal treaty framework, preset 
this agenda in ways that were impossible for the Commission to ignore. Also, 
the Commission was not entirely immune to ad hoc governmental influence. 
In fact, it became increasingly dependent on governmental expertise, and it also 
struggled to fight off national influence on internal politics. Finally, the Com-
mission gradually lost the capacity to await situations that were conducive to 
the adoption of its preferred proposals. Because governments refused to discuss 
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process became, in fact, determined by the work rhythm of government experts 
in a massive informal Council substructure.
Formal governance in voting is defined as practices by which the Council votes 
frequently, and the European Parliament brings negotiations out into the open. 
Chapter 4 shows that actual practices again diverge from this standard. Despite 
an increase in the use of majority voting over time, it turns out that it has always 
been the norm among the governments to refrain from voting and to collectively 
accommodate a government that would otherwise face strong conflict at home 
and succumb to domestic pressure to defy the law in question. This consensus 
norm led to the development of a large Council substructure of  preparatory 
groups, which consisted of government experts with specific  knowledge about 
sensitivities on the ground. Furthermore, as soon as the  European Parliament 
was promoted to a more serious legislative actor that was able to contest the 
Council in public, it was implicated in informal governance even despite its 
members’ incentives to publicly contest the Council.
Finally, formal governance in implementation was defined as practices by 
which the Council delegates implementing powers and wide discretion to the 
Commission. In actuality, however, the Council established an informal and 
highly elusive system of committees composed of government officials, the comi-
tology, which afforded the member states the flexibility to determine the scope of 
delegation and the Commission’s discretion.
Importantly, these practices are not random. The table below visualizes the 
six practices of formal and informal governance in agenda setting, voting, and 
implementation, as they emerged over the course of the past fifty-plus years in 
the European Union’s economic issue areas. It distinguishes between issue areas 
of low political uncertainty, which we said holds true for the Common Agricul-
tural Policy, and issue areas of high political uncertainty, a category that com-
prises all policies that grew out of the former European Economic Community 
and deal directly with economic integration. Each cell constitutes an individual 
observation of the prevalence of either formal or informal governance. Because 
the European Parliament was excluded from decision making on the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and only gradually gained power in other economic issue 
areas, some of these observations are dropped from the analysis. 
The table suggests that informal governance varies systematically both over 
time and across issue areas. In contrast to the expectations of classical regime 
theory, which predicts informal governance would emerge across the board 
and vary over time in response to enhanced legislative activity and the acces-
sion of new member states, we can see that most of the practices are, in fact, 
remarkably stable over time. Formal governance is most notable in the predict-
ably sensitive Common Agricultural Policy—an observation that runs counter 
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to power-based institutionalism, which regards informal governance as a means 
for large states to eschew formal commitments in areas that are of particular 
importance to them.
In line with Liberal Regime Theory, informal governance appears to be most 
pronounced in issue areas where it is, in fact, difficult to predict where exces-
sive adjustment costs might suddenly stir up pressure against EU legislation. 
Once these informal practices have emerged, they rarely disappear again. In the 
 Common Agricultural Policy, however, where the timing and extent of domestic 
pressure against EU measures are far more predictable than anywhere else, for-
mal rules are much more readily applied.
As we shall see, another piece of evidence in support of Liberal Regime Theory 
is the fact that most of the time the emergence and use of informal governance 
spurs conflicts between the governments, on one side, and supranational actors, 
on the other side. Power-based institutionalism, in contrast, would have expected 
far more conflict between large and small member states, whereas classical regime 
theory did not expect informal governance to be particularly contentious.
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THE COMMISSION’S AGENDA- 
SETTING POWER
I would often use the word “reasonable” to describe a project or a 
proposal that seemed to me not only to be consistent with reason, 
but also to have qualities of moderation in a good sense. “I don’t 
understand what you’re trying to say,” Hallstein would object. “What 
does reasonable mean? An idea is rational or it is absurd, there is no 
intermediate term.”
—Robert Marjolin, French vice president of the Commission, 1958–67
In many ways, the European Commission is a bureaucracy like any other 
 international bureaucracy. Similar to the United Nations or the World Bank, it 
undertakes tasks that are defined in an international treaty, it is primarily funded 
by direct financial contributions from the member states, it is staffed by civil 
servants of many different nationalities, and it usually appoints its political lead-
ership only after a ritualistic wrangling among the member states.
The European Commission is also special in at least two regards. Many view 
it as the incarnation of the “European idea”: to gradually transcend the nation-
state through supranational institutions in order to bring peace to the war-torn 
continent.1 The Commission therefore oftentimes attracts idealistic staff mem-
bers who are strongly committed to integrate ever more policies into this project 
(Volker Eicher, cited in Christiansen 1997, 83).
A second difference from other international bureaucracies is that the treaties, 
as Hallstein observes, endow the Commission with a decidedly political role. It 
does not simply implement what the member states decide. Due to its right to 
set the legislative agenda, it is deliberately involved in the law-making process.
Why did the member states grant the Commission the exclusive power to 
set the agenda? The most prominent explanation is that the delegation of these 
powers to an independent actor represents a strong commitment to integration. 
There are three aspects to this commitment. First, given that there are always 
various feasible legislative proposals, an independent agenda setter pledged to 
observe the treaty will pick the one that promises to implement the treaty in 
the best possible way. Second, choosing the timing of its submission, the agenda 
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 setter will wait until the time is ripe for a majority of countries to adopt its 
 preferred proposal. Third, in both cases, the agenda setter has to be immune to 
ad hoc influence on its decision.
The Commission thus thought of itself, with good reason, as the “motor” of 
integration that brings forward the implementation of the treaty even in the face 
of opposing winds from the member states (Hallstein 1962, 21).
As the chapter-opening quote shows, the flip side of this commitment is that a 
supranational bureaucracy that takes its mandate seriously—that is, that seeks to 
implement the treaty in the most conscientious way by following, to paraphrase 
Hallstein, an intrinsic logic (Sachlogik)—may lose touch with political realities. 
Specifically, it may submit legislative proposals that result in excessive adjust-
ment costs and, as a consequence, stir up excessive distributive conflicts at the 
domestic level.
The Commission’s motive force was often challenged and sometimes com-
promised in the course of European integration. Depending on the school of 
thought, scholars attribute the ups and downs in the Commission’s agenda-
setting power to a variety of factors. Some point to the Commission’s political 
leadership. There is wide agreement, for example, that the Commission had its 
heyday under the leadership of men like Jacques Delors and Walter Hallstein, 
and was mostly neglected under less dynamic presidents (for a brief summary, 
see, e.g., Nugent 1995, 610). Focusing on the appointment of commissioners 
and the composition of the college, Arndt Wonka and others (Wonka 2008; Hug 
2003) have begun to question the idea that the Commission has always sought to 
achieve high levels of integration. Although these studies identify the Commis-
sion’s preferences in very different ways, they nevertheless demonstrate how they 
may vary over time and across issues.
Students of public management and organizational sociology focus on the 
Commission’s internal organization and administrative culture. In a brilliant 
early study of the Commission’s internal organization, for example, David 
Coombes (1970) points to the difficulty of reconciling its technical, administra-
tive functions with its political leadership role. Other excellent and empirically 
rich analyses followed that suggest that the Commission’s permanent apparatus 
is quite complex and its socializing effect on its own civil servants less powerful 
than one might think (Hooghe 2001, 2005; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2010).
Pioneered by George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett (1996) and others, a third 
body of literature uses spatial and formal models to analyze how changes in the 
legislative procedure affected the Commission’s formal agenda-setting power. 
Notably, these studies found that the promotion of the European Parliament 
in the 1990s to the Council’s co-legislator occurred largely at the expense of the 
Commission’s formal agenda-setting power (Crombez 2000).
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In this chapter I argue that, in addition to all these developments, the 
 governments also added less noticeable “emergency brakes” within and around 
the motor, which allow them to jointly counteract the formal rules when the 
Commission’s legislative proposal threatens to create intense conflicts in one or 
more member states. More specifically, the governments adopt practices that 
sidestep the three aspects of the Commission’s formal agenda-setting power. Our 
theory expects these practices to emerge in issue areas of high political uncer-
tainty, and their use to stir up disputes between the governments and the Com-
mission, but not among the governments themselves.
The implications of this argument are significant. It casts doubt on the 
 standard assumption of many models of legislative bargaining, namely that the 
Commission holds invariably strong preferences for high levels of integration 
(similarly, Hörl, Warntjen, and Wonka 2005). Instead, its proposals are often 
“softer” than they might be as the member states compel the Commission to 
avert measures that promise to generate extensive conflicts at the domestic level.
The Commission’s Right to Set the Agenda—
Not Quite Exclusive
The Rome Treaty endows the Commission with the exclusive right of initiative 
and thus with a remarkably powerful and political role in the legislative pro-
cess. This right implies that it can choose from a wide range of different feasible 
legislative proposals and, at the same time, selectively bar rival proposals from 
the agenda. The flip side of this remarkable discretion is that the Commission 
might actually select a proposal that, although it implements the treaty in the 
best possible manner, stirs up domestic pressure by inflicting excessive adjust-
ment costs on a single domestic group. To prevent these situations, the govern-
ments need to find a way to limit the Commission’s choice. In the following, 
I focus on practices prior to the preparation of a legislative proposal in order 
to investigate to what extent these practices curtail the Commission’s actual 
leeway in agenda setting.
The Commission Is Put in Its Place (1958–1969)
In the first years after its inception under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission 
made full use of its capacity to choose freely among various feasible legislative 
proposals. Its discretion to do so was in fact quite broad, because the treaty had, 
in many issue areas, remained vague about how the governments were supposed 
to achieve the treaty objectives. Some member states, as well as the  Parliament, 
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occasionally put forth rival proposals for legislation. In 1963, for instance, 
 Germany devised an action plan that was supposed to provide new impetus to 
the integration process; this was deemed necessary after French president Charles 
de Gaulle had left the Community stupefied after vetoing the accession of Great 
Britain. However, the Commission was under no obligation and, in fact, did not 
heed all these requests for legislative initiatives (Ludlow 2003, 23–24).
This changed fundamentally when the chiefs government, who in contrast to 
government ministers had no official role in the legislative process, decided to 
get involved. De Gaulle was especially irritated about the Commission’s decid-
edly political role. At France’s initiative, the chiefs of government met three times 
as part of a general effort toward political cooperation in which the Commis-
sion would play only a minor role. The so-called Fouchet Plan proposed that the 
chiefs of government meet three times a year in order to determine the European 
Community’s broad legislative agenda and to coordinate the member states’ for-
eign affairs (Fouchet Committee 1962, Articles 5 and 6).
France’s partners were initially divided on this proposal (Silj 1967, 5). The 
Netherlands, in particular, feared that the creation of an intergovernmental 
superstructure would undermine the Community Method (Jouve 1967, 286–
87). Although the Fouchet Plan ultimately failed, the idea that the chiefs of gov-
ernment would predetermine the Community’s legislative agenda remained a 
 regular point of discussion (Werts 2008, 2–9).
The idea of having regular summits among the chiefs of government was 
revived toward the end of the 1960s when, after completion of the Customs 
Union, the legislative agenda opened to other concerns. At first, some govern-
ments proposed agendas for issues such as foreign policy or monetary coop-
eration that the treaty did not explicitly deal with. The responsible ministers 
commonly discussed these initiatives in so-called extramural meetings, that 
is, outside the official procedures and, therefore, often without the Commis-
sion’s attendance (Mortelmans 1974, 72–74, 88–91). In the meantime, all gov-
ernments had warmed toward the idea that the chiefs of government could 
define the Community’s broad legislative agenda and attend directly to some 
of its current problems. In 1969, in The Hague, the chiefs of government held 
an “extramural” meeting of their own where they launched a number of new 
 initiatives that would set the Community agenda for the years to come. All 
member states hailed this summit as a watershed heralding a relaunch of 
European integration.
In fact, however, it constituted a direct interference in Community affairs by 
an intergovernmental body that was not provided for in the treaty. Yet since the 
chiefs of government were also the signatories of the treaty, it was impossible for 
the Commission to disregard their instructions (Ludlow 2003, 22–24).
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Hail to the Chiefs (1970–1986)
The success of the meeting in The Hague triggered a series of nearly annual 
 summits among the chiefs of government (Werts 1992, xvii).2 The discussions 
at these meetings did not remain confined to matters that were not covered in 
the treaty, such as foreign affairs (called “Political Cooperation”) or monetary 
cooperation, but broached current Community affairs as well.
At their summit in Paris in 1974, the chiefs of government agreed on meeting 
on a permanent basis at least three times a year. In the format of the “European 
Council” they declared they would aim to “ensure progress and overall consis-
tency in the activities of the Community” (European Council 1974). Despite 
some excitement over the impetus that many hoped the European Council would 
provide (see, e.g., European Commission 1975b, 137; 1976, 19; Noël 1976b, 34), 
the Commission viewed this rival agenda setter with mixed feelings. The new 
Commission president, François-Xavier Ortoli, cautioned against it as a potential 
threat to the Community Method:
[The European Council] represents a change in spirit and content and 
may, if we are not careful, shake the institutional structures set up by 
the Treaties to their very foundations. . . . [Let] us not close our eyes to 
the danger that force of circumstances, a lack of courage, expediency or 
confusion as to who is responsible for what, may tempt us to choose the 
low road of intergovernmental cooperation when we should be strik-
ing out on the high road of integration. (European Commission 1975a, 
ix–xxviii, here xi–xii)
Some small member states remained skeptical, too. In 1975, Jean 
 Dondelinger, at that time Luxembourg’s permanent representative to the Euro-
pean  Community, warned of the danger of compromising the Commission’s 
agenda- setting power:
They [the chiefs of government] constitute a new political authority 
that threatens to undermine the authority of the Commission, which 
already faces great difficulties in assuming its role in full, in particular 
with respect to its right of proposal. (Dondelinger 1975, 43)
Because of this skepticism, the European Council was denied an official men-
tioning in the treaty. The role of the Commission in relation to the informal 
European Council comprised of the chiefs of government therefore differed 
strongly from its ordinary relationship to the official Council of Ministers during 
legislative process. Although the Commission was free to submit initiatives to the 
European Council, it no longer enjoyed the exclusive right to do so. Its proposals 
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to the European Council, in contrast to its legislative proposals, had to compete 
for attention with initiatives from the member states.
The country in charge of the presidency of the Council of Ministers also 
chaired the European Council meetings among the chiefs of government and 
summarized their outcomes in the “Presidency Conclusions.” The outcomes 
ranged from mere policy statements to detailed instructions and genuine deci-
sions on matters where the Council of Ministers had not been able to reach 
 agreement (Bulmer and Wessels 1987, 104).3 And although the Presidency Con-
clusions regarding the discussions at European Council meetings were not legally 
binding for any of the ordinary EU institutions, they were impossible for the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers to ignore (Glaesner 1994, 111). In fact, 
they were treated as binding “framework-laws” (Morgan 1976, 50) to be imple-
mented by the Commission or the Council (Council of the EC 1980, chap. 2). In 
short, even though the European Council (1974) had promised that their meet-
ings outside the ordinary legislative process would “not in any way affect the rules 
of the Treaty,” the chiefs of government had de facto come to predetermine the 
legislative agenda and compromised the Commission’s agenda-setting power.
Accepting the Reality (1987–1993)
The Commission had viewed the chiefs of government’s increasing influence on 
Community matters from outside the official procedures with some mistrust. 
Unsure how to deal with this new body, the Commission presidents in the 1970s 
sought, on the one hand, not to legitimize the European Council and, on the 
other hand, to influence its decisions.
From the mid-1970s on, the Commission presidents began to attend nonre-
stricted meetings of the European Council that dealt with matters concerning the 
European Community (Werts 2008, 35–37). But it was not until the presidency 
of Jacques Delors, who assumed this position in 1985, that the Commission fully 
acknowledged the European Council as a fact.
Jacques Delors’s presidency is often regarded as the second heyday of the Com-
mission during which it reasserted its power vis-à-vis the governments. In fact, 
Delors was able to wield influence through and not against the European Coun-
cil, since the chiefs of governments’ power to predetermine the legislative agenda 
allowed him to circumvent opposition within his own organization. “The fact that I 
fully participate in the European Council,” he acknowledged in an interview, “gives 
me a certain authority over my colleagues, whether they like it or not” (quoted in 
Endo 1999, 58; Delors 2004, 308; on his leadership, see Ross 1995). It henceforth 
became practice that the Commission president would introduce most Commu-
nity matters under discussion in the European Council (Werts 1992, 150).
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Because small member states as well as the Commission’s administrative level 
remained suspicious of this development (Edwards and Spence 1994, 9), Delors 
tried to convince the skeptics that they were better off accepting this new reality. 
In a speech before the European Parliament, Delors made the case for acknowl-
edging the European Council’s influence on the agenda:
The Commission has the right of initiative. But the position is differ-
ent according to whether this right is exercised within a specified insti-
tutional framework [the Community Method] or at a more  general 
 political level. When we are operating within a specified institutional 
framework, our duty is to apply whatever has been decided upon 
 solemnly by the European Council or in a modification to the Treaty.
 . . . It is all very well to dream about greater powers for the Commission, 
but that is the framework in which we have to work. (European Parlia-
ment 1989)
Thus, at the end of the 1980s it had become an accepted fact that the chiefs of 
government had become the true agenda setters. An internal, confidential study 
conducted by the Commission for the years 1991 and 1992, which traced the 
source of legislative initiatives, comes to the conclusion that only 6 percent of 
all legislative initiatives submitted in 1991 and 1992 were proper Commission 
initiatives, which were identified as rather innocuous proposals. One example 
 mentioned in this report is a proposal for the rearrangement of wave bands for 
transport telematics. Most proper legislative initiatives were, in fact, technical 
modifications to existing law or transpositions of international legal  obligations 
into EU law. The remaining legislative initiatives originated from the European 
Council, governmental requests, and international agreements. The author of 
the internal study concludes that the European Commission duly takes into 
account requests from other institutions (Commission des Communautés 
 Européennes 1993).
Tinkering with the Motor (1994–1999)
Because small states and the Commission administration were skeptical, the 
European Council was denied official status in the 1986 Single European Act. 
The new Treaty of Maastricht, which a few years later amended the exist-
ing treaties and added a new “Treaty on European Union,” codified the role 
of the European Council only loosely. Article D of the Treaty on European 
Union stated that the European Council was supposed to “provide the Union 
with the necessary impetus” and to “define the general political guidelines 
thereof.”
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In practice, the chiefs of government continued to predetermine the legislative 
agenda by asking the Commission to present or develop proposals for specific legal 
acts (Werts 2008, 46–47). In addition, they sought to “streamline” the Commission’s 
legislative program and required its president to present his program of the term to 
the European Council. As one example of a typical meeting of the chiefs of govern-
ment, the “Presidency Conclusions” of the Madrid European Council in December 
1995 lists conclusions on topics as diverse as Economic and Monetary Union, eco-
nomic policy, employment, subsidiarity, justice and home affairs, legislative sim-
plification, enlargement, and external relations. In short, the chiefs of government 
consolidated their role as the principal agenda setters of the European Union.
It should be noted that the Commission’s discretion was also compromised 
through formal changes to the Community Method. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, the European Parliament was gradually promoted from a consultative 
body to a genuine co-legislator. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty introduced the “co-
decision procedure,” modified by the follow-up Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
 provided that a conciliation committee consisting of the Parliament and the 
Council would negotiate a final compromise between both institutions.
In this last stage, however, the conciliation committee was free to introduce 
and agree on any text even against the Commission’s approval. The Commis-
sion consequently lost its monopoly of initiative, which consists of the capacity 
to select freely among alternative proposals and to bar others from the legis-
lative agenda. It remains an empirical question to what extent this procedural 
change affected the Commission’s capacity to influence the outcome of the 
legislative process, but this change nonetheless constituted a major blow to the 
Commission’s agenda-setting powers. Christophe Crombez gave the gloomiest 
interpretation (2000, 52), concluding that Commission proposals had become 
entirely irrelevant under the co-decision procedure.
A Step toward Formalization (2000–2009)
The European Council continually grew in importance. There was hardly any 
area where it did not define the long-term legislative agenda and decide more 
specific matters. In addition, the chiefs of government also used this forum to 
coordinate those policies that were not officially covered in any of the treaties. In 
2000, they set themselves the objective of coordinating the reforms of the various 
European social systems (the “Lisbon agenda”) and, for that purpose, decided to 
now meet at least four times per year.
As it became more involved, the European Council’s increasing workload in 
all aspects of European Union matters required a tighter organization. At their 
 summit in Seville in 2002, the chiefs of government therefore came up with 
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 several procedural ground rules. For example, the European Council would 
henceforth and on the basis of recommendations by the successive Council 
presidencies adopt a multiannual strategic program (European Council 2002, 
Annex 2). Furthermore, to guarantee continuity in its work, the Council of 
Ministers and its staff were more closely involved in both the preparation of 
the European Council’s agenda and the drafting of its “Presidency Conclu-
sions.” Finally, the European Council was given a permanent seat in Brussels, 
where most of its meetings have been held since (Magnette and Nicolaidis 
2005, 88–89; Werts 2008, 63–64).
However, some countries still felt that the European Council should play an 
even more significant role in the daily life of the European Union. In the context 
of the 2002–03 European Convention, which deliberated on a new institutional 
architecture for the European Union, a joint Franco-German proposal floated 
the idea of introducing a full-time standing president of the European Council 
(European Convention 2003). The proposal met with criticism by the self-styled 
“Friends of the Community Method.” Consisting mostly of representatives of 
smaller and medium-sized countries, this group feared that a full-time European 
Council president who for a term of three years chairs and coordinates the work 
of the chiefs of government would be tempted to direct the work of the Council 
of Ministers and the Commission (Werts 2008, 153).
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty (Article 15) now acknowledges the European Coun-
cil as an official institution of the EU, but emphasizes that it “shall not exercise 
legislative functions” (see also Schoutheete 2003, 474). To assuage the “Friends 
of the Community Method,” the chiefs of government in 2009 appointed the 
Belgian Herman Van Rompuy as the first permanent president of the European 
Council. Due in no small part to the Eurozone crisis, the chiefs of government 
have met almost every other month since. Ferdinando Riccardi, an editor of the 
news agency Agence Europe and an unwavering supporter of European integra-
tion, remarks in this respect:
The European Council now meets virtually every month. It is true that 
Van Rompuy convenes special summits to discuss specific issues, but 
in practice, whenever the European summit gets together, it discusses 
everything that’s happening across the board. This means that the EU 
heads of state are directly and permanently involved in European affairs. 
(Agence Europe 2010)
He notes that this development further compromises the Commission’s right 
of initiative. “The Commission,” Riccardi concludes, “maintains its fundamental 
role when the European Council has nothing to say” (Agence Europe 2011).
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On paper, the European Commission has the sole right of initiative in the EU’s leg-
islative process. A look beyond the written rules, however, reveals a different reality.
Shortly after the inception of the Treaty of Rome, the chiefs of government 
became increasingly involved in ordinary Community affairs through regular 
meetings in the form of the European Council. They frequently announced 
policy guidelines that were impossible for the Commission to disregard. Since 
the European Council’s agenda usually touched on a wide range of economic 
and related policies, this development considerably narrowed the Commission’s 
official leeway to select freely among various feasible proposals and bar others 
from the agenda.
The consolidation of the European Council as the European Union’s principal 
agenda setter was accompanied by strong conflicts among governments, supra-
national institutions, and small and large member states, as well as within the 
Commission itself. Although the European Council was gradually anchored in 
the treaties, its actual role in the legislative process has never been clearly codified.
The Commission’s Independence—Not 
Quite Absolute
The treaty stipulates that the Commission is independent, and that it neither 
seeks nor takes instructions from the member states. The reason is that the gov-
ernments themselves are susceptible to domestic pressure and therefore delegate 
agenda-setting power to an agent that they can expect to stay on the agreed-upon 
course to economic integration.
The flip side of an independent and conscientious fulfillment of a mandate, 
however, can be the loss of a sense for the domestic effects of integration and 
political realities more broadly. The chapter-opening quote of the conversa-
tion between Walter Hallstein, who put great stress on the Commission’s duty 
to engage in functional reasoning, and French commissioner Robert Marjolin 
describes this trade-off.
This section therefore focuses on the internal organization of the Commission 
in order to investigate how and to what extent the Commission was, in fact, able to 
draw on independent information and ideas when drafting legislative proposals.
Before we proceed, however, a caveat is in order regarding the data used in 
this section. There are a number of excellent secondary analyses on the Com-
mission’s internal organization (see, e.g., Cini 1996; Coombes 1970; Nugent 
2001; Page 1997; Spence and Edwards 2006; Poullet and Deprez 1976). Yet 
few of them pay attention to the informal practices investigated on the fol-
lowing pages. The reason is not negligence, but rather the fact that numerous 
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reshuffles of the commissioners’ portfolios and chaotic bookkeeping render 
reliable information a scarce commodity. The data, therefore, have to be 
treated with a grain of salt.4
A European Civil Service? (1958–1969)
Despite the ambition of becoming a civil service that was fully independent of 
governmental influence, the Commission failed to conform to this standard from 
the outset. Describing the development of national “enclaves” within the Com-
mission, Jean Siotis, a close observer of this bureaucracy, noted as early as 1964 
that “there exists a discrepancy between the institutional theory of the Com-
munities, and of the EEC in particular, and the administrative practice of the 
Commission” (Siotis 1964, 242–49; quote, 249).
A first discrepancy between an ideal-typical civil service and reality was the 
Commission’s dependence on governmental expertise. The root of the problem 
was an inefficient use of resources, rooted in the fact that the Commission’s civil 
service (the “services”) was not entirely based on a system of competitive exami-
nation of merit. Instead, recruitment and promotions, especially at senior lev-
els, had to maintain an overall national, regional, and political balance (Siotis 
1964, 248). The highest posts thus remained reserved for candidates on the basis 
of nationality or party affiliation (Coombes 1968, 20–22; 1970, 131; Wallace 
1973, 57; Clark 1967, 67).
Anticipating that this proportional representation would become an obstacle 
to competitive recruitment, Hallstein initially hired expansively and far beyond 
the Commission’s actual need (Noël 1992, 152–53). Yet this effort was largely 
undone between 1965 and 1967 when the Commission was merged with the 
administrations of Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(Coombes 1970, 265–66; Cini 1996, 56).
Although their structure was heavily in flux in the first decade, the services 
gradually differentiated functionally into several departments, the so-called 
Directorate Generals. Most Directorate Generals faced strong difficulties chan-
neling their resources into the preparation of quality legislative proposals. The 
development of the Directorate General for Agriculture was in stark contrast to 
this trend; it grew enormously relative to other Directorate Generals and became 
henceforth known as the “Agricultural Empire.” It never suffered any shortfall in 
staff or financial resources and increasingly insulated itself from the rest of the 
Commission by establishing its own expert services such as a legal service and a 
directorate for external relations (Poullet and Deprez 1976, 41).
Because of the shortfall in expertise for the preparation of quality legisla-
tive proposals, the Commission adopted the custom of consulting groups of 
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experts from national administrations or the private sector (Lindberg 1963, 
57–62; Scheinman 1966, 758–62). The number of these groups proliferated 
from the mid-1960s onward (Institut für Europäische Politik 1989, 43; Maurer, 
Mittag, and Wessels 2000, 34–40)5 to the point that the number of government 
experts who were actively involved in the preparation of Commission propos-
als massively exceeded the Commission’s own permanent staff. According to 
a contemporary study, the Commission staff in 1969 numbered five thousand 
(including translators) while the number of government experts consulted 
for the preparation of proposals exceeded ten thousand (Poullet and Deprez 
1976, 28, 117).
Importantly, although the Commission was not legally bound to heed the 
governments’ advice, it had no influence on who was delegated to these govern-
ment expert groups. Because the governments usually sent the very same officials 
who would also negotiate the legislative proposal in the Council of Ministers 
and oversee its implementation, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between mere consultation of government experts and genuine prenegotiation. 
Emile Noël, the Commission’s executive secretary, complained:6
There is a great temptation for the Commission’s services to try to work 
out compromise formulae at this stage, even though the national experts 
consulted take part in these debates as independent persons. . . . Often 
the same national experts, returning from the Council groups duly 
armed with instructions, reopen the question of the compromise and 
the whole discussion has to start again. (Noël 1973, 127)
The second factor that compromised the Commission’s independence, in 
addition to its reliance on government expertise, was the member states’ inter-
ference in internal Commission politics. Once again, this was possible because of 
a departure from merit-based hiring and promotion.
On top of the Commission’s administrative level, the services, was a polit-
ical level composed of the president and a college of commissioners, each of 
whom was appointed by the member states and responsible for a specific 
 portfolio. Following the French model, the commissioners established personal 
offices, the original function of which was to prepare decisions in the college of 
 commissioners (Krenzler 1974). But these offices, the cabinets, quickly assumed 
additional tasks. Composed mainly of fellow countrymen, they served as a trans-
mission belt between the commissioner and her home country, and the member 
states themselves did not shy away from using these ties to raise objections to 
legislative proposals in the making.
The cabinets thus permitted the commissioner, to whom they were directly 
responsible, to intervene in the work of the Commission services (Coombes 
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1970, 255). For example, in an internal meeting of undersecretaries in the late 
1960s, the German economics ministry observed that other countries made 
much better use of their contacts with commissioners, and urged that Germany 
follow suit in order to be able to voice specific concerns about Commission ini-
tiatives (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1967). Fearing a degradation of the 
Commission’s supranational character and of the collaboration between the col-
lege and civil servants, Hallstein was keen to keep the cabinets’ size as small as 
possible. A member of the Hallstein Commission explains:
The President [Hallstein] was categorically opposed to the numer-
ous cabinets: he said he did not want the Commissioners to become 
“mediatized” by their immediate collaborators. Beyond doubt, he also 
 considered that because everyone seemed to quietly agree that cabinet 
members ought to be of the same nationality as the Commissioner, 
their excessive multiplication risked creating an internal nationalism 
within the cabinet. (Lemaignen 1964, 49–50)
Nevertheless, the commissioners found various ways to work around the pres-
ident’s order. The size and influence of the cabinets consequently grew consider-
ably toward the end of the 1960s (Bitsch 2007, 200; Ritchie 1992, 104).
Government Experts All over the Place (1970–1986)
The Commission continued to diverge in practice from the ideal-typical inde-
pendent civil service. In reaction to growing complaints about the poor qual-
ity of its legislative proposals (Weinstock 1981, 50; Sasse 1975, 162–63), the 
Commission appointed an independent review body, the Spierenburg Group, 
to suggest internal reforms. The chiefs of government for their part commis-
sioned the “Three Wise Men” (Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell, and Robert 
Marjolin) to consider adjustments to the Community institutions in general. 
Both groups highlighted the fact that the Commission often failed to assert its 
independence and that it faced difficulties preparing quality legislative pro-
posals.
First, the reports acknowledged that the Commission lacked the human 
resources necessary to come up with fully independent proposals. Although the 
Commission’s permanent staff increased in absolute numbers in the 1970s, the 
growth was much lower than that of other EU institutions and concerned mostly 
staff occupied with technical tasks and translation (Strasser 1979, 322). The Spie-
renburg Report notes:
The total number of Commission employees is smaller than is generally 
realized. Excluding staff paid from research appropriations, it amounts 
72      CHAPTER 3
to 8,300 officials, of whom some 40% are directly or indirectly con-
cerned with linguistic work. Taken as a whole, these numbers do not 
seem excessive when compared with national central administrations. 
(European Communities 1979, n. 11)
In fact, the Commission was, up to that time, in absolute numbers not larger 
than the municipal administration of Madrid, and the average Commission 
Directorate General (a staff of 230 in 1979) was usually the same size or smaller 
than its counterpart in the average national administration (Henig 1980, 41, 44). 
By far the largest number of staff (640 in the late 1970s), three times as many as 
in the next policy area, were employed in the “Agricultural Empire” (European 
Communities 1980; Willis 1982, 9), which continued to enjoy a special and inde-
pendent status that gained it “a reputation for separateness” (Harris, Swinbank, 
and Wilkinson 1983, 16).
In other Directorate Generals, however, the Commission consequently con-
tinued to rely on government expertise in the preparation of its legislative pro-
posals. The available data are to be taken with a grain of salt, because neither the 
Commission nor other institutions kept official records of these expert commit-
tees. The various existing sources suggest, however, that the number of govern-
mental experts that the Commission consulted in the preparation of proposals 
was at least twice as large as the Commission’s permanent staff (Rometsch 1999, 
329–31).7 In addition, the Commission also began to host senior officials, who 
were loaned to the Commission from national administrations for up to three 
years but remained paid by their employer (Spence 1994, 73). To be sure, these 
numbers need not imply that the Commission’s independence was compro-
mised. However, these government experts were still largely identical with the 
government representatives who would later negotiate the same proposal in the 
Council of Ministers (Amphoux et al. 1979, 347). Both the Spierenburg Group 
(European Communities 1979, n. 27) and the Three Wise Men cautioned against 
this erosion of the Commission’s independence. The Three Wise Men explicitly 
demanded that
the Commission must frame its proposal in a more independent 
manner. . . . It is sensible and sometimes  essential for the Commission’s 
departments to consult national and other experts on the purely technical 
background to a proposal. But they should not, as so often happens now, 
be drawn into negotiating with them to find a supposedly acceptable form 
of the measure. (Council of the EC 1980, chap. 4)
Although the college decided in the early 1970s to restrict the number of cabi-
net members, the commissioners did not adhere to their own rule (Endo 1999, 
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44). The cabinets grew dramatically, from an average of four members in the late 
1960s to fourteen members by the mid-1970s (Michelmann 1978, 495; see also 
Poullet and Deprez 1976, 53), and increasingly became a channel for the member 
states to raise objections against proposals in the making, and for the commis-
sioners to subsequently intervene in the work of the services. The Spierenburg 
Report in particular pointed to the resulting frictions between the cabinets and 
the services:
Some aspects of [the cabinets’] operation are starting to cause difficul-
ties and are even threatening to disrupt, quite substantially, the smooth 
running of Commission Services: Cabinets “shielding” their Member 
[States] from their Services, Chefs de cabinets usurping the responsi-
bilities of the Directors-General, meetings of the Chefs de cabinets (and 
indeed of junior Cabinet staff) questioning proposals without consult-
ing the officials responsible for them, interference in appointment 
 procedures with undue weight being given to nationality factors, and so 
on. (European Communities 1979, 56; Cini 1996, 111–15)
A Common Cause and Growing Frictions (1987–1993)
The presidency of Jacques Delors from 1985 until 1995 is often hailed as the 
second heyday of the Commission. The objective of establishing a genuine 
Internal Market, to which the member states committed themselves in 1986 
with the Single European Act, brought new impetus to the legislative process. 
Helped by many dedicated people around him (Ross 1994; Cini 1996, 183–87), 
Delors exerted personal leadership that also allowed him to unite the Commis-
sion behind this common cause. Ironically, these years only served to aggra-
vate the deeper structural problems that we identified before. The Commission 
became increasingly dependent on government expertise, frictions between the 
college and the services intensified, and the cabinet system got out of control.
In 1985, the Commission’s White Paper (the “Cockfield Paper”) identified 
more than three hundred measures that needed to be adopted in order to com-
plete the Single Market. However, few, if any, provisions were made to increase 
the Commission’s human resources in order to match this workload. “Commis-
sion services,” one official explains, “were faced with the choice between sim-
ply not doing the work, or finding other means to secure the necessary staff” 
(Spence 1994, 72). To draw another comparison to a European city: employing 
about twelve thousand permanent officials (excluding translators) in 1993, the 
Commission was smaller in size than the staff of the Edinburgh city government 
(McGowan and Wilks 1995, 154).
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Furthermore, the Commission was unable to channel its existing staff 
resources to where they were needed. Agriculture thus remained the largest 
policy-related Directorate General with 826 staff members, while that respon-
sible for the Internal Market employed only 430 staff members (Page 1997, 32). 
In hindsight, Delors’s chef de cabinet, Pascal Lamy acknowledges: “[We] should 
have changed the structure of the institution, but we thought it wasn’t a prior-
ity. The problem is that officials spend too much time managing tasks and not 
enough time with the tasks themselves” (quoted in Grant 1994, 114).
Against this background, the Commission had no other choice but to inten-
sify its reliance on government experts in the preparation of legislative proposals, 
whose numbers rose dramatically from 1987 onward (Commission des Commu-
nautés Européennes 1988, 3).8 The European Parliament’s Committee on Insti-
tutional Affairs heavily criticized this development, which it said compromised 
the Commission’s independence:
[Where] there are too many national experts in a given sector, they can 
actually jeopardize the independence of the Commission. More serious 
still is the case of experts, consulted during the process of drawing up 
legislative initiatives, who are at the same time Council experts or, worse 
still, who subsequently participate in the decisions of the Council. In 
such cases, there can be no doubt that the independence of the Com-
mission is seriously jeopardized. (European Parliament 1993, 8)
The same committee also worried about the fact that the Commission bor-
rowed a large number of seconded experts from national administrations; their 
numbers increased sixfold between 1987 and 1993, and sometimes exceeded the 
number of Community officials in a department (Page 1997, 59). Most alarm-
ingly, in the view of the European Parliament, these experts were primarily 
assigned to departments involved in drawing up legislative proposals (European 
Parliament 1993).
In addition to the increasing dependence on external governmental exper-
tise, the cabinet system grew massively in these years. For Delors, it was a 
means to make an end run around a slow bureaucracy, and the members of 
his cabinet, headed by Pascal Lamy, were considered particularly patronizing, 
even brutal, toward other commissioners and the Commission services (Ross 
1995, 63–68).
Other commissioners reacted to this by strengthening their own cabinets’ 
power over the services. As one senior official explained, “Certainly, cabinets are 
far more powerful now, and that is certainly a consequence of Delors. His own 
cabinet is very active, and other cabinets are responding” (Peterson 1999, 56). 
The total number of official personal staff exceeded three hundred in 1989—that 
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is, eighteen members per commissioner on average. Official quotas were often 
circumvented through the hiring of additional members financed by national 
governments or political sources (Ludlow 1991, 93).
According to a close observer of the Delors presidency, George Ross (1995, 
161), the cabinet system got completely out of control. The result was increas-
ing frictions within the college of commissioners, on the one hand, and 
between the college and the services, on the other hand. An internal report in 
1991 notes ever-increasing interference by cabinets into the work and tasks that 
are incumbent on the services (Commission des Communautés Européennes 
1991b, 4). Another internal report about the Commission’s efficiency drawn up 
by the services points to the cabinets’ increasing meddling with the Directorate 
Generals’ work, and demands “first of all, to improve the connection [embray-
age] between the institution’s political and the administrative level, and in this 
context to limit the excessive interference of the member states” (Commission 
Européenne 1994, 36).
Paralysis (1994–1999)
The objective of establishing a Single Market had only concealed the Commis-
sion’s deeper structural problems. Once the goal was reached in 1992, these prob-
lems resurfaced and were aggravated in response to new challenges.
First, the Commission’s resources remained tied up due to a number of new 
challenges. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it gradually transpired that the Com-
mission would have to prepare the accession of more than ten Central and  Eastern 
European countries to the EU. Also, the Treaty of Maastricht had created new EU 
competences in the areas of foreign and security policy and justice and home 
affairs policies. Although most of these policies were not (yet) subject to the 
Community Method, they nevertheless absorbed some of the Commission’s 
capacities.
Second, various incidents of mismanagement and nepotism under Delors’s 
and, subsequently Jacques Santer’s, presidencies put the Commission under 
increased public scrutiny. Given its workload and the inefficient distribution of 
staff across departments,9 the Commission continued to rely heavily on govern-
ment expert groups for the preparation of legislative proposals.10 Also, the num-
ber of seconded experts remained high, at 750 in 1999, so that approximately 
8 percent of the most senior ranks in the Commission were staffed with tempo-
rary agents (European Communities 1999, 136–39).
The Commission itself noted in a white paper about the Commission’s inter-
nal organization that in some departments, “the reliance on non-permanent staff 
is unacceptably high [and] cannot be justified” (European Commission 2000). 
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The European Parliament also strongly criticized the Commission’s reliance on 
government experts. One report on “the independence of members of the Com-
munity institutions” notes that “[its] legislation drafting powers are exercised 
under the necessity to draw support from the Council of Ministers, i.e. national 
civil servants and experts preparing the work of the Council” (European Parlia-
ment 1994, 5). Another report cautions against the widespread use of seconding 
personnel from national administrations, and warned that this practice “poses a 
number of risks, above all that of possible conflict of interests, with such officials 
retaining too close a link with certain national or sectoral interests” (European 
Parliament 1999b, 18).
The Santer Commission drafted several reports on the reform of the Commis-
sion, none of which had a significant impact on its internal organization (Cini 
2000; Kassim 2008). Ultimately, these reform attempts were overtaken by events 
when several instances of fraud came to light.
The system of cabinets, which had proliferated under the presidency of Jacques 
Delors, suddenly came under close scrutiny. The French commissioner, Édith 
Cresson, a former prime minister, had employed her dentist and personal friend 
initially as a personal scientific advisor. When this and similar cases became pub-
lic, the Commission set up a task force and the European Parliament set up a 
Committee of Independent Experts to inquire into the cause of the Commis-
sion’s mismanagement. The latter, in particular, saw a clear link between the lack 
of clarity regarding the rules and criteria for the appointment of individuals to 
cabinets. More generally, this committee cautioned against the threat the system 
posed to the Commission’s independence:
It is unacceptable that cabinets—which are involved in policy making 
in the Commission—should be composed exclusively or predomi-
nantly of persons of the same nationality as the commissioner. That 
would put the Community character of the commissioner’s work 
too much at risk. [This concerns] not only appointments but also 
all other areas of  decision making, most particularly where finan-
cial incentives or  subsidies are involved. Commissioners who, in the 
exercise of their office, use undue influence to favour their national 
interests should be deemed in serious breach of their obligation of 
independence. (Committee of Independent Experts 1999b, 117; see 
also Peterson 1999, 56)
The report consequently demanded clearer rules and criteria for the appoint-
ment of individuals to the cabinets as well as limits on the cabinets’ size and 
 quotas to ensure their multinational character (Committee of Independent 
Experts 1999a, 23).
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A Fresh Start or Business as Usual? (2000–Present)
Following the forced resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 and 
another financial scandal in the EU’s statistical office, the incoming Com-
mission under President Romano Prodi made internal reform a priority. 
Neil Kinnock, the vice president of the Commission, was put in charge of 
administrative reforms following the recommendations of the Commit-
tee of Independent Experts. In early 2000, a white paper titled “Reform-
ing the Commission” mapped a number of actions that were supposed to 
enhance the Commission’s independence, accountability, efficiency and 
transparency (European Commission 2000, 7; see also Kassim 2004a, 44–54). 
It found the Commission’s dependence on temporary staff unjustifiable, and 
recommended that temporary experts seconded by national administrations 
“always work under the guidance of permanent officials and they should not 
account for more than a small minority of overall staff ” (European Commis-
sion 2000, 37).
However, the reforms of the personnel policy met with strong resistance by 
the unions that represent EU staff. Although they accounted for more than a 
third of the Committee of Independent Experts’ recommendations, the person-
nel reform proposals were significantly watered down (Kassim 2008, 660; 2004a, 
52–54). It is hence not surprising that ten years later, the proportion of tempo-
rary staff in senior ranks remains largely unchanged at approximately 8 percent 
of total staff.11 However, because the Commission had to absorb the influx of 
new commissioners and civil servants from the new member states (Peterson 
2008, 769–71), it might still take some time for the Kinnock reforms to make 
a noticeable impact on the Commission’s dependence on government experts. 
 Scholarly assessment of the reform remains mixed, with some hailing the 
changes in  personnel policy and financial management as a “historic achieve-
ment”  (Kassim 2004b, 39), and others concluding that the promise of reform was 
not kept (Schön-Quinlivan 2011, 121).
At the same time, the number of expert groups consulted in the prepa-
ration of legislative proposals increased radically. Gornitzka and Sverdrup 
(2008, 733, 743) find that the gradual growth in expert groups since the begin-
ning of European integration was replaced by a dramatic increase of more 
than 40 percent since the year 2000. Although data are still to be treated with 
a grain of salt, since it is difficult to identify and delineate these groups, they 
identify more than twelve hundred expert groups, three-quarters of which are 
informal.
Unfortunately, the existing data do not discriminate between groups consist-
ing primarily of government experts, experts from sectoral interests, or scientific 
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experts. According to an independent study in 2008, government representa-
tives make up at least two-thirds of all experts (Euobserver 2008). Another study 
conducted on behalf of the Swedish Ministry of Finance notes that government 
experts are not regarded as being truly independent. Since there is usually a sub-
stantial overlap in terms of participants, and in some cases even a perfect match 
between the expert groups and the government representatives in the Council 
and in the implementation stage, these representatives usually advocate their 
governments’ opinion (Larsson 2003, 78).
Prodi had more success reforming the cabinets. To reduce national influences 
on the college of commissioners, each of them was supposed to include staff from 
at least three nationalities comprising no more than six senior members (Agence 
Europe 1999c; Prodi 1999; see also Stevens and Stevens 2001, 85; Peterson 2004, 
25). His successor, José Manuel Barroso, decreed that at least three members had 
to be recruited from the services (Peterson 2010, 5).
Although the cabinets certainly became more multinational at the core (Egeberg 
and Heskestad 2010, 780), the actual effects of these changes were mixed. Commis-
sioners once again found various ways around the rules. John Peterson notes that 
there is currently considerable ambiguity with respect to the role of personal advi-
sors, who are not official members of the cabinet (Peterson 2010, 2, n2). Although 
the number of cabinet members has gone down officially, the commissioners 
clearly get additional personal help. “By a liberal account,” he notes, “most cabinets 
could be viewed as having at least 17 members.” Recently, a former member of one 
of these cabinets describes their role as gatekeepers and transmission belts:
A member of cabinet has to be a kind of internal spy. To do this job, he 
has to know what is going on in the DG—and this is not always straight-
forward. . . . As soon as a draft reaches the political level—in other words, 
the level of cabinets—national interests come more strongly into play. 
During my studies, I had been taught that a Commissioner works for 
the greater good of all Europeans. Like many things taught at school, 
this is not entirely true. . . . [All] too often national preoccupations are 
introduced into the debate via the backdoor of the Commissioner’s 
cabinet. (Eppink 2007, 115–16, 199)
There is little evidence that the cabinets have lost their functions as trans-
mission belts between national interests and the Commission. This became 
apparent when the looming accession of new member states from Central 
and Eastern Europe to the EU led to calls to reduce the Commission’s size by 
relinquishing the member states’ right to nominate a Commissioner. Small and 
medium-sized countries were vehemently opposed to the idea of having to give 
up “their” commissioner. Although proponents of a smaller college argued that 
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having a commissioner did not matter, since the Commission was supposed to 
be independent anyway, these countries emphasized the importance of having 
a point of contact in order to make the Commission consider their national cir-
cumstances. “What is important,” the Austrian foreign minister explained, “is 
that there is somebody within [the Commission who] understands the situa-
tion, the problems and sensitivities at home” (Agence Europe 2001). This state-
ment ties in with recent research that finds that the commissioner’s nationality 
is a strong predictor of the policy position of the Commission as a whole. Fur-
thermore, there is no great difference among the member states in this respect 
(Thomson 2008a, 183, 186).
The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions regarding the reduction of the college were 
scrapped in order to assuage the people of Ireland after their initial rejection of 
the treaty in a referendum.
For the Commission to perform its agenda-setting function, it has to be entirely 
independent from the member states. In reality, however, the Commission has 
not always been able to live up to this standard. Unable to channel its resources 
to where they were needed, the Commission saw its services become, in many 
areas, dependent on the governments’ ideas and information. It consulted expert 
groups, which usually consisted of exactly the same government experts who 
would later also negotiate and implement the decision they had helped prepare. 
In addition, the Commission often staffed especially senior ranks with seconded 
experts from national administrations. Finally, the commissioners surrounded 
themselves with personal advisers, most of whom were fellow countrymen with 
close ties to their home country and a feeling for national sensitivities.
A number of reforms in recent years may have done away in particular with 
the role of cabinets as transmission belts between the Commission and national 
administrations, although it is still too early to assess their impact. The develop-
ment of these practices often created strong conflicts between member states 
and the Commission and, more strongly, between the Commission’s political 
and administrative level. The Commission services are especially critical of the 
reliance on government expertise, while their proponents often argue that it is 
necessary to instill a sense of domestic political reality into the Commission.
The Power of Timing—Losing the Beat
The treaty rules permit the Commission to delay the submission of a legislative 
proposal and to withdraw it at any time to await “policy windows,” that is, situ-
ations where the constellation of preferences is more favorable to the adoption 
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of its preferred policy. These might be situations where conflicts among govern-
ments induce a knife-edge majority to impose the most integrationist outcome 
on other countries.
As the quote by Hallstein at the beginning of this chapter suggests, the Com-
mission indeed expected to make full use of this aspect of agenda setting. However, 
the flip side of its control over timing is that it submits the proposal in a situation 
in which a government is very susceptible to domestic pressure or the majority in 
the Council faces difficulties accommodating a government under pressure.
Thus, to be able to exercise discretion, the governments have to find a way to 
collectively determine the timing of a decision.12 In the following sections, there-
fore, we focus on the practices between the submission of a legislative proposal 
and its actual adoption.
Governments Set the Pace (1958–1969)
A strong norm existed from the outset for the Commission to consult govern-
ment experts during the preparation of a proposal and to keep the governments’ 
permanent representatives in Brussels updated about the proposal’s publication 
(Vertretung der BRD bei der EWG 1964b; Noël 1967a, 31).
In the early 1960s, when the Commission occasionally tried to circumvent this 
convention through advance publication, the governments immediately punished 
these attempts (Alting von Geusau 1966, 238). In 1960, for instance, Hallstein 
leaked a proposal on the acceleration of the completion of the customs union to 
the press and encouraged the European Parliament to debate it even before the 
governments had had the chance to discuss it (Räte der Europäischen Gemein-
schaften 1960). All governments in the Council immediately rebuked the Commis-
sion and advised responsible civil servants to be more cautious, especially in their 
contacts with “community-skeptical” groups, that is, domestic groups opposed to 
economic integration (Rat der EWG 1960a, 24–27; Auswärtiges Amt 1960).
Another infringement of the norm in 1965 triggered the so-called empty-chair 
crisis. In response to a Commission proposal on the financing of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, De Gaulle decided to withdraw senior French representa-
tives from the institutions, which resulted in the lack of a quorum and blocked 
the legislative process for half a year. Although he knew it would hit a raw nerve 
with France, Hallstein had deliberately aired the proposal without prior con-
sultation of the Council. This course of action not only infuriated the French 
president but it was widely regarded as a clear “breach of etiquette” (von der 
Groeben 1985, 185; see also Camps 1966, 48–49; Lambert 1966, 198; Newhouse 
1967, 84)—a violation of an established norm in decision making that upset not 
only the French delegation (Marjolin 1989, 349).
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The so-called Luxembourg compromise, an unofficial understanding among 
the member states that resolved the crisis in 1966, notes the governments’ agree-
ment on the significance of the norm of consultation:
Before adopting any particularly important proposal, it is desirable 
that the Commission should take up the appropriate contacts with the 
Governments of the Member States. . . . Proposals and any other official 
acts which the Commission submits to the Council and to the member 
States are not to be made public until the recipients have had formal 
notice of them and are in possession of the text. (European Communi-
ties 1966)
At the same time, the governments began to pass on legislative proposals to 
preparatory groups of government experts in a rapidly growing Council sub-
structure before discussing them at the level of the Council of Ministers. The 
cumulative effect of all these practices was a decoupling of the official submission 
of a legislative proposal from its adoption in the Council. By keeping proposals 
in the Council’s substructure, the governments were now able to defer discus-
sions and a decision on a legal act until domestic shock waves calmed down. The 
Commission was well aware of the effect of these practices and its consequent 
loss of this aspect of agenda-setting power. Christoph Sasse, a chef de cabinet in 
the Commission, describes it as follows:
Constitutional reality diverged [from the treaties. The Commission] still 
prepares proposals with [the] help of governmental experts; yet, if and 
when the Council deals with them . . . [it] lies only to a very little extent 
in the Commission’s sphere of influence. The work rhythm is thus not 
dependent on the Commission’s splendid programs. It depends on the 
progress made by national bureaucracies and the permanent represen-
tatives. (Sasse 1972, 88)
In other words, the member states had gained discretion in determining the tim-
ing of a decision. The Commission, in turn, was no longer able to await policy 
windows for the adoption of its legislative proposal.
The Court Turns the Tide (1970–1986)
The situation changed rapidly in 1980 when the European Court of Justice sud-
denly brought the European Parliament into this play. The Council gradually 
felt obliged over the course of the 1970s to consult with Parliament on “very 
important” problems that were not related to any compulsory expenses (Jacobs, 
Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, 179). This excluded primarily agricultural matters 
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that were usually tied to precommitted funds (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 162–65). 
In 1973, the Council had pledged “except in cases of urgency not to examine a 
proposal of the Commission on which the Parliament has been consulted until 
the opinion of the Parliament has been received, provided that such opinions are 
given by an appropriate date” (quoted in Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, 
179, italics added). Parliamentary hearings subsequently became more frequent, 
particularly after the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament 
in 1979 (Nord and Taylor 1979, 419; Wallace 1979, 439).
At one point, however, the Council failed to consult with Parliament on a 
supposedly urgent decision on an isoglucose (high-fructose corn syrup) produc-
tion quota. The Parliament took legal action and the Court, in its controversial 
Isoglucose judgment, annulled the corresponding legal act for infringement of 
essential procedural requirements (European Court of Justice 1980). In other 
words, the Court found that the Council was not supposed to adopt a legal act 
until the European Parliament had formed an opinion on it. The ruling conse-
quently turned what had emerged as an informal complaisance, the consultation 
of the European Parliament, into a right for the Parliament to veto decisions by 
delaying them indefinitely.
Thus, while the Commission had lost its capacity to await policy windows, 
both the Council and the European Parliament had gained discretion in timing 
decisions for that purpose. This also had implications for the bargaining power 
of both institutions in the event that one was less patient than the other. As a 
consequence, the judgment resulted in arduous maneuvering regarding the pre-
cise sequence of moves in decision making. The European Parliament changed 
its internal practices to be able to reconsider and delay amendments to the Com-
mission’s legislative proposal (Judge and Earnshaw 2008, 39–40). In response, the 
Council ever more frequently took decisions “in principle” and “subject to Parlia-
ment’s opinion,” in order not to provide the European Parliament any pretense 
for withholding its opinion on this decision (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 165–66). 
The Parliament complained that if “there is to be a genuine dialogue and if Parlia-
ment’s opinion is to be taken into consideration, the Council must stop adopting 
acts ‘subject to Parliament’s opinion,’ since this renders the opinion a mere for-
mality (European Parliament 1988, 15). For the time being, this change in practice 
gave the Council the upper hand in determining the timing of a decision, since it 
avoided giving the European Parliament a reason to delay the legislative process.
Starting the Countdown (1987–1993)
This tit-for-tat between the Council and the European Parliament was brought 
to a halt for some time when the Single European Act codified the sequence of 
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moves that had emerged by introducing a second stage to the legislative proce-
dure.
The first stage remained as before: the Commission made a proposal, Par-
liament rendered its opinion (first reading), and the Council made the final 
decision. But now this last decision turned into a preliminary Council position, 
which initiated the second stage with a similar sequence. Importantly, the treaty 
now stipulated that this second stage should be concluded within a three-month 
timeframe (Corbett 1998, 263).
This new procedure changed the bargaining power of each institution. Since 
the last stage was supposed to be concluded within a specific time frame, Parlia-
ment’s veto by delay was turned into a veto by rejection. This seemed a bad deal for 
the Parliament: its threat to reject a decision was less viable than its threat to delay 
it, because it was unlikely to reject a law that was going to enhance economic 
integration in its entirety.13
More relevant for the present purpose, however, is the fact that the procedure 
strengthened the Council’s capacity to determine the timing of a decision, since it 
decided when to initiate the second stage and start the three-month countdown with 
the adoption of its preliminary decision (Bieber, Pantalis, and Schoo 1986, 779).
Giving the Beat (1994–Present)
To recap, the Council’s control of the timing of a decision was based on the 
fact that it decoupled the submission of a proposal from its adoption by pass-
ing legislative proposals to a large informal Council substructure where they 
would sometimes linger for years. When the European Parliament emerged 
in the picture, the member states recovered their control of the timing of 
a decision by subjecting Parliament’s internal decision-making process to a 
clear timeframe.
In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced a new legislative procedure 
(“co-decision I”) with yet another stage—the conciliation stage—added to 
the process, the conclusion of which was once again subject to a three-month 
time limit (Bieber 1995, 62). In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, 
scrapped some steps in this quite complicated procedure and had the new 
“co-decision II” procedure end with a less intricate conciliation procedure to 
be concluded within the previous time limit. This legislative procedure has 
gradually been extended to almost all policies that deal with economic inte-
gration and, with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, even to most 
agricultural matters.
Although the co-decision procedure endowed Parliament with more bar-
gaining power vis-à-vis the Council, it consolidated the Council’s control of the 
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timing of a decision. First, the Parliament’s internal decision-making process 
remained subject to a clear timeframe. Second, in the event that a conciliation 
committee is convened between Parliament and Council, the Commission loses 
its capacity to withdraw the proposal from the legislative process. As a result, 
the Council is in full control of the timing of a decision, because it initiates the 
legislative process as a whole and it starts the countdown to each deadline within 
the procedure.
In sum, the treaty rules initially allowed the Commission to await “policy 
windows” for the adoption of its preferred proposals. In fact, as the quotes by 
Hallstein at the beginning of this chapter and Sasse in this section suggest, the 
Commission initially expected to make full use of this power. However, the gov-
ernments adopted a number of practices that decoupled the stages of agenda 
setting and decision making. In particular, the practice of passing legislative 
proposals to the Council substructure before discussing them at the level of the 
Council of Ministers allowed the member states to put off domestically con-
troversial proposals for years. The governments also managed to defend their 
control of the timing of a decision against the European Parliament as it started 
to get involved in the legislative game. These practices invariably brought about 
strong conflicts between the governments, on the one side, and supranational 
institutions, on the other side.
Agenda Setting in the European Union, 
1958–2009
Due to its exclusive right to set the agenda, the European Commission plays a 
decidedly powerful and political role in the EU’s legislative process. There are 
three aspects to this power: the capacity to select proposals and, by implication, 
bar rival ones from the agenda; the capacity to await situations that are condu-
cive to the adoption of this proposal; and the Commission’s immunity to ad 
hoc influence. Because its agenda-setting power turned the Commission into the 
motor of integration, it represented a very strong commitment on the part of the 
member states to economic integration.
If we look beyond these treaty rules to actual practices, however, we see that 
the agenda-setting process is littered with practices of informal governance that 
seem to act as “brakes” to the Commission motor. This finding stands in striking 
contrast to standard agenda-setting models, which assume that the Commis-
sion holds invariably strong preferences for high levels of integration. It implies 
that before a proposal is submitted to the Council, the member states frequently 
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compel the Commission to take those edges off it that promise to generate exten-
sive conflicts at the domestic level.
First, the Commission was less and less able to bar alternative proposals from 
the legislative agenda. This became most apparent in the late 1960s with the 
emergence of the European Council, which began to preset the legislative agenda 
in ways that were impossible for the Commission to ignore.
Second, the Commission was not entirely immune to ad hoc governmental 
influence. Since it was, for various reasons, difficult to channel resources into 
the preparation of quality legislative proposals, the Commission became increas-
ingly dependent on governmental expertise and seconded government officials. 
In addition, it was also difficult to fight off national influence on internal politics, 
particularly within the college and via the cabinets system.
Third, the Commission gradually lost the capacity to await windows of oppor-
tunity for the adoption of its most-preferred proposals. Because governments 
refused to discuss proposals before their experts had had a look at them, the leg-
islative process became, in fact, determined by the work rhythm of government 
experts in a massive Council substructure. When the European Parliament sud-
denly entered the legislative game, the governments were quick to adopt practices 
that would deprive it of this newly gained power.
These practices are not random. The table below visualizes the three prac-
tices of informal governance in regulatory issue areas and agriculture during the 
five different time periods. Each cell constitutes an individual observation where 
either formal or informal governance prevailed. 
The table suggests that informal governance varies systematically both 
over time and across issue areas. In contrast to the expectations of classical 
regime theory, which expects informal governance to arise in response to 
enhanced legislative activity and the accession of new states to the EU, the 
practices vary mostly across issue areas and are remarkably stable over time. 
Contradicting power-based institutionalism, formal governance prevails on 
agricultural matters, which are of predictable sensitivity to a large member 
state. According to Liberal Regime Theory, this is because domestic pres-
sure is easier to predict in this than in other issue areas, and it is therefore 
also more easily dealt with in the context of existing formal rules. Another 
piece of evidence that corroborates our theory is that the emergence and use 
of most of the practices of informal governance generated conflicts mainly 
between the governments and the supranational institutions, not among the 
governments themselves.
However, there are also clear limits to Liberal Regime Theory’s explanatory 
power. The European Council, for example, intervened in all issue areas regardless 
of their political uncertainty. The emergence and use of this informal institution 
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also sparked strong conflicts, especially between large and small member states. 
Finally, its role in legislation was, albeit ambiguously, codified in the most recent 
Lisbon Treaty.
In addition, Parliament’s capacity in the 1980s to delay decisions defies 
our predictions. This, and the European Council cannot, or cannot solely, be 
explained in terms of a demand for situational flexibility in order to deal with 
political uncertainty. Other explanations will be more fruitful to make sense of 
these observations.
TABLE 5 Formal and informal governance in agenda setting
TIME PERIOD
DIMENSION
LOW POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY HIGH POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
PROPOSALS EXPERTISE TIMING PROPOSAL EXPERTISE TIMING
1958–1969 Formal Formal Formal Formal Informal Informal
1970–1986 Informal Formal Formal Informal Informal Formal
1987–1993 Informal Formal Formal Informal Informal Informal
1994–2000 Informal Formal Formal Informal Informal Informal
2001–2009 Informal Formal Formal Informal Informal Informal
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DECISION MAKING IN THE COUNCIL 
AND THE PARLIAMENT
There will never be a decision against a government that faces 
strong problems selling or implementing it at home. In these cases, 
we always try to find a compromise.
—Interview with a Council official, January 2008
After the Commission has officially submitted its proposal for a legislative act, 
the Council of Ministers and today also the European Parliament have to decide 
whether they want to adopt or change it. In a sense, this procedure is not very 
different from the decision-making procedures in other international organiza-
tions. In the United Nations, for example, the members of the Security Council 
take votes on official proposals for a resolution.
But there are also some notable differences with the way other international 
organizations typically work. The first is that the voting rules in the Council 
strongly privilege the adoption of the Commission’s legislative proposal over its 
amendment, since it is easier for the ministers to find a majority who endorses it 
than to agree unanimously on changes. As Mark Pollack (2003b, 85) notes, these 
rules provide greater protection for the agenda setter’s proposal than in most U.S. 
congressional legislation.
The second, more recent difference is the involvement of the European Parlia-
ment in the legislative process. To be sure, there are other international parlia-
ments such as NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly or the United Nation’s General 
Assembly. The European Parliament, however, is now far stronger than these 
assemblies and, at least officially, on a par with the Council of Ministers.
Why did the member states cede their national vetoes and make it so difficult 
for themselves to alter the Commission’s legislative proposals? The reason is that 
surrendering the right to veto individual decisions constitutes a strong commit-
ment to cooperation, since the member states accept that economic integration 
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might necessitate that they be overruled on individual decisions. The rules, in 
other words, allow them to demonstrate their determination to attain this objec-
tive even against the myopic interests of one or the other governments under 
domestic pressure for protection. Although the European Parliament’s empow-
erment does not undermine the commitment function of the voting rules, it can-
not be explained in these terms and is probably better understood as an attempt 
to attenuate the European Union’s perceived “democratic deficit.”
Initial studies of Council decision making and the European Parliament 
were mostly descriptive and remarkably knowledgeable in nature.1 The past two 
decades, however, have witnessed an explosion of formal and quantitative analy-
ses. Facilitated by the off-the-shelf availability of models of legislative bargain-
ing, changes to the EU’s legislative procedures, and an increasing availability of 
decision-making data, more and more scholars have approached everyday EU 
politics similar to the way scholars study decision making in the U.S. Congress.
A first line of research sought to explore the ability of individual governments 
to influence Council decisions. Several scholars (see, e.g., Hosli 1993) computed 
power indexes, which represented the proportion of all possible winning coali-
tions to which an individual government is pivotal. Interested in the efficiency 
of the legislative process, scholars such as Jonathan Golub (1999) and Thomas 
König (2007) have investigated the determinants of decision-making speed in the 
Council. Christophe Crombez (1996) and Bernard Steunenberg (1996), among 
others, have pioneered formal models to investigate the effect of legislative proce-
dures, information, and power on the substance of legislative bargaining between 
the Council and the Parliament. Although tests of these formal models are highly 
intricate, a group of scholars sought to meet the challenge and evaluated the 
models’ empirical implications with a newly collected data set of various Council 
decisions. Although the results still have to be taken with a grain of salt (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2004), this project found that so-called procedural models that empha-
size the power of formal rules fare worse than models that give more weight to 
informal bargaining among the member states (Achen 2006b). Corroborating 
this book’s argument, Chris Achen concludes, “However decision-making is car-
ried out, it does not seem well described solely by the formal rules. Informal 
norms and procedures appear to play a more central role.” (Achen 2006a, 295)
A formidable challenge that empirical tests of theoretical models of decision 
making face is that we know little about what the member states and other legis-
lative actors want. More recently, studies have therefore turned to the analysis of 
preferences and cleavages within the Council and the European Parliament. Simon 
Hix and colleagues (2007) show that Left-Right cleavages have become increasingly 
noticeable in the European Parliament. Analyzing speeches,  Sven-Oliver Proksch 
and Jonathan Slapin (2010) contend that national  divisions and party positions 
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toward deeper EU integration are the most important dimensions of parliamen-
tary speeches. Depending on data and time period, students of the Council find all 
kinds of cleavages or coalitions along redistributive dimensions (Zimmer, Schnei-
der, and Dobbins 2005), between regions (Mattila 2009), or about regulatory solu-
tions (Thomson 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004).
Interestingly, and again corroborating this book’s argument, the most consis-
tent finding of these studies seems to be that states’ preferences are quite difficult 
to predict (Thomson 2011, 134). In contrast to the existing literature, which 
continues to search the data for stable preference patterns, this chapter takes the 
contingency of preferences as its starting point. It argues that precisely because 
domestic preferences are difficult to predict, governments frequently need to 
mitigate the rules’ effects when a decision threatens to stir up strong distributive 
conflict at the domestic level. To be sure, this argument does not imply that voting 
rules and the rules governing decision making between Council and Parliament 
are not effective. It is precisely because they are so effective that they also harbor 
the potential of imposing excessive adjustment costs onto an individual group. To 
prevent governments from defying the implementation of EU law in these situa-
tions, the member states use informal governance in order to relieve these govern-
ments of excessive domestic pressure. Specifically, the governments refrain from 
voting against a cooperating partner under intense domestic pressure. Instead, 
they seek to find a consensus that accommodates this troubled government. At the 
same time, they seek to implicate the Parliament in these practices.
Liberal Regime Theory predicts that these practices of informal governance 
emerge especially in issue areas where the formation of domestic pressure is diffi-
cult to predict, while formal governance should be more noticeable in issue areas 
such as agriculture where domestic pressure is easier to predict. Given that the 
member states agree on the necessity of informal governance, its emergence and 
use is expected to generate conflicts between the governments and supranational 
institutions, rather than among the governments themselves. Let us now take a 
look beyond the treaty rules at actual decision-making practices.
The Council of Ministers—
the Consensus Machine
The voting rules in the Council facilitate economic integration even against the 
myopic interests of one or more member states, since it is easier to adopt the 
Commission’s legislative proposal by a majority vote than to attain a consensus 
for its amendment. The flip side of these rules is that it is also easy to impose a 
legal act on one or more governments in the minority even if this act threatens 
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to create strong domestic conflicts in these countries. To prevent these situations, 
governments need to refrain from voting and attain the consensus that is neces-
sary to collectively accommodate the government in difficulty. In the following, 
we therefore focus on the member states’ voting practices in order to investigate 
to what extent and why majorities in the Council restrain themselves from over-
ruling other governments.
Before we proceed, however, a few caveats are in order regarding the data. 
Since there are no official voting records available for the time between 1958 
and 1990, a large part of the analysis draws on semiofficial data from Council 
or national archives. However, these reports often code votes differently. In 
some data sets, for example, an abstention counts as a disagreement with 
the majority, whereas in other data sets a disagreement is an explicit nega-
tive vote. Where possible, this information is therefore complemented with 
qualitative data such as contemporary personal reports by ambassadors and 
other officials.
The Emergence of the Consensus Machine (1958–1969)
Shortly after the Treaty of Rome had come into force, the Council of Ministers 
made a habit of referring the Commission’s legislative proposals immediately to 
their experts for further study, instead of dealing with them officially. This prac-
tice permitted control over the timing of a decision, and it also allowed govern-
ment experts to prepare the Council meetings in such a way that the ministers 
could concentrate their discussion on the proposal’s most important aspects.
The Council therefore recommended in 1960 that the ministries at home 
give their experts much more flexible instructions for the preparatory meetings 
(Conseil de la CEE 1960b; Rat der EWG 1960a).2 It subsequently developed a 
large intergovernmental substructure throughout the 1960s with the ministers at 
the top, an ambassadorial Comité des Représentants Permanents (COREPER, or 
Committee of Permanent Representatives) in-between, and permanent and ad 
hoc working groups of government experts at the bottom. The working groups 
typically comprised the very same experts who had already advised the Commis-
sion in the preparation of its legislative proposal (Lindberg 1963, 53–65; Houben 
1964, 97–100; Noël 1963; Alting von Geusau 1966, 235–40).
The various layers in the Council substructure sought to prepare decisions 
on legislative proposals in a way that the next higher level was willing to accept 
a number of preliminary decisions without further discussion (COREPER 1962; 
van der Meulen 1966). The permanent representatives hardly ever discussed 
items on which the working groups had reached a consensual decision (“Roman 
I-Points”), while they dealt in depth with items that had not been resolved by 
DECISION MAKING IN THE COUNCIL AND THE PARLIAMENT      91
the government experts (“Roman II-Points”) (Virally, Gerbet, and Salmon 1971, 
651–53, 702–4). Similarly, all decisions on which the COREPER reached a con-
sensus appeared as one single item (“A-Points”) on the Council’s agenda. The 
Council of Ministers then typically adopted all A-Points en bloc without any 
further debate. Issues that the permanent representatives had not been able to 
resolve (“B-Points”) were discussed in the Council of Ministers and then usu-
ally referred back to COREPER or the working groups with further instructions 
(Noël 1967b, 248).
The fact that the Council substructure served as a kind of “consensus machin-
ery” is evidenced by the fact that the proportion of consensual A-Points relative 
to contentious B-points in the Council climbed dramatically when the number 
of working group sessions increased threefold over the course of the 1960s.3 As 
Emile Noël, the Commission’s first executive secretary, describes it: “True, the 
Commission proposal will always remain in the Council’s files and the Commis-
sion will be able to uphold it before the Ministers, but this prerogative can be 
rather theoretical if an agreement on quite different lines has already emerged 
before the Council session” (Noël 1967b, 244).
Because this decision-making practice supposedly ran counter to the spirit of 
the treaty and the Community Method, the Commission eyed the development 
of the Council substructure with great suspicion. Walter Hallstein, the Commis-
sion’s first president, was particularly critical of the involvement of government 
experts and the Permanent Representatives in decision making:
The first danger is that the responsibilities, which the Treaty unequivo-
cally confers to the Ministers, slip to functionaries to whom they do not 
belong. . . . The second danger is that . . . there is a reallocation of powers 
to the detriment of the supranational element. As a result of a newly 
developing habitude we run the risk that an administration develops 
within COREPER that assumes tasks that—according to the Treaty—
belong to the supranational organ, that is, to the Commission. (quoted 
in Virally, Gerbet, and Salmon 1971, 712)
Other commissioners joined in these complaints, saying that Council of 
Ministers had shifted their responsibilities to an unaccountable Areopagus 
(council of senior public officials) of government experts that rivaled the staff 
of the Commission (Lemaignen 1964, 85).4 The Commission, therefore, ini-
tially refused to send its own senior officials to meetings within the Council 
substructure (Rat der EWG 1962). But when the Commission realized that this 
strategy did not prevent the Council substructure from making decisions, it 
gradually established contacts with COREPER (Noël and Étienne 1971, 433; 
Houben 1964, 104–7).
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As the Council decentralized its powers to the substructure, it also became 
more differentiated horizontally. In addition to meeting in different ministerial 
formations, the ministers of agriculture decided to sideline the Council substruc-
ture by establishing their own Special Committee for Agriculture that reported 
directly to them, thus bypassing COREPER (Rat der EWG 1960b).5 The practices 
of this Special Committee and agricultural working groups differed substantially 
from other issue areas. The government experts responsible for agricultural mat-
ters did not adopt the “Roman-I-Point” procedure, and the representatives in the 
Special Committee agreed on far fewer consensual A-Points than their counter-
parts in COREPER. As a result, most legislative proposals on agricultural matters 
ascended quickly through the Council substructure to be discussed and decided 
by the ministers themselves.6 Thus, just as the Directorate General for Agricul-
ture developed into a self-contained “Agricultural Empire” within the Commis-
sion, those government experts responsible for agricultural matters also secluded 
themselves from the rest of the Council substructure.
The Council substructure was conducive to consensus decision making. Not 
only were the government experts not authorized to vote but the informality of 
the discussions allowed governments to be more flexible. As Joseph van der Meu-
len, Belgium’s permanent representative in the 1960s, explained:
The advantages of COREPER become most apparent when tensions arise 
in the Council of Ministers. . . . These conversations [among the Permanent 
Representatives] would at a higher level give the impression that one is not 
pressing hard enough and not willing to succeed. (van der Meulen 1966, 25)
As a result, the Council virtually never made use of majority voting, despite the 
fact that, by the year 1965, eighty-eight treaty provisions were subject to this vot-
ing rule (Bundesministerium für Landwirtschaft 1965; Ophüls 1966, 193; Torrelli 
1969, 94–96). As the German Ministry for the Economy noted,
More often than not you can hear the global assertion that the Coun-
cil of Ministers decides by unanimity, and that majority voting is only 
going to be introduced in 1966. This is incorrect. There are plenty of 
decisions that are already subject to majority voting. (Bundesministe-
rium für Wirtschaft 1965)
However, despite the fact that majority voting was permitted in a number of 
cases, in the Community’s first eight years the Council adopted only four to ten 
decisions, out of more than five hundred, against a minority (Vertretung der 
BRD bei der EWG 1965a). Observers of the Council spoke accordingly of a horror 
majoritatis (horror of majority) governing decision making in the Council in the 
first half of the decade (Houben 1964, 112–15).
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Given that consensus decision making had always been the norm in the Council, 
the member states were taken by surprise when in 1965 a Commission proposal 
suddenly brought about a principled debate about majority voting. The debate 
was triggered when Commission president Hallstein violated an informal norm by 
announcing that he had placed a legislative proposal on agricultural finances before 
the European Parliament without consulting the governments in advance. This pro-
posal sought to play off the member states’ interests by linking agricultural matters 
with budgetary matters as well as with a proposal to empower the European Parlia-
ment. The French president, Charles De Gaulle, was furious about this obvious ruse 
on the part of the Commission and decided to escalate the conflict by demanding 
the reintroduction of national vetoes when a country considered its “very important 
interests” to be at stake. To demonstrate his resolve, De Gaulle boycotted decision 
making by withdrawing all senior French representatives from the Council.
The other member states were baffled. In secret deliberations after the French 
withdrew, they considered De Gaulle’s public onslaught on majority voting as a 
pseudo debate on an abstract problem (“plus théorique que réel”) (Représentation 
Permanente de la Belgique 1966b). In an internal debate that ultimately led to the 
resolution of the conflict, the German Foreign Ministry notes with bemusement:
The rule has always been in practice that decisions are unanimous even 
in cases where the treaty provides for majority voting. We simply usually 
negotiate until we have reached consensus. (Auswärtiges Amt 1965, 2; 
see also Alting von Geusau 1964, 190; Pryce 1962, 35)
Importantly, all governments were, in principle, in complete agreement that 
majority voting should never be used against a country’s important interests. The 
main points of controversy concerned the codification of this informal norm and 
the definition of very important interests. France insisted that the authority to deter-
mine whether important interests were at stake lay with the respective government. 
The other member states resisted this proposal on the grounds that it was simply 
impossible to define this term in advance. As the German Foreign Ministry put it:
The term “vital interests” of a member state cannot be put in legal 
terms. Nor is it possible to list a number of situations in which the vital 
 interests of a state can be considered in jeopardy. [A mere declaration of 
government] without any vindication or acknowledgement by the other 
council members would in fact lead to the abdication of the principle of 
majority voting. (Auswärtiges Amt 1965, 4)
France’s partners therefore argued that the decision to determine whether 
very important interests were at stake had to be a collective one  (Représentation 
Permanente de la Belgique 1966a). The Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, 
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also strongly cautioned against the demand to codify the French proposal, 
because he believed it would encourage even stronger domestic demands to 
defy the rules:
[The] French formula places governments in a thorny position at the 
domestic level. We will consequently face strong difficulties resisting all 
kinds of pressure, which will not fail to demand a veto on this and that 
national interest, no matter how unimportant. (quoted in Représenta-
tion Permanente de la Belgique 1966a)
The member states ultimately agreed to disagree. The Luxembourg Compro-
mise, which concluded this “empty-chair crisis,” consequently produced a very 
ambiguous extralegal declaration, which states that while France insisted that 
the Council decide by unanimity in the event that a member state claimed that 
its vital interests were at stake, the other member states declared that they were 
prepared to search for a consensus only within a reasonable time period. The 
document acknowledges this contradiction by stating that the “six delegations 
note that there is a divergence of views on what should be done in the event of a 
failure to reach complete agreement” (European Communities 1966).
Given that consensus decision making had been the norm all along, the Lux-
embourg Compromise did not trigger any change in existing practices. Even so, a 
number of contemporary sources suggest that voting always remained an option 
after the Luxembourg Compromise. The Commission’s director general at the 
time, Christoph Sasse, remarked: “It is entirely wrong to think that the Luxem-
bourg compromise had ousted the possibility of majority voting from the del-
egations’ minds. They are fully aware of the legal provisions” (Sasse 1975, 143).
In fact, other contemporary sources suggest that some majority votes still 
took place in practice.7 Emile Noël (1968) remarked that majority voting contin-
ued on questions of “average importance,” and considered it imprudent to vote 
on matters that aroused public interest (Noël 1973, 133–34; see also Amphoux 
et al. 1979, 123). These sources also agree that the votes that did occur were 
 predominantly taken on agricultural and related budgetary matters (Streinz 
1984, 52–73; Lahr 1983, 229; Sasse 1975, 136; Noël 1976a, 41; Ungerer 1989, 98).
Keeping the Machine Running (1970–1986)
The conclusion of the Luxembourg Compromise in 1966 coincided with a 
 dramatic leap in the Council’s legislative activity in the second half of the 1960s. 
As figure 3 shows, the number of adopted legal acts increased fourfold between 
1965 and 1970, and almost doubled over the course of the 1970s. The result of 
this sudden growth was a bottleneck in decision making.
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This bottleneck, in combination with the upcoming accession of Great Brit-
ain and Denmark to the European Community in 1973, raised concerns about 
an imminent blockage of decision making (European Communities 1972a). In 
early 1970, the Commission president, Jean Rey, called on the member states to 
renounce the Luxembourg Compromise and apply the official voting rules more 
rigorously (Conseil des CE 1970, 3).
However, his plea met with a cool reception from the member states (Auswärtiges 
Amt 1970, 2). The German foreign minister, Walter Scheel, agreed in  principle with 
Rey on the importance of majority voting. However, he also emphasized the neces-
sity of the norm of consensus decision making in parallel to formal voting rules. For 
Scheel, it was not the compromise per se, but rather its ambiguity that allowed the 
member states to provide an optimal level of situational flexibility in every situation:
Still, we found a felicitous solution in 1966 [the Luxembourg Compro-
mise], a formula that is just vague enough as to enable the Community to 
make important progress. This delicate equilibrium would not have been 
reached by a simple Council decision. We therefore need to continue to 
strive for solutions that are acceptable to all of us. (Conseil des CE 1970, 7)
When complaints about the increasing legislative backlog grew louder 
and louder (Bieber and Palmer 1975, 311), the member states began to look 













































FIGURE 3 Council legal acts 1958–2009. Data drawn from the Euro-Lex 
 database on January 22, 2009. The data exclude international agreements.
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 Communities 1972b). They also called on the national administrations to give 
government experts more flexible instructions to make even more preliminary 
decisions in the Council substructure (Rat der EG 1974b, 1974a; Council of the 
EC 1974). As figure 4 shows, the involvement of government experts conse-
quently rose steeply in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
At the same time as the Council substructure sought to increase its efficiency, 
we can also observe a gradual change in the ministers’ voting behavior. First, 
individual governments increasingly abstained from decisions in order to enable 
the remaining member states to attain a unanimous agreement on amendments 
to the Commission’s legislative proposal (Henig 1973, 133; Rat der EG 1973; 
Noël 1976a, 41). Second, the member states increasingly had explicit recourse 
to majority decisions toward the end of the decade. In 1976, the Commission 
noted that a number of decisions were taken by majority vote in the Council that 
year, either because some Member States did not insist on pressing their views or 
because the Council formally recorded a majority vote (European Commission 
1977, 34; European Communities 1977, 10; 1978).
A year later, the Commission observed that majority voting had become 
“standard practice” (European Commission 1978, 23). Several contemporary 
practitioners saw an even greater acceptance of majority decisions again from 
the early 1980s on (Noël 1985). Jean-Louis Dewost, the Council’s juris consult 














































FIGURE 4 Involvement of government experts in Council working groups 
1958–2008. Data drawn from Euro-Lex. 
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to about ten in 1980, twenty-odd in 1982, about forty in 1984 and again in 1985, 
and almost eighty in 1986” (Dewost 1987, 168).
The use of majority voting is most notable in the Agricultural Council. On 
one occasion in the early 1980s where prices for several agricultural goods were 
being determined, the member states openly overruled the British delegation 
despite its demand to be spared (Campbell 1986, 937–8; Teasdale 1993, 571; 
Swinbank 1989, 310). In fact, the available data show that votes in general were 
largely confined to agricultural matters.8
Channeling the Momentum (1987–1993)
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Council decision making was cranked up through a 
reinforcement of the Council substructure and a greater use of abstentions and major-
ity voting. The lubricated machinery gained full momentum with the entering into 
force of the Single European Act in 1987, which extended majority voting to measures 
concerning the achievement of the Internal Market, most importantly to Article 100a 
on the approximation of domestic laws, regulations, and other national provisions.9
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the Single European Act instigated 
a more frequent use of majority voting (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 281–83), the 
data show that voting peaked in 1987 and subsequently declined for the rest of 
the decade to early 1980s levels. Whereas in 1987 15 percent of all decisions were 
adopted by majority voting, the ratio fell to 12 percent and 9 percent in 1988 and 
1989, respectively.10 In other words, the search for consensus remained a strong 
norm among governments despite the more frequent use of voting. The director 
general for competition at the time, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (1990, 1104; Dash-
wood 1992, 79), confirms that the Single European Act did not result in a spec-
tacular increase in the number of majority votes. Jean-Louis Dewost explains why:
It is the governments to which citizens and affected firms turn, and 
it is the governments that will have to face their reactions—politically 
or, in extreme cases, to maintain the public order. This explains why it 
is implicitly acknowledged by all actors of the Community game that 
it is necessary to strive for a reasonable consensus on sensitive issues. 
(Dewost 1987, 174, italics in the original)
New Rules, New Players, Same Game (1994–Present)
Although they extended the scope of majority voting and provided for more 
transparency in decision making, neither the 1993 Treaty on European Union, 
nor the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, nor the 2001 Nice Treaty, nor the  accession 
98      CHAPTER 4
of new member states changed the fact that consensus decision making remained 
a very strong norm in the Council. According to data collected by Dorothee 
Heisenberg (2005, 72), the governments used majority voting in only 19 percent 
of the cases where they could have called a vote between 1994 and 2001. Data 
collected by Mikko Mattila (2009, 844) and a study by Robert Thomson (2011) 
suggest that this pattern has not changed since. In the postenlargement period 
from 2004 until the end of 2006, the governments overruled a minority in only 
about 10 percent of all cases. When this happens, the minority usually consists 
of isolated governments or quite small coalitions (Mattila and Lane 2001, 44).11
The few data that differentiate among issue areas suggest that majority vot-
ing is still largely confined to agricultural matters where approximately every 
third legal act is taken against explicit dissent.12 Hayes-Renshaw and colleagues 
conclude that some 25 percent of the decisions agreed under majority voting in 
1994 were explicitly contested through negative votes and abstentions. “Of these, 
almost half were on agriculture and fisheries, with a further quarter on inter-
nal market issues, and the remainder thinly spread across other areas” (Hayes-
Renshaw, Van Aken, and Wallace 2006, 165). They find the same pattern for the 
period between 1998 and 2004 (Hayes-Renshaw, Van Aken, and Wallace 2006, 
171). Similarly, Mattila and Lane (2001, 42) find for the period 1995–98 that neg-
ative voting (explicit voting against a legal act) is most routinized on agricultural 
issues (28 percent), followed by 21 percent in the internal market, 18 percent in 
transport, with the rest, again, thinly spread across other areas.
This formal governance practice in the Common Agricultural Policy is 
reflected in considerably less decentralization within the Council. Whereas most 
ministers rely on government experts to prepare their decisions,13 the ministers 
for agriculture still make far less use of the Council substructure than their 
colleagues. Since the agricultural working groups have little discretion and the 
next highest level, the Special Committee for Agriculture, rarely reaches con-
sensual agreements (Culley 2004, 204), most legislative proposals swiftly ascend 
to the level of the Council of Ministers, who are quick to take a vote (inter-
view with a member of the German Permanent Representation, the term for 
the national embassies to the EU, Brussels, February 2008). Similarly, a Council 
official responsible for agriculture notes that “characteristically, the [govern-
ment representatives] don’t get flexibility in the interest of getting something 
settled before Council; this is a big difference with my colleagues in COREPER” 
(quoted in Lewis 1998, 134).
The treaty rules make it much easier for governments to adopt a Commission 
proposal with a majority than to change it unanimously. A closer look at actual 
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voting practices reveals, however, that governments rarely ever vote at all. In 
fact, some variation over time notwithstanding, consensus decision making 
has always been a strong norm in the Council in almost all issue areas except 
for agriculture.
For the most part, the search for consensus agreements to change the Com-
mission’s proposals takes place in the Council substructure, which consists of 
thousands of government experts with specific knowledge about the sensitivi-
ties at home. A former permanent representative underscores the importance of 
domestic sensitivities in a private conversation:
Usually, there are only two or three delegations left that have difficul-
ties with a proposal. They worry that a decision will lead some of their 
people to believe that “Europe isn’t that great after all.” We therefore 
always try to take the edges off a proposal. (interview in Brussels, Feb-
ruary 2008)
Although the member states sometimes disagree about the norm’s interpreta-
tion in specific cases, there is little indication that any of them contests its raison 
d’être in principle.
The European Parliament—an Unlikely 
Accomplice
Initially, the Treaty of Rome merely required the Council to consult the European 
Parliament on a few rather minor issues. Over time, however, the Parliament 
massively gained in power in response to a combination of its informal twisting 
of the arms of the Council, the European Court of Justice’s very favorable inter-
pretation of the rules, and the deliberate extension of Parliament’s influence on 
the part of the member states. Today, it acts as a co-legislator on formally equal 
footing with the Council, and the legislative procedure provides the Parliament 
with ample opportunities to challenge its counterpart in public.
The flip side of its empowerment, however, is that Parliament’s incentive to 
demonstrate its significance may jeopardize the accommodation of another 
government by bringing it to the attention of domestic opponents. Liberal 
Regime Theory therefore expects the governments to eschew public debates 
of  sensitive issues in the Parliament where possible. This section therefore 
focuses on the actual use of parliamentary debates in order to show how the 
governments implicate the European Parliament into their practices of infor-
mal governance.
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Benign Neglect (1958–1969)
The Treaty of Rome granted very little legislative power to the European 
 Parliament; the member states were supposed to consult it on a few decisions, but 
they were under no obligation to heed its demands. However, the Council gradu-
ally gave in to parliamentary pressure to extend consultation to “very important” 
problems even if the treaty did not oblige it to do so. Toward the end of the 
1960s, it also committed itself to consult Parliament on nonlegislative texts and 
to give reasons for departing from the Parliament’s opinions (Jacobs, Corbett, 
and Shackleton 1992, 179; European Parliament 2009b, 162–63).
Still, the European Parliament’s consultative function was largely a charade 
in that it did not precipitate much open deliberation, due to the Council’s influ-
ence on the Commission and the norm of consensus decision making. Thus, 
whenever the European Parliament was given the opportunity to voice its opin-
ion, it was confronted with laborious consensus decisions that the governments 
were not going to open up anyway. Frustrated, it therefore demanded a clearer 
distinction between the stages of agenda setting and decision making in order to 
provide it real opportunities for a public contestation of the Council. A member 
of the European Parliament complained in 1964 that
the Council has tried to create a back and forth with the Commission, 
thereby suggesting modifications to the text [the legislative proposal] 
even before Parliament has had the chance to deliberate on it. [This 
exercise of influence] is illicit and undue, since decisions are made 
despite the fact that the Treaty prescribes prior consultation of the opin-
ion of another institution [the European Parliament]. (quoted in Alting 
von Geusau 1964, 138–39)
More Influence, Little Publicity (1970–1986)
In 1970, after a lengthy campaign by the Parliament, the member states decided 
to give it a greater say on budgetary matters. Specifically, they granted it the 
right to modify “noncompulsory” expenditures up to a certain limit. Although 
noncompulsory expenditures did not include agricultural spending and made 
up only a small fraction of the budget (Fitzmaurice 1978, 217; Westlake 1994a, 
121–34, 264),14 the member states soon recognized that Parliament could use its 
new  powers to extract concessions on other issues. To avert such situations, they 
decided to extend parliamentary consultation even into areas where the treaty 
did not specifically make provisions for it. Three years after extending Parlia-
ment’s budgetary rights, the Council therefore promised to consult Parliament 
within one week of receiving the Commission proposal, while the Commission, 
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for its part, pledged to explain its opinions in Parliament’s plenary session (Cor-
bett 1998, 114–15).
In 1975, a “conciliation procedure” was set up as a forum to iron out con-
troversies with the European Parliament on matters with “appreciable financial 
implications” (European Communities 1975).15 Thus, Parliament was gradually 
given more and more opportunities to make its voice heard. However, there was 
not much it could do in the event that the Council decided not to listen to it. Its 
consultation was still largely symbolic.
The European Court of Justice’s Isoglucose ruling in 1980 that legally obliged 
the Council to consult the European Parliament changed the situation dramati-
cally by turning what seemed to be a mere complaisance into a real obligation. 
The Court argued that the European Parliament was supposed to serve as a trans-
mission belt between the European Community and its citizens:
Although limited, [parliamentary participation in decision making] 
reflects at Community level the fundamental democratic principle that 
the people should take part in the exercise of power through the inter-
mediary of a representative assembly. (European Court of Justice 1980)
However, the European Parliament’s newly gained power to veto Council 
decisions by indefinitely withholding its opinion did not create more opportuni-
ties for public contestation. On the contrary, the Council’s positions on which 
it consulted Parliament became ever more vague so as not to give it anything to 
contest and, thus, any pretext to postpone the delivery of its opinion. The Euro-
pean Parliament was furious about the Council’s ruse, which it regarded as a 
“breach in spirit and probably of the letter of the Isoglucose principle” (Westlake 
1994a, 136–37; Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, 182).
The situation changed only slightly with the first direct elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament in 1979. Whereas the members of the European Parliament had 
previously been mere delegates from the various national parliaments, they were 
now full-time members chosen in Europe-wide elections. Although the number 
of public hearings and question times leaped due to its increased presence, the 
Parliament remained largely unnoticed. Richard Corbett, a member of the Euro-
pean Parliament, observes:
In terms of public visibility, Parliament remained stranded in a per-
ceived secondary role. Even where its influence may have been great, it 
was Council that adopted the legislation and it was within Council (or 
the European Council) that the major political deals were made. Not 
surprisingly, media coverage of the Parliament declined. (Corbett 1998, 
123, 124–25)
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Nudged into Informality (1987–1993)
The Single European Act introduced a new two-stage legislative procedure, the 
cooperation procedure, which supplemented consultation in the important area 
of the Internal Market (Earnshaw and Judge 1995). The second reading now 
allowed the European Parliament to reject the Council’s position, and the mem-
ber states could override this veto only when they were able to attain a consensus.
Although this procedure provided another opportunity for the Parliament 
to make its voice heard in public, it actually resulted in even greater informality. 
Why? Since Parliament’s threat to veto a legislative act was hardly viable—it usu-
ally preferred any kind of integration to the less integrated status quo (Jacobs, 
Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, 185)16—a more promising way for it to influence 
decisions was through informal contacts with the Commission. Parliament then 
used these contacts in order to persuade the Commission to include its amend-
ments in the legislative proposal, from which they could only be scrapped by 
a unanimous Council decision (Westlake 1994b, 38; Fitzmaurice 1988, 391). 
The Council, however, remained largely unreceptive to Parliament’s attempts to 
establish informal contacts (Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, 190).
Instead of leading to greater public contestation, the introduction of the cooper-
ation procedure consequently led to an intensification of informal contacts between 
the Commission and Parliament prior to the submission of the legislative proposal 
(Westlake 1994a, 141–43). A member of the European Parliament explains:
The theoretical model, which says that the Commission proposes and Par-
liament discusses and amends, seems to me to be absolutely defective—
because a lot of parliamentary influence is actually exercised before the 
Commission proposal appears. (European Parliament 1995, 12)
It simply made more sense for the European Parliament to concentrate its 
efforts on persuading the Commission to its views during the drafting stage, which 
itself encouraged contacts between Commission officials and parliamentarians 
during the preparation of its proposal (Corbett 1998, 270). Thus, although the 
second reading provided another opportunity to gain visibility through public 
contestation, the European Parliament clearly focused its attention on the first 
reading as well as the “preformal stage” before the official submission of the pro-
posal (Earnshaw and Judge 1997, 549–52).
Skipping Steps (1994–Present)
The Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 introduced a new legislative procedure, the 
“co-decision 1” procedure, which was supposed to strengthen Parliament’s 
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 bargaining power vis-à-vis the Council.17 As three well-known experts on the 
European Parliament note, simplicity is not the essence of this procedure (Jacobs, 
Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, 192). For our purposes, it suffices to note two 
alterations to the cooperation procedure. First, co-decision endowed Parliament 
with a final veto over Council decisions, and it set up a conciliation committee 
in the event that both institutions failed to reach an agreement in the previous 
readings (Shackleton 2000, 326). Second, the co-decision procedure deprived the 
Commission of its right to withdraw the legislative proposal in the event that the 
Council and the Parliament entered conciliation.
There is considerable academic discussion about whether these changes 
enhanced or decreased the European Parliament’s bargaining power (Tsebelis 
1994, 1996; Moser 1996; Crombez, Steunenberg, and Corbett 2000). There 
is general agreement, however, that they substantially weakened the Commission’s 
agenda-setting power, since the Parliament and the Council can agree on a joint 
text regardless of the Commission’s approval (Crombez 1997, 113).
How did these changes affect publicity about the EU’s decision making? On 
the one hand, they intensified informal contacts between the Commission and the 
European Parliament in the preformal stage, since the Commission was now more 
susceptible to parliamentary requests to include amendments to the legislative pro-
posal.18 On the other hand, the European Parliament used its newly gained power 
to contest the Council in public when the Council remained reluctant to establish 
direct contacts with the European Parliament.19 Between 1993 and 1999, around 
40 percent of all legislative proposals subject to the co-decision 1 procedure went 
through all of the readings to end up in the conciliation committee. Since there 
was no official option to conclude the procedure after the first reading, all acts were 
openly discussed in at least two readings (European Parliament 1999a).
None of the legislative actors was particularly happy with the co-decision I 
procedure, since it was complex, lengthy, and required a high degree of coordina-
tion between and within the institutions (European Parliament 1996a).
In addition, although the European Parliament’s veto power formally placed 
it on par with the Council, its threat to use it to reject new legislation was largely 
deemed unviable (Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, 191). Aware of this 
weakness, the European Parliament therefore changed its internal rules in order 
to commit itself to using the veto even if it preferred the piece of legislation under 
discussion to no legislation at all (Nicoll 1994, 410). The credibility of its veto 
threat consequently increased substantially when the Parliament in fact exercised 
it in 1994 (Hix 2002, 274).
Acknowledging this new situation, the member states, in the 1999 Treaty of 
Amsterdam, replaced the legislative procedure with “co-decision 2,” which sim-
plified the existing rules and allowed for an early conclusion of the  procedure.
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As soon as the Council realized that the Parliament had to be taken more 
seriously, it established informal contacts among a reduced number of partici-
pants, joined by the Commission, early on in the legislative process prior to the 
start of official negotiations (European Parliament 1999b, 333–36; Shackleton 
2000). The vast majority of these contacts developed between Parliament and 
the chairmen of Council Working Groups or the Deputy Permanent Represen-
tative (Farrell and Héritier 2004, 1198). These informal meetings, which would 
become known as trilogues, serve a similar function as the Council substruc-
ture in that they facilitate preliminary agreements between both institutions 
that can then be officially adopted without further discussion (Shackleton and 
Raunio 2003, 177).
Thus, just as the Working Groups and COREPER reduce conflicts in the Coun-
cil of Ministers by assisting it in its search for consensual decisions, the trilogues 
enable Council and Parliament to reach agreements without going through all 
stages of public contestation. As a consequence, the number of early agreements, 
which are concluded after extensive informal consultations between the legisla-
tive actors, increased steadily. In 1999, when the modified co-decision procedure 
entered into force, only 13 percent of all legislative acts were concluded early in 
the first reading (see figure 5). By the end of the legislative period in 2004, the 
ratio was already 41 percent. In 2009, the final year of Parliament’s sixth legisla-
ture, 80 percent of all legislative acts subject to co-decision were concluded early 
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FIGURE 5 Percentage of early agreements. European Parliament 2009b, 10.
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As more and more legal acts were adopted during the early stages of the 
procedure, trilogues became a “major factor in the equation” (Council of the 
EU 2000). Despite this dramatic shift toward early conclusion, the average total 
length of co-decision procedures decreased only very modestly from an average 
of 22 months between 1999 and 2004 to 20.7 months in the following five-year 
term (European Parliament 2009a, 13).
By its own assessment, the more notable effect of Parliament’s implication in the 
Council’s informal governance has not been higher efficiency but its lower public visi-
bility. Members of small party groups in the Parliament, in particular, have criticized 
the trilogue system for undermining the European Parliament’s function as a transmis-
sion belt between the public and politicians. A report on the co-decision 2 procedure 
demands that “there must be scope for the wider public to follow the legislative pro-
cedure” (European Parliament 2004).20 A 2008 internal report is even more explicit:
[Serious] concerns have been expressed, within Parliament and beyond, 
about the potential lack of transparency and democratic legitimacy inher-
ent in the informal first reading negotiations. . . . [This practice goes] at the 
expense of an open political debate within and between the Institutions, 
with the involvement of the public. . . . [This] certainly does not increase 
Parliament’s visibility in the public and the media, who are looking for 
political confrontation along clear political lines and not for a flat, “techno-
cratic” debate where the representatives of the three Institutions congratu-
late each other on the “good work” done. (European Parliament 2008, 26)
The Council, however, defends this informal practice on grounds of its flex-
ibility. In the words of a Council official (quoted in Farrell and Héritier 2004, 
1199), “[informal trilogues] make it possible to speak more frankly and to explain 
what the underlying reasons are. You also can say: here is a real problem—we 
cannot go further on this, please recognize this.”
Summary
The official legislative procedures provide ample opportunities for the European 
Parliament to contest Council decisions in public. In reality, however, the mem-
bers of the European Parliament rarely make use of this opportunity. As soon as 
the Parliament gained influence, it became implicated in the Council’s practices 
of informal governance.
Just as the Council substructure reduces the need for discussion at the level of 
the ministers, the informal trilogue system facilitates early agreements that can be 
adopted without having to go through all the steps of the legislative procedure. 
This practice seems to have increased the efficiency of decision making within 
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the Parliament and, to a lesser extent, between the Council and the Parliament. 
But it also makes the European Parliament forgo opportunities to contest the 
Council in public. This is why this practice has met with much criticism from 
smaller party groups in the Parliament that are quite often shut out of the trial-
ogue system, whereas the member states approve of its efficiency and flexibility.
Decision Making in the European 
Union, 1958–2009
The voting rules in the Council permit a majority of countries to impose a decision 
on one or more recalcitrant governments. And because it is easier to scrape together 
a majority than to change a legislative proposal unanimously, the same rules also 
strongly boost the Commission’s agenda-setting power. Together, these rules represent 
a very strong commitment on the part of the member states to economic integration. 
A closer look beyond the treaty rules reveals, however, that governments rarely make 
use of these rules. The decision-making stage is once again littered with practices of 
informal governance that seem to run contrary to the rules’ actual purpose.
First, despite their increasing recourse to majority voting over time, it has 
always been the norm among the governments to refrain from voting and col-
lectively accommodate a government that would otherwise face strong conflict 
at home and succumb to domestic pressure to defy the law in question. This 
consensus norm led to the development of a large Council substructure of pre-
paratory groups, which consisted of government experts with specific knowledge 
about sensitivities on the ground. Second, as soon as the European Parliament 
was promoted to a more serious legislative actor, it was implicated in informal 
governance even despite its members’ incentives to contest the Council in public.
As with the practices in agenda setting, the table below shows that infor-
mal governance does not occur at random. The cells depict observations of the 
prevalence of either formal or informal governance. Since it was for a long time 
excluded from decision making, some observations regarding the European Par-
liament are excluded from the analysis. In line with the predictions of Liberal 
Regime Theory, the table shows that governments made consistently more use of 
informal governance in issue areas where domestic pressure is, in fact, difficult 
to predict, while they had far more recourse to majority voting on the Common 
Agricultural Policy, where farmers’ pressure is easier to anticipate and manage 
within the formal institutional framework. The theory is further corroborated 
by the fact that all governments were in principle in full agreement over the need 
for a norm of consensus in the Council, whereas the Commission viewed this 
practice with far more suspicion.
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The European Parliament’s practices of informal governance are more dif-
ficult to interpret. Given that its empowerment does not necessarily constitute 
a commitment to economic integration, its exclusion from decision making in 
the early years and on agricultural matters neither confirms nor disconfirms any 
theory. The fact that it used its opportunity to publicly contest the Council in the 
early 1990s even contradicts Liberal Regime Theory, since this contestation can 
potentially thwart the accommodation of a government under pressure.
As soon as the Parliament gained in power, the member states adopted a 
number of practices that limited its opportunity to contest Council decisions in 
public. The trilogue system, in particular, implicates the European Parliament in 
the informal norms and practices that apply in the Council and its substructure. 
To some extent, this development seems to be due to the need to increase the effi-
ciency of decision making. Yet its informal character also provides for more 
flexibility and limits publicity about decision making. Accordingly, and in line 
with Liberal Regime Theory, the development and use of the system generates 
more conflict within the European Parliament and between Parliament and the 
Council than among the member states.
TABLE 6 Formal and informal governance in decision making
TIME PERIOD
DIMENSION
LOW POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY HIGH POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
VOTING PARLIAMENT VOTING PARLIAMENT
1958–1969 Formal N/A Informal N/A
1970–1986 Formal N/A Informal Informal
1987–1993 Formal N/A Informal Informal
1994–2000 Formal N/A Informal Formal





“Comitology” is established Community shorthand for the 
system . . . whereby the Member States can exercise some control 
over implementing powers delegated to the Commission by the Coun-
cil. The fact that these committees exist is fairly well-established. 
But who sits on them, when they meet, how they work and what they 
decide is something of a mystery . . . 
—House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, 1999
Given the vast array of legislative proposals, the complexity of many issues, and 
the scarcity of resources and time, it seems impossible for legislative actors to 
formulate laws in a way that lets the laws always be applied without ambiguity. 
Legislative actors usually have no choice but to delegate the making of secondary 
rules to a bureaucracy.
The Treaty of Rome envisaged this bureaucracy to be the European Com-
mission. Article 155 states that the Commission should “have its own power of 
decision and participate in the shaping of measures.” In some areas, the Treaty 
of Rome conferred implementing powers automatically on the Commission. 
The rules were more ambiguous in other areas where the treaty left it up to the 
Council and, later on, the European Parliament to decide how and by whom the 
legal act was supposed to be implemented. Once delegated, however, the treaty 
provided for no means to revert powers to the member states.
Why on so many issues did the Treaty of Rome delegate substantial powers 
to the Commission and give it ample discretion to implement EU policies? After 
all, national authorities can draw on extensive local knowledge to apply legal acts 
on the ground. The reason is that the centralization of implementing powers in 
the hands of an independent bureaucracy constitutes a credible commitment to 
economic integration where governments might otherwise cave in to domestic 
pressure to renege on the agreement. Pledged to the rule of law, the Commission’s 
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primary concern is supposed to be the timely and consistent implementation of 
the EU’s legal acts, whereas implementation by national administrations, which 
are more susceptible to government’s ad hoc pressure, may result in disparate sets 
of national policies that defy the purpose of an EU policy.
The political science literature typically explores the factors that determine 
the choice of the implementing agent and its discretion. Fabio Franchino, among 
others, investigates under what circumstances the Council and Parliament del-
egate implementing powers to the Commission, to national administrations, or 
to both (Franchino 2007). Introducing the American literature on bureaucratic 
discretion to EU studies, Mark Pollack (1997, 2003b) brilliantly explores why and 
to what effect governments establish ex ante and ex post control mechanisms to 
keep the Commission and other supranational agents in check.
Of particular interest in that regard has been the development and use of 
comitology, which we will see is an opaque web of informal governmental com-
mittees that oversee the Commission’s implementing actions. There has been 
some debate about the function of comitology. Instead of viewing comitology as 
a mechanism to control the Commission, as Pollack suggests, Christian Joerges 
and Jürgen Neyer (1997, 294; cf. Pollack 2003a) argue that these committees are 
better perceived as an instance of “deliberative supranationalism,” a decision-
making mode that is characterized by collective problem-solving rather than 
strategic bargaining among states. Finally, given that the ambiguous treaty rules 
incited intense conflicts among the legislative actors, there is also an extensive 
legal literature on the rights and obligations of each actor in the area of imple-
mentation (Bergström 2005).
All these analyses highlight important aspects of the implementation of EU 
legislation. What has been overlooked, however, is the important function that 
comitology and other implementation practices play in the provision of flexi-
bility. This chapter argues that the implementation of EU policies is character-
ized by informal governance practices that function like an emergency brake 
when central implementing measures trigger strong conflicts at the domestic 
level. Precisely because the member states remove the Commission from the 
national level in order to bolster their commitment to economic integration, 
this central bureaucracy may become oblivious to the political sensitivities on 
the ground.
To gain situational flexibility in the implementation of policies, Liberal 
Regime Theory expects governments to adopt practices of informal governance 
in areas of high political uncertainty. The emergence and use of these practices 
is expected to generate strong conflicts between the member states and supra-
national actors, rather than among the member states themselves. Thus, in 
addition to preventing the Commission from overstepping its discretion, as the 
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literature on bureaucratic discretion suggests, I argue that some of the informal 
governance practices in the implementation of EU policies also serve to prevent 
the Commission from doing precisely what it is supposed to do when its action 
would otherwise stir up strong domestic conflict.
Before we proceed to our empirical analysis, two caveats are in order. First, in 
comparison to the previous stages, the treaty rules regarding the implementation 
of EU policies are very ambiguous and have been changed, challenged, and reinter-
preted over and over again. As a result, the definition of formal and informal gover-
nance is sometimes ambiguous and changes over time. Second, it is difficult to attain 
reliable and systematic data about the variation in informal governance. As the quote 
above suggests, it is doubtful that any of the legislative actors has always had a com-
plete overview, especially of the comitology system of oversight committees.
Implementation on an Elusive Leash
In some issue areas, such as agriculture, competition, the common commercial 
policy, and transport, the Treaty of Rome automatically centralized implement-
ing powers in the hands of the Commission. In other issue areas, it was more 
ambiguous whether the Council was supposed to centralize these powers or 
delegate them to national administrations. Once delegated to either national 
administrations or the Commission, the Treaty of Rome provided no means to 
revert implementing powers to the Council. Given that Council majorities need 
to be concerned about minorities’ willingness to implement an act, a practice 
of formal governance that we can expect on the basis of these rules is the cen-
tralization of implementing powers in the Commission’s hands. Conversely, the 
delegation of implementing powers to national administrations is considered an 
informal governance practice that is less conducive to the timely and consistent 
implementation of EU policies.
Applying the Leash (1958–1969)
One of the European Community’s first policies to become operative was the 
customs union, which replaced the tariffs between the member states with one 
common external tariff for imports from third countries. In this area, the treaty 
automatically gave the Commission the authority to negotiate tariffs with third 
countries. At the same time, however, Article 113 of the Rome Treaty provided 
for a committee (unimaginatively called the “Article 113-committee”) “to assist 
the Commission in this task.” By the early 1960s, it was agreed that the Article 
113-committee would work under the auspices of the Council, not the Commis-
sion, and be composed of governmental trade officials (Johnson 1998, 16–17).
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When, over the course of the 1960s, the Commission assumed more and more 
responsibility in other issue areas as well (Noël 1963, 16), the Article 113-committee 
became a model for those policies where the treaty did not provide for a formal 
mechanism to limit the Commission’s discretion. All governments except the 
Dutch delegation felt that the Commission’s discretion under the treaty rules was 
too extensive. To dispel these concerns, the Commission therefore proposed in 
1961 to set up a committee, similar to the Article 113-committee, to consult with 
it on important agricultural matters. The Council, however, went beyond the 
Commission’s proposal and set up a considerably more restrictive “management 
committee procedure” (comités de gestion), according to which the Commission 
was to submit all its implementing decisions to government experts (Bergström 
and Héritier 2007, 172–79), a majority of whom would be able to refer imple-
menting measures back to the Council for review.1
Crucially, the establishment of this procedure implied that the implement-
ing power was only conditionally delegated to the Commission even if the 
treaty conferred it automatically. In other words, the Commission’s authority 
could potentially revert to the governments and its decisions could be altered, 
whether they concerned technical matters or aspects of political significance 
(Bertram 1968, 247). Complaints by the Commission and the Parliament that 
this informal practice violated the formal rules as it deprived the Commis-
sion of the “authority vested in it by the treaty” went unheeded (Rat der EWG 
1963, 180).
The management committee outlined above was mostly used in the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, but similar formulae were repeated in other issue areas 
as well. A less restrictive “advisory committee procedure” was invented for the 
European Community’s competition policy—another area where the treaty 
envisaged the Commission as the sole implementing authority. Although France 
demanded to copy the aforementioned Article 113-committee for the competi-
tion policy, the German delegation successfully insisted on giving the Commis-
sion much wider discretion (Gerber 1994, 105–7; Hambloch 2002, 892). In 1962 
“Regulation 17,” which specified the content of the competition policy, merely 
obliged the Commission to consult with the governmental advisory committees 
before the adoption of implementing measures (Council of the EC 1962; Wigger 
2008, 147–50; Goyder and Albors-Llorens 2009, 50; on advisory committees, 
see, e.g., van Gerven 1974; Graupner 1973).
A far more restrictive version, the “regulatory committee,” was used mainly 
for the remaining common market policies where the Treaty of Rome had left 
it up to the Council to delegate implementing powers to the Commission or 
to national authorities, or both. According to this procedure, when the Com-
mission was in charge of implementation, it was only permitted to adopt mea-
sures that had previously been approved by the regulatory committee or, if the 
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committee disapproved, by the Council within a given period of time (Bergström 
and Héritier 2007, 179–85).
Absent a legal classification, a broad informal distinction emerged over the 
course of the 1960s among three main types of committees, going from least to 
most restrictive: advisory committees, mainly used in the competition policy, 
consulted with the Commission; management committees, mainly used in the 
Common Agricultural Policy, could block implementing measures; and regula-
tory committees, used in most other areas, had to approve the Commission’s 
measures before they would become effective (Ayral 1975).
This system of informal governmental oversight committees, whose number 
increased fivefold in this first decade, to forty-nine management and regula-
tory committees by 1969 (Institut für Europäische Politik 1989, 43), would soon 
become known as comitology (an EU neologism meaning “the study of commit-
tees”) (Schindler 1971, 184).
The Commission heavily criticized the proliferation of comitology on the 
grounds that it undermined the institutional balance of powers as it was envis-
aged in the Treaty of Rome. The European Parliament, for its part, complained 
that the Council had usurped the Parliament’s official responsibility to control the 
Commission in the performance of its tasks (Lassalle 1968, 406). Since the treaty 
did not make an official distinction between legislation and implementation, 
the European Parliament also worried that the Council might deprive it of its 
consultative legislative function by delegating politically significant decisions 
to the Commission and the comitology committees surrounding it (Bradley 
1997, 231–33). These fundamental points of criticism would give rise to major 
disputes between the institutions over the next forty years.
Legal Uncertainty and Conflict (1970–1986)
The Council’s legislative activity expanded dramatically toward the end of the 
1960s and in the early 1970s. The resulting legislative backlog gave rise to calls for 
a more frequent and extensive delegation of implementing powers to the Com-
mission (Répresentation Permanente de la Belgique 1973). At the 1974 European 
Council, the chiefs of government demanded that their ministers make use “of 
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome whereby the powers of implementation and 
management arising out of Community rules may be conferred on the Commis-
sion” (European Council 1974, 8). On the European Council’s request, the Three 
Wise Men drafted a report on the functioning of the institutions, in which they 
agree with the chiefs of government that the Council “is simply trying to do too 
much. . . . The Council attempts to take far too many decisions which are of a 
minor, technical or recurrent nature” (Council of the EC 1980).
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However, the Council of Ministers showed reluctance to delegate 
implementing powers and typically limited the implementing actors’ discre-
tion by detailing the exact execution of policies in the original legislative act. 
However, when the Council did delegate implementing power to the Commis-
sion, it was generally to be controlled by one of the comitology committees. 
The number of these committees consequently quadrupled from around fifty 
in 1970 to 218 in 1986, two-fifths of which were of the most restrictive regu-
latory type and used for common market matters (Institut für Europäische 
Politik 1989, 43–45), while less restrictive management committees dominated 
the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy. At the same time, the 
variety of these committees also proliferated. At one point, the European Par-
liament identified no fewer than thirty-one different comitology procedures 
(Spence and Edwards 2006, 241).
The Commission continued to view the Council’s reluctance to delegate, as 
well as the system of governmental committees, with great suspicion. In 1970, a 
case brought before the European Court of Justice questioned the legality of an 
implementing measure adopted under a management committee procedure. The 
plaintiff alleged that these committees violated official procedures and consti-
tuted a direct interference in the Commission’s treaty-based right of implemen-
tation, thus distorting the original institutional balance of power. In its Köster 
ruling, however, the Court found the Court’s practice of delegating and scrutiniz-
ing implementation actions through comitology was consistent with the treaty. 
Because the treaty authorized but did not oblige the Council to confer powers on 
the Commission, the Court argued that it was permissible for the member states 
to subject the Commission to additional control as long as these committees did 
not engage in “essential” legislation (European Court of Justice 1970; see also 
Schindler 1971).
Thus, the Court sided with the Council, but acknowledged that a distinction 
had to be drawn between legislation (on essential matters) and implementa-
tion (of nonessential matters), and that the Commission and comitology only 
possessed rule-making authority in the latter case. Yet the Court refused in this 
and related decisions (Bradley 1992, 700–702, 709–11) to draw this distinction 
itself. In fact, it gave the term implementation a very broad meaning, describing 
it as measures, “however important they may be,” that implement those essen-
tial elements laid down in the basic act of the treaty (European Court of Justice 
1969). The Court thus left it up to the Council to determine what it considered 
essential because, in the words of an expert, this distinction between the essential 
and nonessential parts of legislation was a political judgment that the Court was 
reluctant to make. Instead of clarifying the situation, the Court thus created new 
ambiguity that provided the Council ample flexibility to decide who and to what 
114      CHAPTER 5
extent politically sensitive matters were going to be implemented (Türk 2009, 
55; Lenaerts and Verhoeven 2000, 661–62, 652).
The lack of legal clarity regarding the scope of delegation and the use of comi-
tology worried the European Parliament, which thought that the comitology had 
become “to some extent autonomous and no longer fully under the Commis-
sion’s supervision” (European Parliament 1983). The Parliament was especially 
critical that there were no ground rules to determine the scope of delegation 
(i.e., the political importance of implementing measures) and the choice of the 
comitology procedure (i.e., the Commission’s discretion). This situation not only 
provided the Council ample flexibility to delimit the Commission’s discretion 
at will. By delegating the implementation of politically sensitive matters to the 
Commission and comitology, the Council could also at any time limit Parlia-
ment’s participation in legislation on essential matters. A rapporteur on this mat-
ter complained:
How can the Council explain the contradiction in its argument that [it 
requires comitology because] its final decision on matters of vital inter-
ests to the Member States is essential, while maintaining that participa-
tion by Parliament [in comitology] is superfluous since only “technical 
implementing provisions” are involved? . . . Either the interests involved 
are really vital, in which case the issue is so important that this Parlia-
ment must be consulted on them, or they are in reality technical ques-
tions; then it is not necessary for the Council to reserve the decision 
for itself as it has frequently done in the past. (European Parliament 
1975, 103–4)
To press for greater legal clarity, the European Parliament therefore threat-
ened to freeze a part of the Commission’s funds unless the member states came 
up with ground rules for the use of the various types of comitology committees 
(Bergström and Héritier 2007, 191–92). It became more adamant in its demands 
when it became apparent in the mid-1980s that the Commission was slated to 
play an essential role in the implementation of the Single Market. In 1986, it 
noted again that the ambiguity of the comitology system allowed the member 
states to retain power especially on politically sensitive matters (European Parlia-
ment 1986, 19).
The revision of the Treaty of Rome through the 1986 Single European Act 
therefore seemed a welcome opportunity to resolve the legal ambiguity sur-
rounding the scope of delegation and the choice of comitology procedures. In 
fact, its supplement to Article 145, which specified the Council’s rights and obli-
gations, now seemed to oblige the Council to confer power of implementation 
to the Commission rather than to national administrations. It stated that the 
Council shall “confer on the Commission, in the acts the Council adopts, pow-
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU POLICIES      115
ers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lay down,” and that 
only in “specific cases” did it reserve the right “to exercise directly implementing 
powers itself.”2
At the same time, however, the treaty put comitology on a legal footing by pro-
viding the Council the possibility of “impos[ing] certain requirements in respect 
of the exercise of these powers.” The member states also refrained from making 
a clear distinction between legislation and implementation in the new treaty. As 
a result, the Single European Act largely codified existing practice by which the 
Council flexibly defined the scope of legislation and implementation as well as 
the Commission’s discretion on a case-by-case basis.3
For the Commission, this meant that it was still not able to control which type 
of comitology committee would oversee its actions. For Parliament, it implied 
that the Council still deprived it of its task to control the executive and—where 
the delegated power was, in fact, politically sensitive—of its newly gained right to 
participate in essential legislation.
Formalized Ambiguity (1987–1993)
Although the Single European Act had legalized the comitology system, it did little 
to settle the conflict between the institutions as it remained ambiguous about the 
scope of delegations and the conditions of comitology’s use. The Commission 
and Parliament therefore continued to push for further formal specification of 
the ground rules. The Commission submitted a proposal for a Council regulation 
that suggested a simplified comitology structure and, more important, defined 
the principles and rules for the Council’s use of this system (Commission of the 
European Communities 1986). However, the Council in its 1987 Comitology 
Decision departed substantially from the Commission’s proposal (Meng 1988, 
214–20; Ehlermann 1988) and refused to specify criteria for the scope of imple-
mentation and the use of the various comitology procedures (Council of the EC 
1987; Dehousse 1989, 125–28; Bluman 1989, 68–70). According to a legal expert,
a unanimous Council was keen to preserve the flexible nature of 
implementing powers, to establish any boundaries only on a case-by-
case basis, and to avoid, therefore, any type of general definition or 
“principles” similar to those found in national constitutions (restricting 
the scope of implementing powers a national parliament may delegate 
to a Government). (Bergström 2005, 198)4
In fact, the decision did little to change existing practices and contin-
ued to keep the Commission “at the national leash” (Meng 1988, 219). In its 
aftermath, Parliament and the Commission complained that the Council still 
reserved implementing powers for its national administrations5 and that when 
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it delegated powers to the Commission, it still made excessive use of the most 
restrictive regulatory committees, especially in relation to the implementation 
of the Single Market (Commission des Communautés Européennes 1991a, 11).
Although the member states retained flexible control over the implementa-
tion of the Single Market, they lost flexible control over one of its aspects: the 
competition policy. Recall that in the early 1960s the Council had decided to 
give the Commission ample discretion in this policy and merely obliged it to 
consult with advisory committees. Until the early 1980s, the Commission had 
used its authority primarily in the area of trade-distorting restrictions in vertical 
relationships between firms (“vertical restrictions”), while it had paid far less 
attention to other aspects of competition policy such as merger control, antitrust, 
and state aid. However, the renewed commitment to the Single Market that the 
Single European Act represented resulted in a leap in Europe-wide mergers and 
acquisitions (increasing sixfold between 1982 and 1990) and suddenly pushed 
the EU’s competition policy in all its aspects to center stage (McGowan and 
Wilks 1995, 152; McGowan and Cini 1999, 179–80). In this context, the Com-
mission began to use its wide discretion to shift the focus from traditional con-
cerns with private conduct toward the sensitive issue of government interference 
with the competitive process (Gerber 1994, 137–41)—a development that in the 
years to come would fuel more general criticism of excessive centralization and 
bureaucracy at the EU level (Neven, Nuttal, and Seabright 1993, 218; similarly, 
Goyder 1993, 508).
Order and Scatter (1994–1999)
The Treaty of Maastricht did nothing to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the 
comitology system. This situation remained unacceptable for the European Par-
liament. In a modus vivendi concluded in December 1994, the Council and the 
Commission agreed to a more extensive exchange of information with the Parlia-
ment (European Parliament 1996, 2). But for Parliament, which the Maastricht 
treaty had just been promoted to a genuine co-legislator, the modus vivendi was 
merely one step in the right direction. It felt that the Council continued to take 
advantage of the system’s ambiguity by delegating rule-making power on essen-
tial matters in order to exclude the Parliament from legislation on politically 
sensitive questions. It therefore pressed for a clear distinction between legislative 
and implementing matters and, in the case of implementing matters, for criteria 
regarding the choice of the committee procedure (Bergström and Héritier 2007, 
210, 217).
Most member states, in contrast, preferred to retain the flexibility on politi-
cally sensitive matters that the ambiguity of the situation provided. The House 
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of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Communities shared the Council’s 
skepticism about formulating legal delegation criteria:
Any criteria must be generally acceptable, readily understandable and 
workable . . . They must not be too prescriptive, and they should per-
mit differences of policy . . . As mentioned, one of the key interests to be 
protected is that of the Member States. There will remain matters on 
which there are sensitivities, at least until the Commission has shown 
itself capable of exercising the powers in question completely. (House 
of Lords 1999, part 4, no. 164)
According to the Select Committee, it was unlikely that the criteria required 
could be accurately and concisely translated into formal rules. Therefore, some 
sort of guidelines should be agreed on in a political rather than a legal text (House 
of Lords 1999, part 4, no. 165).
Given the member states’ reluctance to give up their flexibility, they did not 
use the opportunity at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference on the Treaty 
of Amsterdam to rid the treaty of its legal ambiguity. The conference merely 
charged the Commission with formulating a proposal for amending the 1987 
Comitology Decision. The new 1999 Comitology Decision revised the existing 
system in several ways, most notably by introducing criteria for the use of each 
comitology procedure and providing for a limited involvement of the European 
Parliament in scrutinizing the implementation of acts adopted under the co-
decision procedure.
Overall, however, the 1999 Comitology Decision did little to limit the 
Council’s extensive freedom of choice (Lenaerts and Verhoeven 2000, 671). 
Allaying fears that the new criteria might become a new cause for litigation, 
the decision explicitly states that these were “of a nonbinding nature.” The 
Commission also committed itself in an official declaration to search for bal-
anced implementing measures in “particularly sensitive sectors” (European 
Commission 1999a).
As Parliament built up pressure for a formal systematization of comitology, 
the member states increasingly resorted to an alternative way of implementing 
policies. In 1993, they established eight “European agencies,”6 and, by the end of 
1999, eleven agencies were in operation, most of which dealt with narrow cross-
sectional topics within the broader fields of regulation and social policy. There 
were, for example, an agency for the evaluation of medicinal products and a cen-
ter for the development of vocational training. Created on a case-by-case basis 
through an ordinary Council regulation, the agencies were governed by a man-
agement board mainly composed of member states’ representatives and operated 
largely independently of other supranational institutions (Kreher 1997, 227). 
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The Commission usually had organizational or budgetary responsibility for 
these agencies. Their principal function was the collection, management, and 
dissemination of information about the procedures and progress of the imple-
mentation of EU policies by national administrations (Majone 1997, 271–72; see 
also Chiti 2000, 342).
The European Parliament viewed this development with suspicion and 
demanded formal and transparent procedures to improve the monitoring and 
control of these agencies (Kelemen 2002, 104–5). The Commission initially wel-
comed their establishment insofar as the agencies relieved its workload. However, 
just as the European Parliament had come to demand clear criteria for the use of 
comitology, the Commission also became increasingly concerned about the lack 
of criteria for the creation of these agencies.
The Commission became more wary about the establishment of inde-
pendent agencies when this idea became popular in the competition policy 
where the Commission had come under increasing fire for its overly aggres-
sive implementation (Gerber 2007–08). Germany floated the idea of delegat-
ing the Commission’s responsibility for this policy to a European cartel office 
similar to the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) (Ehlermann 
1995, 474–75). Other member states and employers’ associations partly echoed 
Germany’s criticism of the Commission (Financial Times 1994; see also Wilks 
and McGowan 1995, 265; House of Lords 1993, 35–50), but were more luke-
warm about the idea of centralizing authority in the hands of an agency on 
the German model (McGowan and Wilks 1995, 162–64). Alternative proposals 
for reform suggested the decentralization of implementation with a view to 
enhancing the competition policy’s “accountability, flexibility and sensitivity” 
(Wilks 1996, 167). Overburdened by the competition policy’s complex proce-
dures, the Commission agreed on the need for reform (Forrester 2000, 1036). 
It reacted to the growing criticism by publishing a white paper on this topic. 
Hailed by its former directorate general, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (2000, 1239), 
as the “most important policy paper the Commission has ever published in the 
more than forty years of EC competition policy,” the paper proposed a sub-
stantial decentralization of the competition policy to national authorities and 
courts (European Commission 1999b, 5).
Formalization and Fragmentation (2000–2009)
After the Treaty of Amsterdam further strengthened the Parliament’s role as a 
co-legislator, it pressed even more adamantly for a greater formalization and 
involvement in comitology. It did so first in the context of financial services. In 
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the early 2000s, the member states decided to give new impetus to legislation 
in this area and tasked a committee chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy to make 
policy suggestions. This committee proposed to tackle the challenge in a two-step 
process starting with the formulation of regulatory principles through the nor-
mal legislative procedure and, in a second step, technical measures to be decided 
through a comitology procedure.
Though the Commission and the member states welcomed Lamfalussy’s 
proposal, the European Parliament was more skeptical and successfully pressed 
for three changes to the proposed procedure: the inclusion of sunset clauses to 
all delegating acts, that more comprehensive information be provided to the 
Parliament, and the opportunity for Parliament to react to the Commission’s 
draft implementing measures (Blom-Hansen 2011, 350–51). Parliament subse-
quently succeeded in extending the use of this new procedure and establishing 
criteria for its use. Initially, it had hoped to accomplish this with the ongoing 
treaty revision through the 2002–04 Constitutional Convention (Bergström 
and Héritier 2007, 220–23). When the product of this Convention, the Con-
stitutional Treaty, failed, however, it decided to resort to more confrontational 
means by threatening the Council with withholding funding for comitology 
committees as well as its agreement to extend sunset clauses for the financial 
services measures (Blom-Hansen 2011, 358). In response to this threat, the 
Council agreed to extend this new comitology procedure to provide for greater 
parliamentary involvement in areas that were subject to co-decision (“regula-
tory procedure with scrutiny”) (Council of the EU 2006). The Council also 
specified that “measures of general scope” ought to be subject to this new pro-
cedure (Blom-Hansen 2011, 359).
At the same time that the Council agreed on greater parliamentary involve-
ment in comitology, the member states also delimited the gray zone between 
legislation and implementation that provided the Council so much flexibility. 
Following the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a 
hierarchy between so-called legislative, delegated, and implementing acts. Legis-
lative acts are supposed to contain essential, nondelegatable elements such as the 
objectives, content, scope, and duration of delegated powers. By implication, del-
egated and implementing acts are not supposed to alter these essential elements. 
At the time of writing, however, it is still unclear whether these new treaty rules 
succeeded in clarifying the distinction between legislation and implementation.7
Whilst the comitology system was being formalized, the member states 
increasingly had recourse to agencies. Another fourteen agencies were estab-
lished in diverse fields such as defense (e.g., the European Defence Agency), 
transport (e.g., European Railway Agency), and on very specific regulatory issues 
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(e.g., the European Food Safety Agency). Both Parliament and the Commission 
eyed the agencies’ popularity with increasing suspicion. In its White Paper on 
European Governance, the Commission stressed that the agencies should not 
be established in policy areas where the treaty gave it exclusive authority (Euro-
pean Commission 2001, 24; Commission of the European Communities 2002, 
5–6; European Commission 2005). Repeating arguments about comitology, on 
numerous occasions it demanded the establishment of clear criteria for the agen-
cies’ creation, arguing for example in 2008 that
the diverse role of agencies fuels concerns that they might stray into 
areas more properly the domain of the policy-making branches of 
the EU. The responsibilities of the other institutions toward agencies, 
and of the Commission in particular, suffer from the lack of a clear 
framework and defined lines of responsibility. (European Commis-
sion 2008, 6)
This complaint was echoed by the European Parliament, which furthermore 
demanded that the creation of agencies be subject to the co-decision procedure. 
The Council, however, rejected the Commission’s proposal for an interinstitu-
tional agreement on clear criteria for the creation of agencies (Andoura and Tim-
merman 2008, 25). The debate was still ongoing at the time of writing.
In the meantime, national authorities became available as a new poten-
tial implementing actor alongside the Commission due to the “revolutionary” 
(McGowan 2005, 987) reforms that followed the Commission’s white paper on 
the competition policy. Some argue they entail a dispersion of power and author-
ity to the member states and national competition authorities (Forrester 2000, 
1040), while others assert that they served to augment the Commission’s power 
(Riley 2003, 671–72). For our purposes, the important fact is that the involvement 
of national authorities supposedly made the implementation of the competition 
policy far more flexible than the previous, highly formalized system (Cengiz 2010, 
662–67). The reform envisaged that member states would be primarily respon-
sible for the application of EU competition law, and the Commission would take 
enforcement action only under limited circumstances (Gerber 2007–08, 1242). To 
guarantee a consistent Europe-wide application despite this decentralization, the 
national authorities were supposed to exchange information within the so-called 
European Competition Network. This informal network decides which national 
jurisdiction has responsibility for each case. Customarily, the national authority 
that opens a case typically continues to handle it, and only when more than three 
countries are affected does the case go to the Commission (Wilks 2007, 441).
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Implementation in the European Union, 
1958–2009
The original Treaty of Rome centralized implementing powers for many policies 
in the hands of the Commission. On the remaining issues, the Council could 
confer powers to the Commission on a case-by-case basis. Once the Commission 
was delegated implementing powers, there were no legal means for the member 
states to alter the Commission’s measures.
If we take a look beyond these initial formal rules, however, we see that much 
of the implementation of EU policies takes place within an ambiguous legal space 
or outside the treaty rules. These practices commonly afford the member states 
collectively a great deal of flexibility to determine the Commission’s discretion 
on a case-by-case basis. For the European Parliament, on the other hand, these 
practices usually implied a curtailment of its legislative power and its capacity to 
control the Commission in its executive function.
This great legal ambiguity—and the real loss in power it implied, especially 
for the European Parliament—meant that the treaty rules have constantly been 
subject to legal challenges, revision, and reinterpretation. Although this makes 
it difficult to clearly discriminate between practices of formal and informal 
governance, a few trends become apparent. First, the Council managed for 
most of the time to attain flexible control of the scope of delegation (through 
the ambiguous distinction between legislation and implementation) and the 
Commission’s discretion (by specifying implementing actions in the parent 
legal act and subjecting the Commission to the comitology scrutiny). This 
flexibility afforded the Council the opportunity to retain much leeway in the 
implementation of politically sensitive matters. Second, as soon as the Euro-
pean Parliament from the 1990s on successfully pushed for a clear delineation 
of the scope of delegation and a greater systematization of comitology in order 
to reduce the member states’ flexibility, the Council increasingly had recourse 
to alternative forms of implementation. Thus, it created more and more agen-
cies and, in the case of the competition policy, involved national authorities to 
a greater extent in the process.
As the table below visualizes, however, the empirical record supports Liberal 
Regime Theory only in part, and only ambiguously so. In line with the theory’s 
expectation, the Common Agricultural Policy is once again an outlier in these 
broader trends because the Council subjected the Commission in this area to 
the less intrusive management comitology committees, whereas most other eco-
nomic policies with a higher degree of political uncertainty featured the restric-
tive regulatory comitology procedure.
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A second piece of evidence that corroborates Liberal Regime Theory is the fact 
that—most of the time—conflicts over the rules took place between the member 
states on one side and the supranational actors on the opposite side. The Euro-
pean Parliament skillfully fought the member states for legal rules that provided 
greater voice in the delegation of implementation and the scrutiny of the Com-
mission. The Commission, for its part, almost always demanded rules that pro-
vided it with the widest possible discretion. The member states, in turn, typically 
resisted rule changes that would reduce their flexibility to determine the scope of 
delegation and the Commission’s discretion, and only gave in when the Parlia-
ment strong-armed it into giving it more power.
This evidence notwithstanding, table 7 makes apparent that there are limits 
to Liberal Regime Theory’s explanatory power and no straightforward patterns 
in the emergence of informal governance. The member states codified the comi-
tology system, and they ultimately agreed to a legal distinction between legisla-
tion and implementation, which strongly curtailed their ability to flexibly alter 
measures that threaten to generate strong conflict at the domestic level. These 
developments are probably best explained by the European Parliament’s capacity 
to twist the Council’s arm. And although it seems likely that the increasing for-
malization of comitology led the Council to search for alternative implementa-
tion methods, it is nevertheless an open question whether agencies and national 
administrations are good substitutes for the flexibility the Council used to have 
in the early days of comitology. 
Thus, contrary to our theory’s predictions, the final three observations in 
areas of high political uncertainty feature formal rather than informal gover-
nance. In addition, the Common Agricultural Policy is an outlier only during the 
first three decades of the Community’s existence, that is, until the Commission 
starts to make full use of its discretion in the competition policy. As a result, the 
empirical evidence is only straightforward for the first two decades of the Euro-
pean Community and ambiguous afterwards.
TABLE 7 Formal and informal governance in implementation









It seems impossible to define “vital interests” in legal terms or to 
list a number of cases in which the vital interests of a state would be 
considered in jeopardy . . . . So who decides whether a member state’s 
vital interests are at stake? I’m not sure there is a solution to this 
problem.
—A senior official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 1965
The EU legislative process is governed by a norm of discretion, which prescribes 
that governments facing unmanageable domestic pressure ought to be accommo-
dated. The norm of discretion manifests itself in collective informal governance 
practices at every step of the EU’s legislative procedure. However, the norm’s 
precise boundaries are vague; they are also prone to abuse when it is difficult to 
verify that legitimate demands are being made for the use of informal governance. 
This means that the actual use of informal governance is fraught with difficulties, 
since the governments are bound to disagree about its necessity. Disagreements 
about the necessity of informal governance, however, cast more general doubts 
about the credibility of one another’s actual commitment to cooperation. There 
is, consequently, a tension between formal rules and informal governance, since 
doubts about the legitimacy of the latter erode the effectiveness of the former.
The chapter-opening quote by a senior official in the German Foreign Ministry 
demonstrates that the member states have been remarkably aware of this prob-
lem from the outset. The note was written in the context of the 1965 “empty chair 
crisis” following De Gaulle’s demand to codify the right of a national veto in 
situations where “vital interests” are at stake. Although consensus decision mak-
ing had been the norm in the Council from the outset, since all member states 
agreed about the necessity to refrain from majority voting for political reasons, 
France’s cooperating partners feared that the legalization of this norm would in 
fact undermine the commitment that the formal voting rules represented. The 
German official goes on to explain:
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Although majority voting is legally justified, its actual use has to be 
a political decision. No state should be overruled if this puts its vital 
interests in jeopardy . . . However, if we refrained from voting each time 
a member state declares its vital interests to be at stake without having 
to justify this assertion or obtain the other member states’ approval, this 
would in fact result in the abdication of the principle of majority voting. 
(Auswärtiges Amt 1965)
To resolve the tension between formal commitments and informal flexibility, 
the member states have had to find a way to determine in each situation whether 
formal rules apply or whether informal governance is pertinent. The purpose of 
this and the following two chapters is to show how the EU member states man-
age this problem.
The central argument in this chapter is that states meet this challenge by 
delegating this decision to a trustworthy actor who elicits information about 
the actual demand for informal governance in each situation. This argument 
is developed in six steps. As a first step, we explain how the informal norm of 
discretion brings about a demand for additional institutions to cope with the 
classical problem of moral hazard. Drawing on the economic literature on insur-
ance markets, the second step discusses several solutions for the problem such 
as penalties and investigation. The third step argues that the solutions that are 
commonly invoked in the rational institutional design and international law lit-
erature are, in fact, ill suited for the problem at hand. The fourth step develops 
this insight further: we argue that, in order to guarantee that a sufficient level of 
discretion is granted, governments delegate the authority to adjudicate the use 
of informal governance to another member government that is biased against 
the demand for accommodation. The fifth section specifies this hypothesis in 
the empirical context of the EU, arguing that the member states holding the 
EU’s Council presidency may under certain circumstances wield adjudicatory 
authority, and explains how this hypothesis can be tested against rival theories. 
This exercise sets the stage for the empirical analysis, which traces the theories’ 
predictions regarding the development of the Council presidency’s adjudicatory 
practices and prerogatives (chapter 7) and its role in the negotiation of the EU’s 
Working Time Directive (chapter 8). This chapter concludes with a look ahead 
to the findings of this empirical analysis.
Informal Discretion, Ambiguity, and Moral Hazard
Informal governance adds flexibility to otherwise rigid formal rules where gov-
ernments might face excessive domestic pressure to defy their commitment. Let 
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us assume for one moment that all member governments are perfectly able to 
observe the nature and extent of the domestic pressure on their cooperating 
partner. In this situation, all states have an incentive to accommodate this 
government even without an explicit quid pro quo, because they all want to pre-
vent this government from defying its commitment in order to uphold the highly 
beneficial level of integration among them.
Yet these conditions do not hold in reality. In some situations, it may be obvi-
ous to all governments that informal governance is necessary. Borderline cases, 
however, are bound to generate conflicts among governments. The problem is 
aggravated when the governments, as they usually are, are better informed about 
their own domestic situation than their cooperating partners, since this informa-
tional advantage creates incentives to abuse the norm. To once again draw a com-
parison between the norm of discretion and car insurance: the probability of car 
accidents is not entirely beyond our control, but it is to some extent influenced 
by our driving behavior. Comprehensive coverage for accidents may then induce 
me to drive more recklessly or to fake an accident in order to claim the full insur-
ance sum. The informal norm of discretion, just like car insurance, may also 
induce behavior that undermines the very purpose of the norm in that govern-
ments have an incentive to exaggerate the domestic pressure they are under in 
order to, for example, protect special interests or manipulate the terms of trade 
in their favor (Feenstra and Lewis 1991, 1288; Goldstein and Martin 2000, 621). 
Put differently, the informal norm of discretion creates a classical problem of 
moral hazard.
This problem casts doubt on the feasibility of informal governance in practice. 
If states are aware of the fact that the norm of discretion is prone to abuse, then 
the credibility of the formal commitment that this norm is supposed to protect 
sustains damage after all. It consequently creates a demand for additional insti-
tutions that allow the governments to collectively discriminate between false or 
exaggerated and legitimate demands for informal governance.
Alternative Solutions for Problems 
of Moral Hazard
How can states resolve the problem of moral hazard? The economic literature on 
insurance offers two suggestions (Shavell 1979), both of which have found their 
way into the literature on institutional design.
Coinsurance, or incomplete coverage, prevents moral hazard by making the 
insured bear some costs of a claim. Making the driver share the costs of an acci-
dent, for instance, induces him to drive less recklessly. Accordingly, making a 
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government pay a penalty for the use of informal governance should induce it 
to be less susceptible to domestic pressure for defection. This solution underpins 
a number of formal models on flexibility mechanisms in trade agreements. For 
example, George Downs and David Rocke (1995, 77) argue that sanctions in 
response to defection have to be low enough to allow politicians, in response to 
domestic pressure, to break the agreement from time to time, but still just high 
enough to prevent states from caving in to domestic pressure all the time. Peter 
Rosendorff and Helen Milner (2001, 835), among others, argue that coinsurance 
is the rationale behind the design of escape clauses. For example, Article XIX of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade authorizes temporary protection in 
the event that import surges threaten to cause serious damage to an industry. In 
order to discourage overuse of this escape clause, governments must pay a pen-
alty for invoking it. Similarly, Randall Stone (2011, 35) argues that large states 
pay a fixed cost to the small states when taking informal unilateral control of 
an international organization—a cost that prevents the large state from using 
informal governance excessively.
Another commonly invoked solution for the problem of moral hazard is 
observation, which prevents the abuse of insurance by using situational informa-
tion to determine whether an event is covered by an insurance policy. In the case 
of car insurance, for instance, companies often pay experts to gather information 
about the actual cause and severity of an accident. Competition and certification 
schemes are supposed to prevent conflicts of interest and induce the expert to 
report truthfully. In international politics, this translates into third-party adju-
dication about the legitimacy of demands for flexibility. According to B. Peter 
Rosendorff, this rationale underpins the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure. 
This procedure delegates to a panel the task of adjudicating on rule violations 
and setting a level of sanctions, the payment of which permits the violator to 
signal its willingness to stick to its commitment in normal times:
The institution then serves a crucial information-providing role. It 
establishes the facts, adjudicates on a violation, estimates the dam-
ages, and reports a successful completion of the process. It is this 
informational role of the DSP [Dispute Settlement Procedure] that 
determines its effectiveness in the world trading system. (Rosendorff 
2005, 391)
Moral Hazard Solutions and Political Uncertainty
How adequate are these solutions for the problem of moral hazard in the context 
of an informal norm of discretion? Coinsurance on the basis of a preset penalty 
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is in fact inadequate for our purposes. Insurance companies usually know quite 
well how, for example, full coverage will affect their clients’ driving behavior. 
However, political uncertainty, against which states “insure” themselves through 
the norm of discretion, lies by definition beyond the realm of things that states 
know when designing institutions. They are consequently unable to determine 
the optimal size of a preset penalty that would discourage the abuse of the norm. 
If states nevertheless made the use of informal governance conditional on the 
payment of such a penalty, this would lead to several economic inefficiencies1 
and generate intense conflict about the legitimacy of informal governance in 
practice. Unsurprisingly, states often invoke escape clauses without requiring 
the beneficiary to pay a penalty for using them (Pelc 2009). Similarly, there is 
little evidence that the United States pays any kind of costs when it makes use of 
informal governance in the International Monetary Fund. In fact, Stone (2011, 
217) shows that United States does abuse informal governance, and that these 
practices have weakened the IMF.
Observation seems a more promising candidate than coinsurance. However, 
not all actors are equally adequate for this purpose in the context of the norm 
of discretion. Recall that the norm of discretion remains deliberately informal, 
since the accommodation of excessive domestic pressure per se seems to betray 
the institution’s purpose. Consequently, institutional actors such as courts and 
bureaucracies that are pledged to upholding the rule of law cannot adjudicate 
on the use of informal governance. Although legal bodies are often given broad 
discretion in the interpretation of rules, the rule of law requires these bodies to 
do so in a consistent manner. Yet, as the chapter-opening quote notes, this is not 
possible in the case of political uncertainty. Institutional actors that derive their 
authority from their pledge to enforce the rule of law would consequently jeopar-
dize their reputation if they were to recommend the use of informal governance. 
This is, after all, a political decision that needs to be made by political actors.
Final Adjudicatory Authority
If coinsurance in the form of preset penalties is inadequate, and observation in 
the form of third-party adjudication also seems ill suited for our purposes, how 
do governments elicit the information that is necessary to determine whether 
formal rules apply or whether informal governance is pertinent? In principle, 
the governments themselves are best placed to assess whether imminent dam-
age to the commitment justifies the use of informal governance. However, 
decisions to accommodate a cooperating partner through informal governance 
may also have nonnegligible distributional effects that create conflicts of  interest. 
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Thus, the authority to decide the use of informal governance cannot lie with 
the government (the claimant) that says it is facing excessive domestic pressure, 
since its incentives to exaggerate the case for its personal benefit gives rise to the 
problem of moral hazard to begin with. In formal language, one would say that 
if the claimant’s ideal point is located far away from the law in question, it has no 
incentive to report truthfully the actual pressure it is facing at home. For the same 
reason, the authority to decide on the use of informal governance also cannot lie 
with a government with a similar ideal point that would personally gain from 
the accommodation of another government, because it has an incentive to col-
lude with the claimant and recommend the use of informal governance in order 
to change the law in question even if it is not necessary.
However, states can trust the judgment of a government that does not per-
sonally gain from recommending concessions to the claimants. If the claimant 
opposes the law in question, whereas the adjudicating government supports it, 
then the only reason for the latter to recommend the accommodation of the for-
mer through informal governance is to prevent a costly disruption of the inter-
national organization. Again in a more formal language, one would say that the 
adjudicating government’s ideal point is located close to the law in question, but 
far away from the claimant. In this situation, the adjudicating government’s bias 
against the claimant makes its judgment about the need to move closer to the 
claimant trustworthy in the eyes of other member states (Calvert 1985, 552).2
Interestingly, for the adjudicating government to make an informed decision, 
it need not actively collect information about the claimant’s motives. Since there 
are various ways to provide flexibility, all of which have different distributional 
consequences (Pelc 2011), its authority alone induces actors with a stake in the 
outcome to increase the level of available information about the situation in 
order to prevent a false, unfavorable judgment (Dai 2002, 413–15; McCubbins 
and Schwartz 1984).
Testable Implications and Alternative 
Explanations
The theory of informal governance elucidated above is more explicit than 
other theories about the source of final authority over the use of the norm of 
discretion. This section therefore draws on existing studies in the tradition of 
 power-based institutionalism and classical regime theory, and then seeks to derive 
testable implications of our theory and rival theories about this authority in the 
EU  context.
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Liberal Regime Theory
What would an arrangement for fair adjudication of a claim for informal gover-
nance look like in the institutional context of the EU?
There are, in principle, two ways to accomplish the delegation of adjudica-
tory authority to a member government that is biased against the  claimant. 
One is the delegation of adjudicatory authority on each issue under negotia-
tion to a government that supports the legislative proposal in question and 
is, therefore, biased against claimants that demand to change this proposal 
through informal governance. One might object that the member states can-
not know one another’s preferences at the beginning of a negotiation. In the 
EU, however, the broad contours of states’ preferences in the Council of Min-
isters are common knowledge, even if they are usually better informed about 
their susceptibility to domestic interests than about another government’s 
breaking point.3 Yet this solution seems impractical in light of the fact that the 
EU adopts hundreds of legal acts each year; it would be quite cumbersome to 
choose a different suitable adjudicator for each and every legal dossier under 
discussion.
A second solution seems more appropriate for the specific context of the 
EU. The treaty envisages that the country holding the presidency of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, which is an office rotating on a six-month basis among gov-
ernments, convenes and organizes Council meetings. Thus, the member states 
could also just delegate adjudicatory authority to the Council presidency. To 
make sure they can trust the presidency’s judgment, they would have to com-
pel the government in office to drop those legislative proposals from the leg-
islative agenda that it opposes and keep those that it endorses on the agenda. 
If this was not the case and the government holding the presidency recom-
mended the use of informal governance in the case of a legislative proposal 
it opposes, other member states would not be able to trust and defer to its 
judgment.
Two testable implications follow. First, because the norm of discretion gives 
rise to a demand for adjudication, the informal governance practices that we have 
described coevolve with adjudication practices and prerogatives on the part of 
the Council presidency. Second, because other member states will only trust the 
judgment of a government that is not suspected of colluding with the claimant, 
they defer to the presidency only when the government in office is biased against 
the claimant. Ceteris paribus, they defy the presidency’s judgment when the 
 government in office and the claimant share similar preferences. Anticipating 
this reaction, the government in office will keep legislative proposals like this off 
the agenda, even if the claimant’s demands are justified.
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Power-Based Institutionalism
Conceiving of informal governance as a means for powerful states to eschew 
formal rules in issue areas that are particularly sensitive, a power-based theory 
of informal governance would not expect dominant states to make their use 
of informal governance dependent on the judgment of another government. 
In Stone’s model of informal governance, for example, it is the dominant state 
that, after the payment of a fixed cost, decides to take informal control of an 
institution when urgent strategic objectives override its long-term interest in the 
institution (Stone 2011, 35).
The model implies that an existing institution like the Council presidency 
will wield informal authority only when a dominant state assumes this office. 
Accordingly, there is no intrinsic connection between the practices of informal 
governance and the Council presidency’s informal authority. Nor can we expect 
dominant states to pay deference to the adverse judgment of a small state holding 
the presidency.
Classical Regime Theory
For classical regime theory, informal governance is the result of uncodified institu-
tions that states design to reduce the relative costs of transactions among them. In 
a brilliant book, Jonas Tallberg (2006, 3) interpreted the emergence of the Coun-
cil presidency along these lines. In his view, multilateral decision making among 
governments in the Council is fraught with various problems that bring about a 
demand for leadership. For example, when agendas are “unstable, overcrowded, or 
underdeveloped” (Tallberg 2006, 21), states delegate agenda-management power 
to the presidency. In addition, when governments lack complete information 
about one another’s preferences on an issue, they delegate to the presidency the 
task of brokering among them (Tallberg 2006, 24–27).4 In other words, the presi-
dency is vested with a number of procedural prerogatives that allow it to raise the 
overall efficiency of negotiations in the Council. It therefore wields authority by 
virtue of its office, not its power or its stance on an issue, and may well use it in 
order to manipulate the agenda and decisions in its favor (Tallberg 2006, 31–33).
This implies that the presidency’s practices and prerogatives emerge system-
atically with increasingly intense bargaining problems, and not with political 
uncertainty. Therefore, according to Tallberg, the presidency gained in promi-
nence in response to the sudden leap in legislative activity and the accession of 
three more members to the EU from the late 1960s onward. Furthermore, since 
the presidency enjoys authority by virtue of its office, other governments, small 
and large, generally pay deference to its decisions. 
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A Look Ahead to Subsequent Chapters
The following two chapters trace the theories’ implications using various qualita-
tive data. Altogether, the collective evidence of chapters 7 and 8 provide strong 
support for Liberal Regime Theory’s second hypothesis concerning adjudication 
on informal governance.
Drawing on archival material and practitioner reports, chapter 7 evaluates 
the claim that the development of informal governance that we have described is 
directly related to the development of adjudicatory practices on the part of the 
presidency. Thus, it shows that the member states’ practice of consensus decision 
making went hand in hand with the presidency’s prerogatives to call a vote in 
the event that a government’s demands for accommodation were found unjusti-
fied. Similarly, the practice of sending the Commission’s proposals straight to the 
informal Council substructure before discussing them officially among ministers 
afforded the Council presidency the ability to restructure the legislative agenda 
according to new priorities. A mini case study on the negotiation of the End-
of-Life Vehicles Directive between 1997 and 2000 that tackles the problem of 
automotive waste indicates that other member states typically compel the gov-
ernment holding the presidency to drop legislative proposals from the agenda 
when they cannot trust its judgment.
Chapter 8 presents a case study of the negotiation of the Working Time Direc-
tive from 1991 until 1993 under six different presidencies. This study assesses in 
depth the conditions under which other governments defer to the presidency’s 
judgments on the use of informal governance and formal voting rules. In this 
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case, a legislative proposal on the Europe-wide mandatory regulation of working 
time threatened to impose excessive adjustment costs on British employers. The 
proposal immediately caused strong resistance from numerous domestic groups, 
causing the UK government to appeal to its cooperating partners to refrain from 
majority voting and to alleviate British adjustment costs. However, the legitimacy 
of the UK government’s demand to be accommodated through informal gover-
nance was dubious. It consequently took six successive presidencies to determine 
whether they should call a majority vote on the proposal or alternatively include 
the UK in formulating a consensus around a modified proposal. The analysis 
shows that governments holding the presidencies enjoy adjudicatory authority 
only when it is biased against a claimant—that is, its authority is critically depen-
dent on its trustworthiness, not the office itself or power asymmetries.
In sum, the following chapters suggest that the Council presidency serves 
to resolve the tension between formal and informal institutional elements that 
builds up when there remain doubts about the legitimate use of informal gov-
ernance. By rendering informed judgments about the true demand for informal 
governance, the member states are able to add situational flexibility to the formal 




THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY AS 
AN ADJUDICATOR
[Overruling] a minority is just as reprehensible as insisting on accom-
modation up to the point that it threatens the community interest. . . . 
Since the normal negotiation process has not allowed [such 
conflicts] to be prevented, the only alternative to having recourse 
to force is arbitration. . . . These rules of the game have led to the 
development of a decisive role of a new communitarian organ: the 
Presidency. It is the Presidency’s responsibility to maintain “normal” 
political relations within the Community, to try to construct compro-
mises between extreme positions, and at the same time to avert 
conflict.
—Jean Louis Dewost, juris consult of the Council of Ministers
Barely mentioned in the original Rome Treaty or the Council’s internal Rules of 
Procedure (Conseil de la CEE 1958), the Council presidency, rotating every six 
months among governments, surprisingly assumed important responsibilities in 
agenda setting and intergovernmental negotiations in the Council.
Some of the Council presidency’s tasks are certainly particular to the European 
Union, and some of its aspects might be in urgent need of reform. Yet one of its 
principal functions presents a solution to a more general cooperation problem, 
which has so far been underappreciated in the literature (Kleine 2013). This chap-
ter argues that the Council presidency serves a crucial information- providing role 
through its authority to adjudicate demands for informal governance. In other 
words, it serves to elicit the information that is needed for the governments to 
discriminate between false and legitimate demands for informal governance. The 
presidency’s adjudicatory authority is the direct result of an informal norm of 
discretion and other informal governance practices that surround the EU’s entire 
legislative process. This implies that it should assume its adjudicatory responsi-
bilities in close parallel to the practices we have previously described.
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Other theories disagree. Initial studies regarded the presidency as a stopgap 
by default, rather than by design, for sundry tasks that popped up and the Com-
mission failed to assume (Kirchner 1992, 71). Power-based institutionalism does 
not expect dominant states to subject their use of informal governance to the 
judgment of the government holding the presidency. There is consequently no 
reason to expect any direct relation between the presidency’s informal author-
ity and other informal governance practices. Studies in the tradition of classical 
regime theory view the presidency as a functional solution to prominent inter-
governmental bargaining problems. It follows that the presidency assumes more 
and more responsibility in response to the increasing complexity in decision 
making in the late 1960s and early 1970s, following De Gaulle’s threat to with-
draw from the European Union during the “empty-chair crisis,” the Council’s 
increasing legislative activity, and the Community’s first enlargement in 1973.
These different explanations of the rationale for the presidency’s authority 
in decision making are now evaluated by tracing the informal evolution of this 
office. Drawing mainly on new archival material and reports of contemporary 
practitioners, this chapter demonstrates that the governments in charge of the 
presidency adopted a number of practices in agenda setting and negotiation as a 
direct result of the governments’ informal practices in agenda setting and voting. 
Other factors, such as the Council’s growing workload and the accession of new 
states to the EU, the variables stressed by classical regime theory, merely accentu-
ate what had already become standard practice.
The Presidency in the Council
As early as 1961, Jean Megret, a close contemporary commentator on EU deci-
sion-making practices, observed:
There has been a very interesting development in the first three years 
of practical application of the Treaty. More frequently the Presidency 
finds itself released from its task of expressing its national position as 
a member of the Council of Ministers. Instead, it devotes itself to the 
organization of work and the search for a compromise among govern-
ments. (Megret 1961, 636, 646)
Specifically, the presidency’s authority was based on three practices: 
intense contacts especially with recalcitrant delegations; the preparation of com-
promise proposals among the member states; and the prerogative to call votes or 
declare consensus.
The presidency adopted the first practice, the establishment of intense con-
tacts with recalcitrant governments, as a direct result of the norm of consensus 
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decision making almost immediately after the Treaty of Rome became effective. 
In an analysis of the German 1964 presidency, for example, the permanent repre-
sentative emphasizes that these contacts were invaluable for attaining  information 
about the “motives and problems of individual delegations” (Vertretung der BRD 
bei der EWG 1965b). It was thereby assisted by the Council Secretariat, which 
gathered intelligence from the member states’ permanent representatives or in 
direct consultation in the capitals of other governments (Wallace 1985b, 16).1 
Emile Noël, the Commission’s executive secretary, also underscores the impor-
tance of contacts between the Council presidency and individual delegations: 
“The chairman has a feeling for unformulated desiderata and requests. He knows 
where positions are reserved. He knows how to take account of and interpret 
remarks made in confidence” (Noël 1967b, 238; 1966, 32).2
The Council presidency’s central role in intergovernmental negotiations was 
accentuated even more in recent years by the gradual promotion of the European 
Parliament to the status of a co-legislator. Instead of face-to-face negotiations 
among members of the European Parliament and the Council in full session, the 
governments relied on the presidency to establish contacts with the Parliament in 
informal trilogue meetings and to conduct negotiations on the Council’s behalf 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 151, 212; Council of the EU 2000, 15).
The Council’s norm of consensus decision making directly led to a second 
practice by the Council presidency: the preparation of compromise proposals, 
which soon became known as “presidency compromises.” The term appears in 
Council documents as early as the first years of the 1960s. For example, in prepa-
ration for the third German presidency in 1964, the permanent representative 
advised the chairmen of the various Council working groups to prepare possible 
presidency compromises prior to group meetings (Vertretung der BRD bei der 
EWG 1964a). By the late 1960s, the presidency compromise had become a fact 
of Community life (van Rijn 1972, 652; Sasse 1975, 143–47; Dewost 1987, 174).
The Commission played an important, yet a secondary, role in this process. 
Although the Council presidency understood the scope for changes, the Com-
mission felt more obliged to defend its original legislative proposal. As Emile 
Noël and Henri Etienne explain:
[The Commission] is more obliged to uphold, even practically on its 
own, the Simon-pure position, which the Commission has decided is 
most in accordance with the Community interest. . . . So it is the chair 
[the Council presidency] that has the most scope for quietly tak-
ing soundings, putting out feelers, and coming forward at the right 
moment with compromise suggestions—particularly suggestions 
some distance away from the Commission’s original proposal. (Noël 
and Etienne 1971, 438)
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The member states gradually had more frequent recourse to majority voting 
from the mid-1970s on. In the absence of a norm of discretion, we would 
expect the presidency’s role in the search for a consensus to fade away with this 
 development. However, just the reverse is true. In line with Liberal Regime The-
ory, the more frequent use of majority voting in the Council only increased the 
demand for an adjudicator to determine whether the formal voting rules applied 
or informal governance was demanded.
The gradual shift to more frequent majority voting consequently served to 
accentuate even more the third informal practice: the presidency’s prerogative to 
call votes.3 As Noël and Etienne explained at the end of the 1960s:
When there has been a vote, this is because the Council Presidency, after 
consultation of the Commission, judged that the negotiations had been 
sufficiently stretched to the effect that the law of majority voting can 
be rightfully used to provoke hesitant partners to rally round an agree-
ment. (Noël and Etienne 1969, 47)
The Three Wise Men in 1979 approved of this unwritten law that the authority to 
determine whether and when to invoke formal voting rules rests with the Council 
presidency:
Each state must remain the judge of where its important interests lie. 
Otherwise it could be overruled on an issue which it sincerely considered 
a major one. It is only when all states feel sure that this will not happen 
that they will all be willing to follow normal voting procedures. . . . The 
application of these solutions lies in the hands of the Presidency. The 
Chairman of the Council is best placed to judge whether and when a 
vote should be called. (Council of the EC 1980)
The fact that in mid-1980s, when the number of majority votes peaked, the 
Commission found it necessary to complain about the presidency’s dominant 
role further testifies to the fact that the presidency’s authority increased with a 
growing need to adjudicate whether formal voting or informal consensus deci-
sion making was needed:
The practices once begun tend to go on: multiplication of the compro-
mises made by the Presidency on all sorts of subjects, thus supplanting 
Commission proposals, undue resort to bilateral talks, national glori-
fication of the “Presidency of the Community,” although this is a new 
office with no legal basis. (Noël 1985, 150)
The chapter-opening quote by Jean-Louis Dewost directly pinpoints, in 
line with Liberal Regime Theory, why the presidency assumed its adjudicatory 
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function. For him, the presidency serves to prevent disruptive conflicts by 
determining whether a minority ought to be overruled or accommodated. The 
presidency’s three practices of intense contacts with recalcitrant delegations, the 
preparation of compromises, and the prerogative to call votes have hardly altered 
over time. Neither the empowerment of the European Parliament nor the estab-
lishment of a permanent president of the European Council alongside the rotat-
ing presidency of the Council of Ministers changed the fact that the authority to 
adjudicate on ambiguous demands for added discretion rests with the govern-
ment that holds the Council presidency.
The Presidency and the Agenda
At the same time that the Council presidency adopted a number of new preroga-
tives in intergovernmental negotiations, it also assumed new responsibilities in 
the micromanagement of the legislative agenda. As before, this authority was a 
direct result of informal governance practices in the decision-making stage.
The Treaty of Rome endowed the Commission with the exclusive right of 
initiative. This monopoly allowed the supranational bureaucracy to submit pro-
posals for legal acts when it considered the circumstances for their adoption to 
be favorable. However, instead of discussing them at the level of the Council of 
Ministers, the governments began from the early 1960s onward to pass Commis-
sion proposals on a regular basis to the ever-growing Council substructure of 
government representatives in working groups and committees.
This practice broke the link between the Commission’s agenda-setting activ-
ity and the composition of the Council’s legislative activity. In other words, the 
Council agenda ceased to be determined by the Commission’s timing of legisla-
tive proposals, and this in turn afforded the governments the opportunity to 
structure the Council agenda according to new priorities.
As soon as the Council agenda opened up for new priorities in the early 1960s, 
the presidency began to play an increasingly important role in determining the 
specific composition of the Council agenda. Reflecting on its working methods, 
the Council’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) recom-
mended in 1960 that the “choice of important subjects, which merit discussion in 
the Council, ought to be conferred to the Presidency” (Conseil de la CEE 1960). 
The Council presidency subsequently outgrew its modest official role as a mere 
organizer of meetings to become the informal driving force behind intergov-
ernmental negotiations in the Council. For example, recapitulating the role of 
the presidency, the Belgian permanent representative, Joseph van der Meulen, 
explained in 1966 that the “presidency is . . . anything but mere decoration”:
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Not only does it maintain the good order of negotiations. It pre-
pares . . . the work program for the Working Groups with a view to 
 keeping up a progressive examination of all questions. All these Working 
Groups in fact constitute a considerable machinery that risks becoming 
paralyzed were it not for the vigilant attention of the President. (van der 
Meulen 1966, 12; see also Wallace and Edwards 1976, 540)
In short, the governments’ practice of passing the Commission’s legislative pro-
posals to the Council substructure deprived the Commission of its influence on 
the Council’s legislative activity and allowed the member states to structure the 
Council agenda according to new priorities. The Council presidency immedi-
ately assumed this responsibility and consequently gained the opportunity to 
prioritize agenda items and, ceteris paribus, let others slide. The Commission 
official and close observer Thomas van Rijn noted:
This task [of organizing meetings] gives the Presidency great influence, 
and it is here that different national characteristics become apparent. 
It permits putting strong emphasis on certain problems while waiting 
for others to become “ripe.” The very fact that one country occupies the 
presidency for six months at all levels allows initiatives to be taken and 
other issues to be concluded as soon as possible. (van Rijn 1972, 653; 
see also Noël 1967b, 237)
In recognition of this development, the Council obligated incoming presiden-
cies from 1973 onward to publish their work program and timetables for meet-
ings (de Bassompierre 1988, 24; Amphoux et al. 1979, 110). This work program 
became the basis for the semiannual State of the Community address, in which 
each incoming Council presidency announced a list of its objectives and pri-
orities to the European Parliament (Wallace and Edwards 1976, 543; Westlake 
1995, 342). In their report on the European institutions, the Three Wise Men 
recommend strengthening the presidency’s agenda-setting function even further 
(Council of the EC 1980). Jean-Louis Dewost concurs in 1984:
[The] Presidency has assumed [a] delicate role: the generation of politi-
cal impetus through the revitalization of forgotten dossiers and the 
provision of new topics that hopefully mobilize political energy. . . . The 
Presidencies announce programs and present themselves as real motors 
for the Community, hoping to impose their national interests at the 
Community level. (Dewost 1984, 32; see also Wallace 1985b, 5)
How did the presidency use its influence over the agenda? According to close 
observers, the government holding the Council presidency usually neglects leg-
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islative proposals that are controversial and that it would like to see changed 
substantially in Council negotiations (interview in Brussels, January 2007). But 
it does not do this on its own initiative. Rather, corroborating Liberal Regime 
Theory, the government in charge neglects legislative proposals that it wishes to 
change because other governments in the Council would cold-shoulder self-serv-
ing demands from the presidency. In 1964, the German permanent representative 
reflected on his experiences during the German presidency, noting that in general 
the “chairman has to contain himself in his demands for consideration of spe-
cific national interests” (Vertretung der BRD bei der EWG 1965b). Violations of 
this custom were considered inappropriate and strongly discouraged. “Attempts 
like this,” emphasized another internal report on the conduct of the presidency, 
“would meet with strong refusal” (Vertretung der BRD bei der EG 1971; Elgström 
2003, 47).
The example of the End of Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive is instructive. The 
Commission proposal, submitted in 1997, stipulated take-back and recycling 
duties for the automobile industry. Initially, only Spain and the United Kingdom 
under pressure from their automobile industries voiced opposition while the 
majority of governments, including Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria, 
supported the Commission proposal (Agence Europe 1999a). The negotiations 
did not make much progress during the first half of 1998 under the British presi-
dency, which opposed the directive in its current form. The Austrian presidency 
consequently inherited responsibility for finding an agreement among the mem-
ber states and announced its determination to adopt a common standpoint by 
December 1998 (European Voice 1998). Under its chairmanship, the permanent 
representatives swiftly prepared a compromise text that all delegations were will-
ing to accept (Council of the EU 1998). The incoming German presidency, led 
by the newly elected “red-green” coalition of the Social Democratic and Green 
parties, announced that the adoption of this directive would be a key policy goal 
for Germany’s term in charge of the Council business (European Voice 1999d).
Suddenly, and to everyone’s surprise, the German chancellor, Gerhard 
Schröder of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), decided to revoke the German 
delegation’s support for the compromise. The reason was a direct intervention by 
the chief executive of Volkswagen, Ferdinand Piëch, who had complained about 
the extensive adjustment costs the German automobile industry was going to 
face. Schröder invoked his prerogative as chancellor to define the German policy 
guidelines and instructed his minister for the environment, Jürgen Trittin of the 
Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen [Alliance 90/The Greens]), who chaired 
the Council of Environmental Ministers, to use his prerogatives as Council presi-
dent in order to postpone the scheduled decision in order to reopen negotiations 
and then garner a blocking minority to reject the proposal (Wurzel 2000).
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Other delegations reacted strongly to this rumor, which they regarded as an 
abuse of the presidency’s power, and reminded the German presidency that its 
prerogative to call a vote was not a codified right. If the German presidency called 
a vote to block the proposal, they threatened they would for the first time in the 
history of European integration overturn the presidency’s procedural decision, 
which according to the Council’s rules of procedure was possible with a simple 
majority (Agence Europe 1999a).
Trittin then decided to discuss the dossier in a Council session strictly closed 
to the public (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1999; Die Welt 1999a). In this ses-
sion, he once again demanded concessions for the German car industry. Because 
one television camera was still recording sound, the European Voice was able to 
report the highlights of exchanges among the Ministers:
Fascinated journalists gathered round the screen as Trittin harangued 
ministers for refusing to accept his new “compromise” proposal. . . . “What 
are you doing trying to talk us into a compromise when you are the 
problem?” asked the Austrian Environment Minister, Martin Bartens-
tein. Denmark’s Sven Auken was almost screaming with anger and 
France’s Dominique Voynet boomed: “We cannot leave this room to tell 
the press and the public that we have dropped our trousers for the car 
industry!” . . . The only support for Trittin’s trousers came from the UK’s 
Michael Meacher, who announced he was not performing a U-turn but 
had been told to reverse his stance by Premier Tony Blair under pressure 
from Schröder. (European Voice 1999a)
The Council then noted the impossibility of adopting the text and decided to 
pass on the issue for further discussion to the subsequent Finnish presidency 
(Agence Europe 1999b). Since it was obvious from its U-turn that the domestic 
pressure on the German government was far from unmanageable and that it 
could very well afford having its automobile industry adjust to the EU directive, 
it took only three more weeks of deliberations under the Finnish presidency to 
form a qualified majority in favor of the proposal and against a recalcitrant Ger-
man delegation in the minority (Die Welt 1999b).4
Given this strong reaction to self-serving demands to make changes to the 
Commission proposals, presidencies that are more experienced than the German 
presidency back in 1998 typically stall these dossiers until the next government 
takes over and it can speak more freely. Two close observers of this office, Helen 
Wallace and Geoffrey Edwards, also note that the “only strategy left to the chair is 
to block such issues by keeping them off the agenda or by delaying their discus-
sion in a committee” (Wallace and Edwards 1976, 544; see also Wallace 1985b, 
16–17; Elgström 2003, 50).
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As a result, Council agendas developed a bias in favor of legislative proposals 
that the government holding the presidency does not wish to change  substantially. 
Other governments fully accepted the presidency’s influence on the Council 
agenda. Asked about the importance of an adequate balance of interests on the 
agenda, a former permanent representative explained succinctly:
Nobody cares if the Council agenda adequately balances the govern-
ments’ various interests. It’s simply like that: Governments decide what 
needs to be decided and what the Presidency thinks is important. (inter-
view in Brussels, February 2008)
The presidency managed to retain its influence on the micromanagement of the 
agenda despite the emergence onstage of rival agenda setters such as the Euro-
pean Council. For example, upcoming presidencies established contacts with the 
Commission well before their term in order to ensure a timely preparation of 
the legislative proposals it wished to discuss during its term (Edwards and Wal-
lace 1978, 82; Wallace 1985a, 463). The presidency also invented more subtle 
strategies. In 1986, a confidential document (cited in Maass 1987, 10) entitled 
“Guidance on the Exercise of the Presidency” instructed British officials: “[The] 
simplest device will be for the chairman to let the delegation ramble on.” The 
document added that the chairman can delay matters by setting a meeting for a 
month later, then canceling it “because another group needs the meeting room 
allocated for the next session, and so on.” Asked about this document, a British 
official shrugged it off, arguing that “everyone in the community uses the kind of 
maneuvers or procedures that were mentioned in the paper. . . . The only surpris-
ing thing is that the British put them on paper” (see also Thalmann 1987, 72; and 
Dewost 1976, 3; 1984, 32).
In addition, the establishment of a permanent president for the European 
Council (currently Hermann van Rompuy from 2009 to 2014) as well as for the 
Foreign Affairs Council (currently Catherine Ashton) did not change the fact 
that the rotating presidency micromanages the legislative agenda for the Council 
of Ministers. New rules of procedure for the European Council envisage that its 
president will coordinate with the member state holding the six-month Council 
presidency on dates for summits by the chiefs of governments (Council of the 
EU 2009, Article 2).
Despite this phenomenal rise in importance, it is noteworthy that the Council 
presidency’s role in the setting of the Council agenda has hardly ever been for-
malized in the treaties. In 1988, the Council of Ministers decided that each presi-
dency should present a more comprehensive work program for its six-month 
period. In 1993, this procedure was integrated into the Council’s internal Rules 
of Procedure (Tallberg 2006, 50). Despite long debates about the inefficiency of 
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the rotating presidency’s influence on the Council’s legislative agenda in today’s 
twenty-seven member European Union, the practices described above have 
hardly changed since.
Mentioned only in passing in treaties, the office of the Council presidency under-
went a surprising development over time. The government in office serves as 
the “hub” in intergovernmental negotiations, suggests compromises among its 
cooperating partners, decides whether to call a vote or declare a consensus, and 
micromanages the Council’s legislative agenda.
In line with the predictions of Liberal Regime Theory, the Council presidency 
assumed all these responsibilities as a direct consequence of other practices of 
informal governance in agenda setting and decision making. Thus, the norm 
among governments to search for a consensus in the event that a government 
faces unmanageable domestic recalcitrance created a demand for a government 
to assess the legitimacy of this claim. In addition, the member governments’ 
practice of passing legislative proposals to the Council substructure of working 
groups and committees deprived the Commission of its direct influence on the 
legislative agenda and opened up the opportunity for the presidency to structure 
it according to new priorities.
The chapter has asked the question of why the member states defer to another 
government. The deference to a cooperating partner is not self-evident, since 
the government holding the presidency might use its procedural prerogatives for 
national gain and at the expense of other member nations. This is why, as we have 
seen in this chapter, the government usually faces much headwind when it per-
sonally stands to gain from changes to the legislative proposal under negotiation. 
The following chapter seeks to demonstrate that the presidency wields authority 
only when it is biased against governments that demand accommodation and, 







—Front page headline, The Sun, November 1, 1990
Making full use of its procedural powers, the European Commission under the 
presidency of Jacques Delors in 1990 submitted a proposal for a directive on the 
Europe-wide regulation of working time for a large variety of sectors. This pro-
posal was well received by trade unions and most member states, which already 
had equivalent domestic regulations in place. In the United Kingdom, however, 
where workers worked the longest hours, the proposal immediately generated 
strong domestic opposition from employers as well as from Euroskeptics in the 
ruling Conservative Party, who regarded this proposal as only the beginning of a 
stream of “socialist” interventions. All other member states felt it was necessary 
to accommodate the British government in this situation to calm the domestic 
waves. The problem, however, was that the British government was so ambiguous 
in its complaints that it was difficult for the other member states to assess which, 
and how many, concessions were, in fact, required.
The case of the Working Time Directive illustrates the need to determine 
the boundaries between formal rules and informal governance in the event of 
ambiguous demands for accommodation. Because the norm of discretion is 
vague and the conditions that give rise to domestic pressure not always perfectly 
observable for outsiders, governments have an incentive to abuse the norm and 
demand more concessions than are truly necessary to render domestic pres-
sure manageable again. The member states therefore delegate the authority to 
adjudicate on ambiguous demands to a government whose judgment they can 
trust. Specifically, they delegate adjudicatory authority to a government that is 
biased against the claimant, since the only reason for it to recommend informal 
governance even though it has nothing to gain from these special concessions 
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must be that it seeks to avert damage to the institution. In the context of the 
European Union, member states invest the Council presidency with a number 
of procedural prerogatives and thwart attempts to chair negotiations when it has 
an incentive to collude with the government demanding to change the legislative 
proposal through informal governance.
Existing empirical studies of the Council presidency and its influence on nego-
tiations partly support the claim that the government in office needs to be biased 
in order to wield adjudicatory authority in the Council. Many excellent qualita-
tive studies point to the existence of a norm that says that the presidency should 
be neutral during Council negotiations (Edwards and Wallace 1977, 42; Bunse 
2009, 43–48; Dewost 1984). Unfortunately, they usually fail to specify what it 
means to be neutral—that is, if it implies disinterest, fair-balanced brokering, or 
the absence of demands to amend the legislative proposal under discussion (Elg-
ström 2003, 38). More recently, a number of quantitative studies have begun to 
examine the presidency’s influence on Council negotiations. In separate analyses, 
Robert Thomson and Andreas Warntjen find that holding the presidency during 
the final stages of negotiations has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
a government’s influence on the final outcome (Thomson 2008b, 611–12; Warn-
tjen 2008, 332; see also Schalk et al. 2006). Warntjen (2007) also finds evidence 
for a presidency influence on the Council agenda. These studies, too, are fraught 
with difficulties, since the influence they identify depends on the counterfactual 
outcome (i.e., the outcome that would have occurred if no or a different govern-
ment had not held the office) that the models assume. Furthermore, these studies 
beg the questions of why the member states would agree to an arrangement that 
gives one of them a competitive edge in Council negotiations to begin with.
Rather than being concerned with influence on outcomes, this chapter is 
interested in the presidency’s authority in adjudicating demands for accommo-
dation. Authority, in this sense, is the presidency’s ability to demand deference 
from other governments, not to assert national interests. It argues that without 
the office of the Council presidency, the member states would likely adopt the 
wrong level of informal governance. Since they care about using the right level 
of informal governance, and consider a biased presidency’s judgment informa-
tive in that regard, the member states defer to its judgment in the form of the 
presidency compromise.
To show that the Council presidency wields adjudicatory authority in the 
Council, this chapter focuses on the behavior of the member states and the six 
governments holding the presidency during the negotiation of the Working Time 
Directive. Liberal Regime Theory expects presidencies that are biased against 
the United Kingdom to be active adjudicators and render judgments on the 
use of informal governance to which all other member states defer. Conversely, 
presidencies that have an incentive to collude with the United Kingdom can 
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be expected to stall the negotiation or render judgments on the use of informal 
governance that their cooperating partners pay no deference to. Power-based 
theories, in contrast, would not expect small states in charge of the presidency to 
wield authority in decisions over the use of informal governance or, for that mat-
ter, for large states to defer to a decision that goes against their interests. Classical 
regime theory would expect all presidencies to wield authority by virtue of the 
office, regardless of power asymmetries or their stance on the legislative proposal.
There are two reasons, one methodological and one practical, for taking a 
closer look at the Working Time Directive in particular. The methodological rea-
son is that because the conflict took a very long time to resolve, the case enables 
us to apply the different predictions about the presidency’s authority to six suc-
cessive governments in office that held different preferences on the Commission’s 
legislative proposal. The practical reason has to do with the availability of data. 
Because it serves to prevent conflicts, informal governance is rarely newswor-
thy and, because it is a departure from official procedures, often remains unre-
corded. Due to the fact that an overconfident Commission eschewed informal 
constraints on its agenda-setting power to submit a highly contentious proposal, 
the Working Time Directive is an unusually well-documented case that is com-
monly cited to exemplify the Commission’s formal agenda-setting power (Pol-
lack 2003b, chap. 6).
It should be mentioned that it is not always possible to distinguish between 
adjudication and other negotiation dynamics. Since there are various ways to 
mitigate domestic pressure through flexibility (Pelc 2011), all of which have dif-
ferent distributional consequences, the presidency is subject to pressure from vari-
ous governments and other actors as to whether and how to accommodate the 
claimant. The following study seeks to reduce these uncertainties using primary 
“behind-the-scenes” data in various languages, and counterfactual reasoning.
Agenda Setting: Making Full 
Use of Formal Rules
Under the premise of implementing the treaty’s provisions on social policy, the 
Commission in 1990 submitted a proposal for a directive on the Europe-wide 
regulation of working time.1 The preparation of the proposal had been highly 
contentious even within the Commission with a rift running along both national 
and ideological lines (Brittan 2000, 49; similarly, Economist 1990). The final vote 
in the college of commissioners was contested, with six out of the seventeen com-
missioners openly opposing the draft directive (Independent 1990).
The legislative proposal was contentious for several reasons. First, the pro-
posal’s legal base was disputed. It could have been based on Article 100a (2) of 
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the Single European Act, which covered provisions “relating to the rights and 
interests of employed persons,” but that would have required unanimity in the 
Council. Instead, the Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs 
under the Greek commissioner, Vasso Papandreou, based the proposal on Article 
118a, which covered health and safety provisions, and only required a qualified 
majority for adoption in the Council.
Second, the Commission, in drafting the proposal, failed to consult the 
 Council’s standing expert group, the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene, 
and Health Protection at Work. This was considered a breach with custom, 
because the group, which consists of representatives from the member states, 
trade unions, and employers’ organizations, had been envisaged to assist the 
Commission in the preparation and implementation of legislation in this field 
(Financial Times 1991g).
Third, more contentious than these procedural issues was the content of the 
proposal. The draft Working Time Directive provided for regulations on mini-
mum daily, weekly, and yearly rest periods as well as on night and shift work, 
and it also proposed a centralized statutory regulation even though these aspects 
were in most countries subject to sectoral collective bargains between the social 
partners (Falkner et al. 2005, 100). Thus, while redundant in many member states 
with similar or even more stringent collective or statutory regulation in force, 
this proposal promised to require adjustments in other countries, particularly in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, which had no regulations at all (Gray 1998).
Decision Making: Cutting through Ambiguity
Although the proposal was contested on some procedural grounds, the Commis-
sion had not violated the treaty, but simply ignored existing customs and made 
full use of its formal agenda-setting powers: it had independently drafted a legis-
lative proposal, published it without consulting the member states, and tailored 
it in a way that a majority of the Council could adopt it.
While the agenda-setting stage featured practices of formal governance, the 
following negotiation stage was rife with practices of informal governance, by 
which the member states sought to calm the domestic recalcitrance the proposal 
had caused. Despite the quick emergence of a qualified majority in favor of the 
proposal, the Council refrained from overruling the British government, referred 
the negotiations to the Council substructure, stalled it various times, and sought 
to build a consensus by making a number of unilateral concessions to the Brit-
ish government. Before that, however, the member states had to determine the 
legitimacy of the British demands for accommodation.
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Wait and See (the Luxembourg and Dutch Presidencies)
The most contentious part of the Commission proposal was a cap on weekly 
working time. Richer countries with strong regulation in place preferred a cap at 
a low level, because they were concerned about being undercut by poorer states 
with weak regulations (Europolitique 1991d). France therefore demanded that 
weekly working time be capped at a maximum of forty-eight hours (Lewis 1998, 
371). Poorer member states, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, had 
more general reservations about the Commission’s social program (Guardian 
1991c; Independent 1991). However, the most fundamental and hostile resistance 
came from the United Kingdom (Europolitique 1991b, 1991c), which had no 
statutory regulations on weekly working time. Accordingly, nearly 42 percent of 
British men worked more than forty-eight hours a week, compared with slightly 
more than 23 percent of men in the European Union as a whole (Financial Times 
1991f). The directive, therefore, promised to cause massive adjustment costs in 
the United Kingdom.
Unsurprisingly, the Commission proposal immediately took on a very vis-
ible profile in British politics when it was published. While the trade unions and 
the Labour Party welcomed the proposal, British employers universally lined up 
against the Working Time Directive, arguing that they would face adjustment 
costs in the billions (Financial Times 1990). In addition, Euroskeptic backbench-
ers within the Conservative Party suspected that the directive constituted prece-
dence for Europe-wide social regulation on a massive scale (Forster 1998, 352). 
The domestic pressure on the British government to defy any such regulation 
grew ever stronger and threatened to become truly unmanageable. However, the 
cacophony of voices against the directive made it difficult to ascertain the real 
dimensions of the domestic conflict.
Against this backdrop, Luxembourg was the first country to preside over the 
negotiation of the Commission proposal. The country was in favor of the Work-
ing Time Directive and had committed itself to adopting it by the end of its time 
in office (Agence Europe 1991). After Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of 
the Council of Ministers, announced that he was prepared to call a vote to adopt 
the directive even against the fierce British opposition (Europolitique 1991a), 
British employment secretary Michael Howard signaled a more conciliatory 
approach (Forster 1999, 85). The British government promised it would accept 
help from the Council in evaluating the actual costs of the Working Time Direc-
tive for British business (Financial Times Business Information 1991; Financial 
Times 1991e). In this light, the Luxembourg presidency referred the Commission 
proposal for a closer assessment to the working groups and committees of gov-
ernment experts in the Council’s informal substructure.
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The domestic pressure in the United Kingdom against the Working Time 
Directive mounted when Germany, under pressure from its own churches and 
trade unions, demanded the inclusion of a clause to make Sunday a compulsory 
day off. Although the Dutch presidency, which was largely in favor of the Com-
mission proposal, was quick to dilute this amendment (Financial Times 1991a; 
Economist 1991b), it prompted fierce reactions, particularly from the British 
tabloid press quoted at the beginning of this chapter (Economist 1991a; Guard-
ian 1991b; Times 1991d; Financial Times 1991d). The domestic pressure on the 
British government intensified even further in October and November 1991, 
when plans were made to include the Social Charter (a Europe-wide agreement 
between the social partners) as a chapter in the Treaty of Maastricht, which was 
then under negotiation in an intergovernmental conference (Forster 1998, 352). 
This prompted Howard to renounce his earlier conciliatory position and, adding 
fuel to the fire, to issue a report that underscored the massive scale of domestic 
adjustment costs, claiming that the Working Time Directive in its present form 
was going to cost £5 billion a year and ruin much of British business (Financial 
Times 1991a, 1991d).
Although the Dutch delegation had initially committed to concluding nego-
tiations by the end of its term in December 1991 (Financial Times 1991c; NRC 
Handelsblad 1991; Van Beuge 1993, 26), it decided to refrain from bringing 
the proposal to a vote and overruling the British delegation when the pressure 
within the United Kingdom against the directive escalated (Guardian 1991d; 
Financial Times 1991b; Sunday Times 1991b). Since the Dutch presidency was 
to be followed by Portuguese and British presidencies—which were, respectively, 
skeptical of and entirely opposed to the directive—the Commission proposal 
was considered shelved for at least a year. After this year, it was thought, the 
conditions for the adoption of the Commission proposal in its present form 
would be more favorable: the controversial Commissioner Papandreou would 
have bowed out of office, the British Parliament would have ratified the Maas-
tricht Treaty, and the British people could potentially have elected a more pro-
European Labour party that was less susceptible to pressure by British business 
(Times 1991b, 1991c).
Ambiguous Adjudication (the Portuguese 
and British Presidencies)
To everyone’s surprise, the Portuguese presidency continued with the negotia-
tions even though it had been expected to shelve the proposal during its term. 
But it was furious that the United Kingdom, which had spearheaded the opposi-
tion against including the Social Charter in the treaty, had unilaterally secured 
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an opt-out from the Social Charter at the intergovernmental conference on the 
Maastricht Treaty instead of helping Portugal to water it down. Portuguese offi-
cials thought out loud about bringing the Working Time Directive to a Council 
vote in order to have it imposed on the United Kingdom in revenge (Guardian 
1991a). British officials, however, thought that the Portuguese presidency, which, 
in fact, had opposed the proposal in its original form, would instead use its 
time in office to dilute the Working Time Directive considerably (Sunday Times 
1991a; Times 1991a). In other words, Portugal’s motivation, and whether it was 
going to advance the proposal or collude with the British government to dilute 
it, remained unclear. Consequently, its authority was widely questioned by other 
delegations.
Although the British general elections in April 1992 did not bring about 
the change in government that the proponents of the Working Time Directive 
had hoped for, they nevertheless seemed to turn the tide in favor of a swifter 
adoption. A reshuffling of the British cabinet brought Gillian Shephard into 
the position of employment secretary; she had a reputation for being more lib-
eral and conciliatory than her Thatcherite predecessor (Financial Times 1992b). 
In that situation, Germany insisted that the Portuguese presidency rethink its 
plans to have the British government overruled in the Council in order to ascer-
tain the possibilities for consensus (Financial Times 1992e; Press Association 
1992). Instead of softening its stance, however, the British government became 
even more opposed to the Working Time Directive and considerably upset its 
cooperating partners.
This new opposition was triggered when in June 1992 the initial rejection 
of the Maastricht Treaty in a Danish referendum fueled Euroskeptic opposi-
tion by a handful of backbenchers in the House of Commons (Lamont 1999, 
199).2 The Portuguese presidency subsequently announced its willingness to 
make significant concessions to the British delegation. It suggested making the 
forty-eight-hour limit optional, including derogations for several industries, 
and providing the British with a ten-year grace period for the implementa-
tion of this directive (Financial Times 1992a, 1992c; Times 1992; European 
Report 1992b; Financial Times 1992f; Reuters 1992a). Upset by the failure of 
its conciliatory effort, the German government declared it was now prepared 
to vote for the Portuguese proposal in the Council even against the opposition 
of the United Kingdom (Independent 1992). France, however, found that the 
Portuguese presidency’s compromise went too far in its effort to accommo-
date the British delegation. By raising a technical disagreement with Germany 
(Guardian 1992; Financial Times 1992d; Europolitique 1992), France managed 
to put off further negotiations in the Council and send the dossier back to the 
Council substructure.
150      CHAPTER 8
As expected, the British government, which took over the presidency after 
Portugal, shelved the working directive during its term. The issue was only raised 
once over a working lunch, but simply to note that no progress was possible 
under the British presidency (European Report 1992a; Reuters 1992b). One might 
argue that the United Kingdom ignored the proposal not because other gov-
ernments would not have trusted its judgment, but merely in order to stall the 
inevitable adoption of an unwanted legal act. However, as discussed below, the 
legislative text was not yet set in stone.
Accommodation (the Danish Presidency)
Denmark, which was in favor of the Portuguese compromise, immediately 
announced it was going to revive negotiations on the directive during its presi-
dency (Europolitique 1993a). At an informal exchange of views in April 1993, 
ministers agreed that Denmark would begin to organize bilateral contacts with 
concerned delegations in order to be prepared to adopt the proposal after the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Europolitique 1993b). Immediately thereaf-
ter, the directive was indeed scheduled for adoption in June.
Shortly before this meeting, Euroskeptics within the Conservative Party 
demanded that the British government defy the directive outright if it was 
adopted (Guardian 1993b; Independent 1993a). In response, the Danish presi-
dency decided that the Council’s patience had been tested long enough and 
threatened to call a vote (International Herald Tribune 1993; Sunday Times 1993). 
The British government seemed satisfied with the concessions it had received 
and announced its willingness to enable a unanimous vote in the Council by 
abstaining from the decision (Financial Times 1993a). The Danish presidency 
subsequently proposed a compromise that, by and large, resembled the text pre-
viously proposed by the Portuguese presidency (Guardian 1993d). This time, 
however, all governments including France accepted the presidency compromise 
and adopted it as a common position with the United Kingdom abstaining. All 
that remained to be done for the directive to become EU law was for the Euro-
pean Parliament to voice its opinion and for the Council to adopt a final position.
Despite its abstention in the Council, the British government publicly 
announced its complete opposition to the proposal (Daily Mail 1993; European 
Report 1993a; Financial Times 1993c; Guardian 1993a). Prime Minister John 
Major openly accused the Commission of “muddle-headed meddling” (Econ-
omist 1993) and singled out the Working Time Directive as a prime example 
(Times 1993a; Guardian 1993c). Other member states considered Major’s behav-
ior a “misuse of goodwill” (Lewis 1998, 364) and tried to convince the British 
government to stop its inflammation of public anger, arguing that the United 
Kingdom had received adequate concessions (Times 1993b). They argued that 
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Britain would have ten years to implement the voluntary forty-eight-hour work-
ing week, and that many sectors—such as transport workers, those at sea, and 
junior doctors—remained exempt (Independent 1993b).
Sticking Together (the Belgian Presidency)
The European Parliament, dominated by a large socialist majority, was furious 
about the ample derogations in the directive and proposed a number of amend-
ments to scrap them (Herald 1993a). The Commission agreed with the Parlia-
ment and endorsed most of the amendments changing the directive back to its 
original form. A qualified majority in the Council would have sufficed to adopt 
this new text, while the member states needed unanimity to reinstate the conces-
sions to the British delegation against the will of the Commission (Herald 1993b; 
Scotsman 1993). In other words, a single member state would have sufficed to 
block a renewed accommodation of the United Kingdom.
And yet, the Council decided to stick to the concessions it had made. At the 
meeting of the Social Affairs Council in November, the Belgian presidency—
which had favored the initial Commission initiative—proposed a compromise 
that scrapped most of the Parliament’s contentious amendments and largely 
resembled the proposal that Portugal had presented a year and a half previously 
(European Report 1993c; Financial Times 1993b). Although some member states 
silently believed that Belgium was wasting an opportunity to get back at the 
United Kingdom for their ingratitude, they nonetheless deferred to the presiden-
cy’s decision uncomplainingly (European Report 1993b). Thus, after three years 
of arduous negotiations, the Council definitively and unanimously adopted the 
Working Time Directive with the United Kingdom abstaining (Council of the 
EU 1993).3
The Working Time Directive was again brought back into the limelight after the 
European Court of Justice ruled in the so-called SIMAP case that on-call duty 
counted toward total working time (European Court of Justice 2000). Three 
years later, in its Jaeger judgment, the court ruled further that on-call duty in a 
hospital counted as working time even when the worker was allowed to rest when 
the services were not needed (European Court of Justice 2003). Meanwhile, the 
Working Time Directive was amended several times to extend its provisions to 
sectors that had been previously excluded.4 Clearly, the Working Time Directive 
had some dramatic consequences that the member states did not foresee when 
they adopted it in 1993. Yet this need not concern us here.
Important for our purpose is that the case of the Working Time Directive 
illustrates how the informal norm of discretion operates in practice and how 
the member states determine the boundary between formal rules and informal 
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governance. The situation arose not because the Commission transgressed its 
mandate, but because it made full use of its formal power. In fact, it did pre-
cisely what standard agenda-setting models expect it to do: capitalize on conflicts 
among governments, and publish proposals that a majority in the Council could 
easily adopt.
However, the implementation of treaty objectives according to the book can 
quickly, as in this case, stir up unmanageable domestic recalcitrance that prompts 
a government to defy an imminent law. In the case of the Working Time Direc-
tive, the publication of the legislative proposal immediately generated strong 
resistance, in particular within the United Kingdom. British employers’ associa-
tions feared excessive adjustment costs from the directive. The influential British 
Euroskeptics suspected that the Working Time Directive was only the beginning 
of a series of social regulations that would be imposed on the United Kingdom.
All member states agreed that it was necessary to accommodate the British 
government without any explicit quid pro quo in order to avert disruptions to the 
EU’s smooth operation. This is, among other things, exemplified by the fact that 
the Council unanimously scrapped a number of amendments even though they 
were angered by the British government’s actions and could have blamed the Par-
liament for the withdrawal of concessions. The final outcome thus included sev-
eral derogations that were tailored to quell the British employers’ recalcitrance.
In light of the cacophony of recalcitrant voices in the United Kingdom, how-
ever, the principal difficulty for the Council was to assess the type and severity of 
pressure on the British government. Hence, it was up to the six successive Council 
presidencies to determine the actual need for informal governance.
Contrary to the tenets of classical regime theory, the presidencies did not enjoy 
authority by virtue of their control of procedural prerogatives. Instead, and in line 
with our expectations, governments in charge of the presidency wielded authority 
only when they had nothing to gain from making concessions to the British gov-
ernment so that the judgment of the presidency could consequently be trusted. 
For example, instead of using its procedural power to manipulate the negotiations 
in its favor, as classical regime theory would have expected, the British government 
decided to shelve the dossier for the duration of its presidency. Critics might argue 
that the British government stalled negotiations simply to delay the adoption of 
an unwanted legal act. Though this might make sense toward the end of Coun-
cil negotiations, it cannot explain why Britain ignored the proposal during its 
term even though there was still some room to negotiate changes to the proposal. 
The only plausible explanation seems to be that the British government expected 
other governments to thwart any attempt to use the presidential prerogatives to 
manipulate the negotiations in its favor. Similarly, the Portuguese presidency, 
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whose stance on the directive was ambiguous throughout its term, was unable 
to impose its authority. Instead, Germany did not go along with a proposed vote, 
while France refused to accept Portugal’s presidency compromise.
Contrary to power-based institutionalism, the presidencies’ authority did not 
depend on power asymmetries. Thus, two large and powerful states, Germany 
and France, accepted small Belgium’s recommendation to reinstate the conces-
sions to the United Kingdom. They consequently refrained from blocking the 
consensus that was necessary to reinstate these concessions despite the fact that 




Why do governments carefully design formal rules only to depart from them 
repeatedly? What makes the EU and other international organizations work in 
reality?
The central argument of this book is that informal governance is critical for 
understanding not just how institutions work day to day, but, crucially, why they 
work and persist at all. Informal governance is the result of an informal norm of 
discretion among governments that prescribes that governments facing unman-
ageable domestic pressure to defy the rules should be accommodated. The result-
ing practices of informal governance, therefore, add a flexibility to the formal 
rules that permits the member states to keep the EU embedded in the societal 
interests it is based on.
Formal rules bolster states’ commitments to cooperation by signaling their 
willingness to pursue the EU treaty’s objective of deep economic integration. 
However, the patterns of societal interdependence that underpin the European 
institutions inevitably change in ways that were not foreseen. Situations are 
bound to arise where following the rules, although beneficial for a country as a 
whole, imposes concentrated adjustment costs on a group at the domestic level. 
A group thus affected will then mobilize against cooperation and pressure its 
government to renege on its commitment. We referred to this problem as politi-
cal uncertainty.
Crucially, the defiance of an institutionalized commitment, whether in the 
form of obstruction or outright defection, harms all governments at once, even 
those whose interest groups are not suffering, because it creates doubts about the 
CONCLUSION AND EXTENSION      155
commitment’s credibility and, therefore, about one another’s future cooperative 
behavior. For this reason, all governments prefer rules with added flexibility that 
avert the possibility of their institution’s sustaining damage.
Political uncertainty, therefore, gives rise to an informal norm of discre-
tion that prescribes that governments under unmanageable domestic pressure 
ought to be accommodated. It manifests itself in informal governance as states 
collectively depart from the rules in order to exercise discretion. However, the 
norm is vague and prone to abuse when the conditions that justify the accommo-
dation of another government are not easily observable. Departures from what 
the rules stipulate, therefore, risk undermining the rules’ credibility when there 
remain doubts about the legitimacy of the use of informal governance. To resolve 
this tension between formal commitments and informal flexibility, the mem-
ber states consequently delegate the decision to adjudicate on demands for the 
accommodation of domestic pressures to a trustworthy government.
As a result, formal and informal institutional elements complement each 
other and sustain a deep level of integration that neither formal rules nor infor-
mal norms alone permit. This implies substantively that the European Union 
has been able to achieve and maintain the depth of economic integration not 
only because of its intrusive supranational institutions but also because infor-
mal governance allows the member states to flexibly tailor the costs of economic 
integration to what the domestic level is capable of bearing. Because the theory 
emphasizes what has been called the “liberal” insight in International Relations—
that for international institutions to be effective, they constantly have to be reem-
bedded in the changing interests and values of their members—we referred to it 
as Liberal Regime Theory.
Four tasks remain for this concluding chapter. The first is to summarize and 
evaluate the empirical evidence for and against Liberal Regime Theory and its 
main rivals. The second is to evaluate the theory’s implications for the scholar-
ship on European integration. The third task is to discuss the implications of 
this theory for the study of international organization more broadly. Finally, we 
finish by discussing the normative implications of our findings for European and 
global governance.
Summary and Discussion of the Findings
Although informal in nature, the norm of discretion has two distinct  implications 
that can be observed. First, informal governance practices vary systematically 
over time and across issue areas with the extent of political uncertainty. Second, 
states delegate the authority to adjudicate on ambiguous demands for discretion 
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to a trustworthy political body. We then specified these general predictions for 
the context of EU decision making, multiplied their testable implications, and 
evaluated them in light of rival theories.
The evidence presented in this book largely confirms Liberal Regime Theory. 
Chapters 2 through 5 demonstrated that informal governance is not just ran-
dom but varies systematically with the extent of political uncertainty across issue 
areas. Thus, informal governance is less notable in an issue area with exception-
ally low political uncertainty—namely, the Common Agricultural Policy, which 
is deliberately designed to protect farmers from excessive adjustments. Since this 
exceptional level of protection makes the timing and extent of domestic pressure 
far more predictable than elsewhere, there is less demand for flexibility and, thus, 
less informal governance. In all other issue areas of economic integration, mem-
ber states adopt practices that allow them to flexibly gain collective control of the 
agenda, accommodate governments facing excessive political pressure at home, 
and control the implementation of legal acts. As expected, the emergence and use 
of these practices is most often accompanied by conflicts between supranational 
actors, on one side, and the member states, on the other side, rather than among 
the member states themselves.
Chapters 6 through 8 evaluated the second hypothesis, which states that gov-
ernments delegate the authority to adjudicate on ambiguous demands for dis-
cretion to a trustworthy agent. Applied to the context of the European Union, 
we expected that governments would delegate this task to the country holding 
the Council presidency and then compel it to drop legislative dossiers from the 
Council’s agenda where this government’s judgment cannot be trusted.
Once again, the findings largely support Liberal Regime Theory. We first dem-
onstrated that the country holding the Council presidency is invested with several 
adjudicatory prerogatives as a direct result of the informal governance practices 
described earlier in the book. The negotiation of the Working Time Directive 
then illustrated how governments in charge of the presidency assess ambiguous 
demands for discretion. In this case, the member states were, in principle, ready 
to accommodate the British government when a Commission proposal threat-
ened to impose high adjustment costs on British employers. Yet the cacophony of 
recalcitrant voices in the United Kingdom made it difficult to determine whether 
and to what extent special accommodation was necessary. As predicted, the 
member states refused to defer to the Portuguese presidency’s assessment of the 
matter, because this government shared some of Britain’s views and, therefore, 
faced an incentive to exaggerate its need for accommodation. Countries holding 
the presidency with no such conflict of interest, however, faced no difficulty in 
wielding adjudicatory authority in the Council. In short, the collective evidence 
suggests that the European member states have found a way to add flexibility to 
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the formal rules without undermining the credibility of the commitment that 
these rules embody.
To be sure, Liberal Regime Theory is not deterministic, and there are various 
phenomena that are difficult to square with its predictions. First of all, only a few 
observations concerning the implementation of EU laws, discussed in chapter 5, 
corroborate the theory. Contrary to the expectations of Liberal Regime Theory, 
the comitology system, which initially allowed the Council to flexibly determine 
the scope of delegation and the Commission’s discretion, was increasingly codi-
fied to the extent that the member states started looking for other, more flexible 
ways to implement EU policies through agencies or national administrations. By 
distinguishing more clearly between legislation and implementation, this codifi-
cation curtailed the member states’ ability to flexibly alter measures that threaten 
to breed strong conflict at the domestic level. These developments are probably 
best explained by the European Parliament’s capacity to twist the Council’s arm 
by withholding their agreement to parts of the budget or to the extension of 
important EU laws.
In fact, the European Parliament quite often frustrated the member states’ 
attempts to gain flexibility. This was most obviously the case in the implementa-
tion of policies, but it also occasionally managed to seize control of the timing of 
decisions as well of the Council’s attempt to reduce the salience of an issue. Given 
that the recent Lisbon Treaty extended parliamentary involvement in legislation, 
the European Parliament is likely to continue to challenge the member states’ 
quest for informal flexibility.
Finally, the evidence regarding the European Council is more in line with 
the predictions of Classical Regime Theory instead of Liberal Regime Theory. 
Although this extralegal institution allowed the chiefs of government to nar-
row the Commission’s discretion by presetting the legislative agenda, they did so 
across the board and not, as predicted by Liberal Regime Theory, only in issue 
areas of high political uncertainty.
All things considered, however, the theory performs well. The member states’ 
drive for informal flexibility in areas of political uncertainty turns out to be a 
very important factor in the EU’s institutional development through the years.
Implications for the Study 
of European Integration
The book’s findings have a number of implications for the study of European 
integration. As mentioned in the introduction, this book contributes to a debate 
between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists about supranational 
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 autonomy. This debate has gone around in circles. Scholars in the neofunctionalist 
tradition, which sees supranational actors as the driving force behind continuous 
integration, cite various examples from the history of European integration, such 
as the rise in power of the European Court of Justice and the European Parlia-
ment, to demonstrate that supranational actors exploit control gaps to enhance 
their autonomy at the member states’ expense. Intergovernmentalists, in turn, 
point to the fact that, given that the member states are the masters of the treaty, 
there are ultimately limits to supranational autonomy. Yet, while neofunctional-
ists have had difficulties generalizing from these cases, intergovernmentalists have 
failed to clearly specify where the limits of supranational autonomy lie.
This book seeks to reinvigorate the debate by providing a testable argument 
about the absolute limits of supranational autonomy. The member states assume 
collective informal control of the organization when supranational action threat-
ens to generate unmanageable domestic pressure for the defiance of economic 
integration, which would ultimately prove disruptive for the EU as such. In 
 testing this argument, this book demonstrates the pervasive nature of informal 
governance practices, most of which grant the member states far more collective 
control of the legislative process than the treaty provisions alone.
Against this backdrop, it seems necessary to reevaluate what we know about 
the EU’s formal institutional development. The member states’ institutional 
choices in the various treaty revisions can be properly understood only against 
the background of the existing mix of formal rules and informal governance. 
Thus, it seems probable that some member states were willing to extend the use 
of majority voting knowing that they would not be brought into situations in 
which EU laws would generate domestic conflicts. Similarly, some states’ support 
of the European Parliament’s empowerment may be due in part to its readiness 
to participate in informal trilogues with the Council and the Commission.
The insight about the pervasiveness of informal governance also has implica-
tions for debates about legislative bargaining in the EU. A large number of studies 
of EU politics approach the EU as a political system similar to that of its member 
states—namely, based on a stable set of formal rules that are constant constraints 
on the legislative actors’ interaction. On that basis, so-called procedural models 
investigate how these rules affect who gets what out of the legislative bargaining. 
For that purpose, these models assume that the legislative actors consider only 
one another’s actions and what they can achieve within these procedures. By 
implication, they ignore that each actor could, in principle, take actions outside 
the procedures by obstructing, delaying, or openly defying a decision, and that 
these actors, therefore, care about how such outside actions affect the value of 
their institution. Consequently, if we allow for the EU’s  legislative actors to take 
actions outside the formal rules, decision outcomes can no  longer be  predicted 
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merely from knowledge of those procedures and the legislative actors’  preferences 
(similarly, McKeown 2009, 288). The analogy of the EU as a political system 
ceases to be useful in the analysis of EU politics.
The book’s argument about the problem of political uncertainty points 
exactly to the limits of this analogy. The member states deal with the repercus-
sions of political uncertainty by assuming informal control of the EU institutions 
in order to prevent the formal rules from creating disturbances in the domestic 
politics of collective action. Thus, to understand EU politics, it is necessary to 
look beyond official procedures to the member states’ incentives to mitigate their 
effects on the domestic level. This argument is in line with the results of empiri-
cal tests of various formal models of legislative bargaining, in which procedural 
models perform quite poorly. The results suggest, as Chris Achen concludes, that 
“[however] decision-making is carried out, it does not seem well described solely 
by the formal rules. Informal norms and procedures appear to play a more cen-
tral role” (Achen 2006a, 295; see also Steuenberg 2000, 370).
Against this backdrop, it is easy to see why, despite all progress in the field, the 
scholarship has such a hard time detecting traces of stable patterns in preference, 
cleavages, and coalitions within the Council and the European Parliament. This 
book takes the difficulty of predicting preferences as its starting point, arguing 
that, in a dynamic environment like this, situations are bound to arise where 
economic integration generates potentially disruptive conflicts at the domestic 
level. In order to relieve a government from unmanageable domestic pressure 
against the EU, the member states mitigate the formal rules’ effect through infor-
mal governance. To be perfectly clear, this does not imply that these rules are not 
effective. On the contrary: precisely because the formal rules are so effective, they 
also harbor the potential of concentrating the necessary adjustments on a single 
group. And precisely because the rules’ effectiveness is so beneficial to all the 
member states, they have an incentive to prevent one another from withholding 
compliance with them.
Having said that, this book does not pretend to be the final word on the 
topic of informal governance. I probably have only scratched the surface. Since 
the lack of systematic data is endemic to the study of informal governance, new 
material and refined measures of the variables of interest promise to offer fur-
ther important insights. For example, a closer look at the Commission reveals 
that national influences on its internal politics are more important than one 
might have expected. This finding casts doubt on some prominent models of 
agenda setting, which assume that the Commission holds invariably strong 
preferences for high levels of integration (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 280). It 
seems fruitful to relax this assumption to investigate further the conditions 
under which the Commission acts independently of the member states, reacts 
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to national ad hoc influences of individual member states, or is responsive to 
collective demands on the part of the Council. As discussed below, research like 
this also promises to shed new light on debates about the so-called democratic 
deficit of the EU.
For reasons of scope and feasibility, this book also confined its focus to 
the lawmaking stage, thus neglecting the enforcement of EU laws through the 
 European Court of Justice and domestic courts. As argued in the introduction, 
the fact that the EU’s legal system is based on a general consensus on its extraor-
dinary usefulness, and not on a central monopoly of violence, makes it even more 
necessary for the member states to sustain this belief and eliminate any reason for 
noncompliance at the earlier stage, when laws are being made. Still, the practices 
surrounding the EU’s legal system are another promising path of research, not 
the least because some of the European Court’s judgments that curtailed the 
power of trade unions or opened collective goods such as the national education 
system to other EU citizens have been highly controversial and raised doubts 
about this system’s democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 1999, 61).
Implications for the Study 
of International Organizations
The theory of informal governance is not limited to the European Union. 
 Certainly, the European Union is an international organization unlike any other. 
There is hardly another organization in the world with an equally rigid legislative 
process and legal system. However, these are differences in degree, not nature. 
The European Union, just like any other international organization, is based on 
a set of international treaties. It can persist only when the effects of EU laws con-
stantly regenerate the member states’ interests in adhering to them. This book, 
therefore, proposes a new way of thinking about how international organizations 
work and why they persist in a dynamic environment.
Three aspects of Liberal Regime Theory determine its generalizability: pat-
terns of interdependence, rigid formal institutions, and governments’ vulner-
ability to domestic pressure.
The situation described in this book is one of high interdependence where all 
states depend on one another’s cooperation in the pursuit of their interests. Their 
cooperation, however, depends on the EU’s capacity to induce compliance with 
its rules. Consequently, all member states have a strong incentive to prevent one 
another from weakening this capacity by withholding compliance. If the gains 
that the institution helps states to reap were negligible, they would not be ready 
to accommodate one another in order to maintain the institution’s strength. 
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A first empirical proposition that follows is that, everything else being equal, 
high interdependence that entails great benefits from cooperation is conducive to 
the development of a norm of discretion among the members of an international 
organization.
This discussion about patterns of interdependence raises the question of how 
the theory relates to power. One might object that the member states’ inter-
dependence in the EU is not very symmetric in the sense that small states are 
more dependent on the cooperation of large states than the other way round. 
In monetary policy, for example, most Eurozone members depend far more on 
Germany’s willingness to participate in the system than Germany depends on 
the participation of others in the Eurozone. Under these circumstances, Randy 
Stone (2011, 118–20) argues, Germany as the dominant state with viable outside 
options to the Eurozone may use informal governance procedures to assume 
control of this policy. This is certainly true in monetary policy, but less so in 
other issue areas. In most other policy areas, especially those related to the Single 
Market, staying outside is not a viable option for any member state, not even for 
Germany, and the threat to leave the Single Market is hardly viable. Put differ-
ently, political uncertainty in situations characterized by asymmetric interde-
pendence stems from the uncertainty about a large state’s true commitment to 
an international organization. In situations characterized by more symmetric 
interdependence, however, political uncertainty stems from uncertainty about 
each state’s vulnerability to domestic pressure. In both cases, states will use infor-
mal governance in order to accommodate the disruptive force before it damages 
their cooperation.
Political uncertainty is consequently the second aspect that defines Lib-
eral Regime Theory. As we defined it, political uncertainty, which gives rise to 
the norm of discretion, describes the unpredictability of governments’ time-
inconsistent preferences. For example, the “apple wine” case in the introduction 
to this book illustrated how a localized distributional shock in a remote German 
region suddenly turned into excessive domestic pressure to defy an imminent 
EU law. Because it is determined by groups’ capacity for collective action as well 
as governments’ susceptibility to domestic pressure, factors that alter these vari-
ables and consequently reduce political uncertainty, everything else being equal, 
should also alter the demand for a norm of discretion. This book took advantage 
of the fact that the Common Agricultural Policy to some extent operates like 
social insurance mechanisms: it shelters farmers from unexpected adjustment 
costs and consequently reduces this group’s incentives to mobilize in response to 
a distributional shock. It seems worthwhile to assess whether member states with 
generous welfare systems, all else being equal, are less likely to be accommodated 
through informal governance than those without.
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The third and final aspect that determines Liberal Regime Theory’s 
 generalizability is institutional rigidity. Recall that in the case under study, rigid 
rules enable a level of economic integration that bestows tremendous benefits 
on the member states so that all of them have an incentive to preserve the rules’ 
effectiveness. An empirical proposition that follows is that a strengthening of for-
mal commitments, everything else being equal, increases the value of the institu-
tion and, therefore, the demand for a norm of discretion that protects it. One 
case in point is arguably the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World 
Trade Organization. It has undeniably more teeth than its predecessor, yet about 
two-thirds of all initiated disputes are settled informally “out of court” (Busch 
and Reinhardt 2000–2001). From the perspective of Liberal Regime Theory, this 
informal governance is due to an implicit understanding among governments 
that it is in everyone’s long-term interest to accommodate a member under 
intense pressure for protection where a panel, bound by the principles of legal 
reasoning, is unable to authorize such concessions for domestic political reasons.
In addition to predicting patterns of informal governance, the theory also 
offered insights about how states determine the limits of their formal commit-
ments. To determine whether formal rules apply or whether informal governance 
is pertinent in a specific situation, the member states delegate the authority to 
adjudicate on demands for informal governance to a government they can all 
trust (Kleine 2013). This second implication of Liberal Regime theory sheds 
new light on the information-providing role of institutions. Students of (inter-
national) cooperation typically analyze whether and how institutions enable 
cooperation by increasing the level of information about actors’ prospective or 
current rule-following behavior (Weingast 2002, 673; Keohane 1984).1 In more 
dynamic settings, however, where it is sometimes necessary to depart from the 
official procedures in order to sustain cooperation, actors also require “extra-
model” information (Svensson 2002, 23) that permits them to assess whether a 
rule departure is justified in a specific context. Yet how states elicit that kind of 
contextual information is a question that has so far received surprisingly little 
attention (Tomz 2007, 30; Pelc 2009, 350). Against this background, it would be 
interesting to investigate the role of rotating presidencies in other international 
forums, such as the G-20 or the United Nations Security Council, looking at 
whether and how they determine and signal the need to accommodate a particu-
lar state through informal governance.
More generally, this book has sought to go beyond the static character of 
many institutional analyses to offer a dynamic theory of cooperation, which 
takes as its starting point that the societal patterns that underpin an institution 
often change in unpredictable ways. For an institution to remain effective under 
these conditions, states constantly have to adapt it to its changing environment. 
CONCLUSION AND EXTENSION      163
Consider how a dynamic perspective reveals a new layer of delegation problems. 
In the standard view, the act of delegation defines states and international orga-
nizations as parties in a principal-agent relationship. The major problem is then 
for the principal to prevent the agent from transgressing its preset discretion. 
However, if we consider the environment of this relationship to be inherently 
dynamic, there emerges another, potentially more severe problem. Rather than 
preventing a “runaway” international organization from overstepping its discre-
tion, there will be situations in which states need to prevent the organization 
from doing exactly what it is supposed to do. In other words, states need to make 
international organizations responsive to their changing collective interest with-
out compromising the organizations’ credibility. This brings us to the book’s 
normative implications.
Normative Implications for 
European and Global Governance
The informal governance practices described in this book may confirm some 
suspicions that European integration, and global governance more broadly, are 
secretive and elitist projects. Governments adhere to norms that are not put into 
writing, and unelected officials prepare decisions in informal committees that 
accompany every stage of the EU’s legislative process. International organiza-
tions, skeptics charge, exclude the public and lack the transparency necessary 
to hold decision makers accountable. Similar charges can be heard in the very 
advanced debate about Europe’s “democratic deficit.” Somewhat counterintui-
tively, this book argues that informal governance, on the contrary, enhances the 
EU’s legitimacy by incorporating important interests into the legislative process 
that would otherwise be ignored.
Let us briefly review the state of the debate. At least since the rejection of the 
Treaty of Maastricht in a Danish referendum in 1992, it has become a common-
place to say that the European Union suffers from a “democratic deficit”—a term 
that has become a placeholder for a variety of factors that alienate citizens from 
EU politics.
In a widely cited article, Andrew Moravcsik defends the EU’s “democratic def-
icit” as necessary for the EU to work. If judged according to reasonable standards 
for democratic governance, and not abstract normative criteria, he maintains, 
the EU is not less democratic than its member states (Moravcsik 2002, 605). Yes, 
the member states deliberately remove decisions from participation by delegat-
ing decisions to nonmajoritarian institutions. However, there is nothing special 
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about this. The delegation of authority to unelected bureaucrats is a common 
practice in member states as well, because it facilitates the production of public 
goods by enabling governments to commit credibly to a certain policy and to 
elicit policy-relevant expertise (similarly, Majone 1994). According to Moravcsik, 
the member states delegated authority to the EU in precisely those areas where 
citizens want the EU to have authority and where many advanced industrialized 
states, including the EU member states, typically insulate decision making from 
direct political contestation anyway (Moravcsik 2002, 613).
Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix disagree. The European Union, they surmise, 
could still be more legitimate and efficient if it allowed for more democratic con-
testation. According to them, the lack of contestation is, therefore, the root of the 
“democratic deficit.” In domestic political systems, elections provide opportuni-
ties for the public to signal their preferences to politicians, and to oust politicians 
from office who do not act in the public interest (Fearon 1999). The election 
mechanism renders politics more representative of the general public, since it 
allows citizens to signal their will, and a responsive government will implement 
their instructions to generate outcomes that are closer to what the public wants 
(Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999, 10–12). Against this backdrop, Follesdal 
and Hix argue that more opportunities for political contestation at the EU level 
promise to draw citizens’ attention to the EU’s hidden distributive effects and, as 
a consequence, make currently apathetic voters aware of the EU’s significance for 
their everyday life. Having come to this realization, citizens will form meaningful 
views about the EU’s general direction, to which politicians will become more 
sensitive (Follesdal and Hix 2006, 546). Put differently, democratic contestation 
promises to make the EU more responsive to, and therefore more representative 
of, citizens’ interests (Hix 2008, chap. 3).
The main bone of contention between Moravcsik, on one side, and Follesdal 
and Hix, on the other side, concerns the question whether the EU meets the 
conditions for meaningful participation in democratic contestation (Moravc-
sik 2008). The EU, Moravcsik contends, deals mainly with issue areas such as 
consumer protection and environmental regulation that are plainly boring in 
the eyes of the public. In these issue areas of low saliency citizens are rationally 
ignorant, which means that they cannot be expected to make the effort to reach 
an informed decision and deliberate in a meaningful way (Moravcsik 2002, 615). 
Follesdal and Hix, however, find that there is nothing inherently “boring” about 
EU politics. Its low saliency in the eyes of EU citizens is merely a function of the 
EU’s political process that denies citizens the opportunity to become interested 
in these matters.
I agree with Follesdal and Hix that responsiveness is a key issue in the debate 
about the EU’s democratic deficit. For international institutions to remain 
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 legitimate they constantly have to be reembedded in its context, which consists 
of the interests and values of the member states’ societies; thus, when an institu-
tion’s context changes, the institution has, to some extent, to adapt with it. I also 
agree that the low saliency is largely the result of the EU’s political process, espe-
cially its informal governance, which effectively depoliticizes EU politics when it 
threatens to generate strong distributive conflicts at home.
I disagree, however, with the diagnosis of the EU’s democratic deficit and 
Hix and Follesdal’s remedy for it. Even if Hix and Follesdal were correct in their 
analysis and the EU lacked responsiveness, it is not guaranteed that democratic 
contestation would render the EU or any other international organization more 
responsive. Democratic elections put a majority in power and, conversely, skew 
politics for the duration of a legislative period systematically against a minority 
of the population. In national political systems based on a thick common identity 
and a central monopoly of force, minorities accept this temporary bias know-
ing that they might get the chance to wield power after the next election. In the 
EU, however, it is far-fetched to believe that a substantial part of the population 
would put up with an EU that is systematically biased against it, even if the next 
election might turn this bias in their favor. Is it conceivable that, for example, 
a British Conservative government would continually defer to the decisions of 
a socialist EU leadership? Would it not systematically obstruct decisions and 
compliance with EU laws, if not leave the European Union completely? In other 
words, instead of making it more responsive, democratic contestation is likely to 
render the EU inherently unstable.
Yet, and more important for the purpose of this book, I disagree with the 
diagnosis and contend that the EU is already far more responsive than Follesdal 
and Hix suggest it is. Recall that the member states collectively accommodate 
governments that are under intense pressure by domestic groups facing immense 
adjustment costs from economic integration. This implies that, while the EU’s 
legislative process commits its member states to the deepening of economic inte-
gration, informal governance brings into the EU’s legislative process those who 
are most immediately affected by EU politics. The EU is therefore responsive to 
important voices that would otherwise be ignored. Thus, the argument can be 
made that informal governance has so far allowed the EU to maintain a level of 





 1. To avoid confusion, the terms “European Union” (EU) and “European Commu-
nity” or “European Communities” (EC) will be used interchangeably. Strictly speaking, 
however, the three European Communities used to be legally separate entities with a 
shared set of supranational institutions, while the EU used to be a legal umbrella that 
encompassed both the supranational EC and other “intergovernmental” policies, namely 
Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty of 
Lisbon merged all supranational and intergovernmental policies in a single entity, the EU.
 2. On constitutionalism beyond the state, see also, e.g., Maduro 2003, 81–86, and 
Dunoff and Trachtman 2009, 10.
 3. Maduro (2009, 367) describes the difficulties of a court’s adjudicatory role in a 
pluralist legal order.
 4. To be perfectly clear, this is not to say that economic integration in Europe does not 
generate any structural changes and distributive conflicts. The argument implies, however, 
that EU governments seek to minimize the concentration of adjustment costs from structural 
changes at the domestic level to avert conflicts that would otherwise prove disruptive for 
the remarkable level of economic integration among them. The norm of discretion is there-
fore similar to what Ruggie (1982, 399), drawing on Polanyi (1944), called embedded liberal-
ism, the essence of which is “to devise a form of multilateralism that is compatible with the 
requirements of domestic stability. Presumably, then, governments so committed would seek 
to encourage an international division of labor which, while multilateral in form and reflect-
ing some notion of comparative advantage (and therefore gains from trade), also promised 
to minimize socially disruptive domestic adjustment costs as well as any national economic 
and political vulnerabilities that might accrue from international functional differentiation.”
 5. This accumulation of autonomy was initially regarded as a quasi-automatic process 
of spillover, where integration in one field generates a demand for further centralization 
in another (Haas 1961, 368).
 6. Pollack (1997, 110) argues that supranational agents’ autonomy is a function of the 
effectiveness of member states’ control mechanisms. The literature is too vast to be cited 
in extenso. For a recent review, see, e.g., Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012.
 7. It thus sympathizes with a pluralist view of international law that emphasizes the 
empirical and normative limits of legal supremacy. See, e.g., Krisch 2010 and, for an over-
view, Michaels 2009.
 8. This book therefore goes back to the original definition of regimes as explicit and 
implicit norms and rules that govern interaction (Krasner 1982, 185). Norms are stan-
dards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific proscrip-
tions and prescriptions of actions.
 9. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) provide a good overview of the various roles of infor-
mal institutions.
10. The most prominent of these agency problems are shirking, which occurs when 
an agent minimizes her effort, and slippage, which refers to situations in which the agent 
shifts a policy away from the principal’s ideal point.
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11. For an application of the principal-agent approach to European studies, see 
 Pollack 2003b.
12. An institution in the functional sense is Pareto-improving: it is an equilibrium 
for which there is a possible counterfactual situation that leaves at least one actor worse 
off, and no actor better off. Thus, all institutions are equilibria, but not all equilibria are 
necessarily institutions.
13. This problem is also referred to as “equifinality” (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994, 87).
14. Alas, recent regulations to improve the transparency of decision making in the EU 
did not result in a greater availability of information, since intergovernmental debates 
about sensitive issues now often take place over lunch where no minutes are taken.
15. The open and hotly debated empirical question is therefore not whether but rather 
to what extent the various ways of withholding compliance constrain both the making 
and the enforcement of EU law. See Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla 2008, 439. Legal scholars 
have long realized that the ECJ’s threat of enforcement is not absolute. As Alec Stone Sweet 
and Thomas Brunell (2010, 29) remark: “Every scholar in the field assumes that the Court 
pays attention to the legal positions of the [member states], and everyone agrees that the 
Court cares about compliance with its rulings.” See also Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012; 
cf. Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla 2012.
16. The Common Agricultural Policy is also an expenditure policy. Regulatory policies 
are listed in part III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
17. Other policies excluded for this reason are employment; the Social Fund; education 
and vocational training; youth and sports; culture; research, technology, development, 
and space; tourism; civil protection; and administrative cooperation.
CHAPTER 1
 1. Defection is more costly when these policy instruments are not perfect substitutes 
(Copeland 1990, 86).
 2. Thus, it would not make sense for governments to keep an agreement to themselves 
on, for example, the liberalization of state-owned industries, since the codification of this 
agreement can be expected to encourage investment in this sector (Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare 1998, 576–77). Mitra (2002) argues that inefficiencies arise from fixed lobbying 
costs. On the signaling function of institutions, see also Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 
2002, 480; and Thompson 2006.
 3. I therefore use the term “uncertainty” instead of “risk”. Uncertainty is the possibility 
that a strategy yields more than two outcomes. Economists, therefore, draw a distinction 
between predictable risk and (Knightian) uncertainty. For a discussion of the relevance of 
this literature in International Relations, see Wendt 2001, 1029–32.
 4. Given that there are countless ways to influence trade flows across borders, there 
are also multiple obvious and hidden ways for governments to cater to these demands. 
See, e.g., Kono 2006, 370.
 5. On systemic uncertainty, focusing on shocks to the distribution of gains between 
states, see Koremenos 2005, 550.
 6. The “efficient breach” literature (e.g., Posner 2002; Goetz and Scott 1977) in law 
and economics points out that it is socially efficient to break a commitment and com-
pensate for damages when a party would incur greater losses from performing under 
the contract. This study differs from the literature in that cooperating partners sustain 
damage not only because of forgone gains from trade or injury to domestic industries. 
It’s important to note that all governments face costs when unauthorized noncompliance 
reduces the value of the institution. All of them, therefore, have an incentive to authorize 
defection even without compensation.
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 7. For a general discussion of the limits of legal authority, see Raz 1979, 31–32.
 8. To be sure, courts develop legal norms through practice. In the WTO, for exam-
ple, the doctrines of in dubio mitius and non liquet govern the interpretation of WTO 
arrangements. However, the point of law is to provide legal certainty and, therefore, to 
interpret legal norms in a consistent way. This inhibits the optimal provision of flexibility 
in our case.
 9. To be sure, the resulting practices of informal governance will not remain unde-
tected. Yet their purpose will not be obvious to private actors. Informal governance, there-
fore, still conveys less information beyond the realm of cooperating governments than 
codified rules.
10. The theory does not address the question of whether governments adopt informal 
governance practices deliberately. In fact, in the case under study, some practices were 
explicitly adopted to make the rules more flexible, while other practices had emerged 
before for other, adventitious reasons and subsequently acquired an additional purpose. 
My goal is not to provide a theory of institutional design, but rather to explicate their flex-
ible adaptation to a dynamic environment. More relevant than their origin is, therefore, 
the fact that informal governance practices persist because they help states solve coopera-
tion problems.
11. Similarly, Rosendorff and Milner (2001, 835) argue that the authorization of defec-
tion is made conditional on the payment of an “optimal penalty, one that balances the 
need for as much cooperation as possible, while allowing for some flexibility in times of 
domestic political pressure.”
12. In this model, the payment of a penalty acts as a signal of the country’s intent to 
cooperate in the future. This information preserves the country’s reputation as a coop-
erator “in normal times”. The Dispute Settlement Procedure consequently enhances the 
stability of the institution by making it more flexible.
13. But see the critique in Pelc 2009.
14. Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 729) refer to this relationship between formal an infor-
mal rules as “accommodating.”
15. Koremenos (2005, 555) codes all trade agreements as issue areas of high uncer-
tainty. However, her substantive interest lies in uncertainty about the systemic distribu-
tion of risk. Political uncertainty, however, is about the domestic politics of collective 
action and, therefore, has to take domestic institutions into account.
16. Ideally, this proxy covaries with political uncertainty (and thus reflects the value of 
this variable) but is itself exogenous to the norm of discretion. Quantitative studies refer 
to such proxies as “instrumental variables.” For an innovative example, see, e.g., Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 1370.
17. This argument draws on the so-called compensation hypothesis (Cameron 1978, 
1249–51; Katzenstein 1985, chap. 2; for empirical evaluations, see, e.g., Rodrik 1998, 998; 
Kim 2007, 193–210; Mukherjee and Singer 2010), which states that welfare provisions 
enable economic openness because they compensate for short-term dislocation and thus 
reduce domestic opposition to trade.
18. One might object that welfare provisions are themselves endogenous to an issue 
area’s inherent political uncertainty, in which case the existence of welfare provisions 
would indicate a high instead of a low level of political uncertainty. However, the origin 
of welfare provisions usually lies in factors other than a country’s move toward greater 
openness. As I will argue in chapter 2, there is little variation across the EU member states 
in the level of protection provided by the Common Agricultural Policy. For a discussion of 
endogeneity problems in the study of flexibility see Kucik and Reinhardt 2008.
19. Similar models exist for decision making in the U.S. Congress (Krehbiel 1991), 
conflict mediation (Kydd 2003), and international organizations (Fang and Stone 2012).
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20. Dai (2002) develops a model in which international institutions elicit information 
by providing incentives for noncompliance victims to do the job for them. The same logic 
can be expected to hold for public or private “compliance victims” that face concentrated 
adjustment costs.
21. Since large states usually command a higher GDP, the terms “large,” “powerful,” and 
“dominant” are used interchangeably.
22. In the political context, transactions can refer to exchange of support (monetary, 
political, and so forth) among private or public actors. The seminal application in Inter-
national Relations is Keohane 1984; see also Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a; and 
Hawkins et al. 2006.
23. Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier (2007, 232) condense these insights into a theory 
of informal, “interstitial” change, in which they explore under what circumstances suprana-
tional actors assert a reinterpretation of the treaty in their favor.
24. Constructivists rightly point out that this perspective omits the actual process of 
norm formation. Thomas Risse (2000, 6), among others, argues that informal norms 
develop as a result of deliberation, that is, processes in which actors seek to attain a Haber-
masian reasoned consensus on an ambiguous issue that is consistent with the idea of a 
common good (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Risse and Kleine 2010).
CHAPTER 2
 1. In 1965, it was institutionally merged with the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity and Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) to form the European 
Community (EC).
 2. The concepts common market, single market, and internal market are used inter-
changeably in this book as well as in the EU. See Gormley 2002, 519.
 3. If not otherwise noted, all references to treaty articles refer to the Treaty of Rome, 
which established the European Economic Community. It is available at http://ec.europa.
eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.
 4. This “persuasiveness” is often referred to as “informal agenda setting” (Pollack 
1997, 124–28). Neofunctionalists (Haas 1963, 65) emphasize the crucial role of the Com-
mission and other supranational institutions in the centralized provision of independent, 
technocratic expertise in managing European economies.
 5. Majority voting was introduced stepwise until 1970 and then gradually extended to 
cover ever more articles. A majority vote has to be “qualified” in the sense that it has to pass 
several majority thresholds. Under the current system, a qualified majority vote comprises 
(1) the majority of countries (50 %); (2) the majority of proportional voting weights (74%); 
and (3) the majority of the population (62%). From 2014 on, a qualified majority vote 
comprises (1) the majority of countries (55%); (2) the majority of the population (65%).
 6. On some matters, the Council is also supposed to consult the Economic and Social 
Committee as well as the Committee of Regions.
 7. Today, the Court of Justice comprises three individual courts: the Court of Justice 
proper, the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance), and the Civil Service 
Tribunal.
 8. According to Garrett and colleagues (1998, 151), the European Court of Justice 
consequently has to strike a delicate balance between a uniform legal interpretation of the 
law and the seeking of continuous support of the member states and national courts for 
this legal system. As discussed in the introduction to this book, the extent to which these 
aspects constrain lawmaking and Court judgments is an empirical question.
 9. The literature is too vast to be cited in extenso. See e.g. the discussion in Pollack 
2003b, 35–39, n14. Simon Hix and colleagues (2007, chap. 3) argued that the left-right 
dimension has become increasingly important in the European Parliament. It should 
be noted that policy dimensions is an abstract concept that is not the same as cleavages 
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or conflict lines, which describe the differences in actors’ revealed preferences (i.e., their 
actual positions).
10. Evans (1993) finds there is generally little evidence for incomplete information in 
two-level game situations.
11. Shepsle (1979) develops a formal model of a “structure-induced equilibrium” 
under conditions of collectively intransitive preferences.
12. This ties the argument to the informational literature on the organization of the 
U.S. Congress, the empirical implication of which is that committees are structured to 
increase the availability of policy-relevant expertise. The seminal work is Krehbiel 1991.
13. Weingast and Marshall (1988) argue that the demand for the enforcement of politi-
cal transactions explains why Congress is organized like a firm rather than a market. Spe-
cifically, they argue that the demand gives rise to committees and their rights to set the 
congressional agenda. In the EU, however, there is no institutional structure that would 
serve a similar function. It is therefore unlikely that the trading of votes can be enforced 
and, thus, that the trade can take place.
14. As David Mayhew argues for the U.S. Congress: “We can all point to a good many 
instances in which congressmen seem to have gotten into trouble for being on the wrong 
side in a roll call vote, but who can think of one where a member got into trouble for being 
on the losing side?” (Mayhew 1974, 118).
15. The domains are as follows: the first (transitional) period spans from the inception 
of the European Economic Community in 1958 to 1969, the year in which transitional 
provisions in the Treaty of Rome became fully effective. The time period also included the 
Merger Treaty of 1965, which merged the institutions of the then three communities. The 
1987 Single European Act marks the end of the second time period. A third period reaches 
until the entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. The fourth period spans 
from the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2001 Intergovernmen-
tal Conference on the Treaty of Nice, both of which prepared the Community Method for 
the looming “big bang enlargement.” The final period focuses on the years from the Nice 
Treaty until the entering into force of the currently effective Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
16. The literature on the Common Agricultural Policy is too vast to cite in detail. For a 
good analysis of the obstacles to reform, see, e.g., Patterson 1997 and Keeler 1996.
17. Another argument against using the Common Agricultural Policy as a proxy for 
political uncertainty is that the unpredictability of weather, crop failure, and world prices 
makes agriculture an inherently risky issue area that requires protection to enable invest-
ments. But this is only partly true. It is a well-established fact that the level of protection 
in industrialized countries goes far beyond what can be considered efficient. In fact, the 
level of protection is inversely correlated to the size of the sector, which suggests that this 
level primarily depends on farmers’ capacity for collective action (Olson 1985, 933). In 
other words, the costs of protection in the agricultural sector in the EU and elsewhere are 
clearly economically inefficient and outweigh the benefits to the society as a whole. For 
a good review of the political economy literature and a test of its propositions, see Thies 
and Porche 2007.
18. It is notoriously difficult to measure the importance of the agricultural sector for 
the economy, since many other foodstuff sectors (sectors processing food, restaurants, 
retailers, and so forth) indirectly depend on it. According to recent statistics, France’s 
agricultural sector is still the most productive within the EU. Furthermore, the share of 
agriculture in the GDP of France is higher than in other large, industrialized member 
states. See European Commission 2012, 50, 57, and 59.
19. One might mention the 1965 “empty chair crisis” cited below, during which Charles 
De Gaulle withdrew French officials from the EU institutions; the French vetoes of British 
accession in the 1960s; the budget crisis of the 1980s; the BSE (“mad cow disease”) crisis 
in the 1990s; and the disputes related to Eastern enlargement in the 2000s.
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CHAPTER 3
 1. This idea builds on very early functionalist writings (Mitrany 1943) as well as the 
so-called Schuman Plan (Schuman 1950) to integrate the European nation-states in the 
strategically important coal and steel industries.
 2. On the evolution of the European Council in the 1970s and ‘80s, see, e.g., Morgan 
1976, Johnston 1994, and Bulmer and Wessels 1987.
 3. The 1977 London Declaration acknowledged the European Council’s broad scope. 
It states that it “will sometimes need . . . to settle issues outstanding from discussions at 
lower levels” (Conseil Européen 1977).
 4. For example, the Commission kept few records of the consultation of govern-
ment experts. The situation is, as the Commission (2000, 16) itself observes, confusing 
and opaque. It is consequently difficult to distinguish clearly between governmental 
and nongovernmental experts, or experts involved in the drafting of proposals and 
the implementation of decisions. See Rometsch 1999, 321–31. There are also few data 
on the reliance on government expertise across issue areas, given that the Director-
ate Generals were regularly restructured to fit the portfolios of a growing number of 
Commissioners.
 5. According to Leon Lindberg (1963, 56), 117 such expert groups already existed 
in 1960.
 6. Lindberg (1963, 284) welcomed this practice as a form of “informal co-optation” 
while authors such as Miriam Camps (1958, 4) and David Coombes (1970, 95) regarded 
this practice as a threat to the Commission’s independence.
 7. Wessels (1990, 233) reports the consultation of 10,381 government experts in 1975 
and 15,652 in 1985 for the preparation of Commission proposals. Other unofficial sources 
exceed these numbers (Azzi 1982, 100; Pag 1987, 471; and Erhardt 1983, 61).
 8. Another official report (Hay 1989, 28) counts 150 expert group meetings per week 
in 1989. Four years later, the Commission (Commission des Communautés Européennes 
1992) discovered no less than 635 different expert groups.
 9. Some departments, such as Agriculture and, increasingly so, Competition and 
Enlargement, were less constrained than others. On the Directorate General for Agricul-
ture, see Swinbank 1997, 70.
10. The data do not distinguish between government and scientific experts, and not all 
experts are actually registered with the Commission.
11. It is difficult to compare the numbers to previous years, since the staff grades have 
been changed. The numbers here refer to the three highest grades, A16-A14. See European 
Union 2011, 1222.
12. Few studies have so far theorized change in the power over the timing of a proposal, 
which is probably due to the fact that few models allow for preferences changing over time. 
On the basis of the assumption that time is a scarce resource, more attention has been paid 
to the power to delay a decision (Kardasheva 2009).
13. On its end, the Parliament could choose to accept the Council’s common posi-
tion, propose amendments (conditional on the Commission’s endorsement), or reject it. 
A unanimous Council could still change and adopt the proposal even against Parliament’s 
will (Dehousse 1989, 123). The Parliament recognized this loss, noting that the capacity 
to delay is an important weapon where an urgent matter is concerned but Parliament 
cannot use it during the second reading since it must then meet a three-month deadline 
(European Parliament 1988, 15).
CHAPTER 4
 1. For a good introduction to practices in the Council, see, e.g., Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 2006; and Westlake and Galloway 2004; for the European Parliament, see Corbett, 
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Jacobs, and Shackleton 2005; and Judge and Earnshaw 2008. Jeffrey Lewis (2005, 943) 
argues that the norms in the Council are the result of processes of socialization, to which 
dense institutional settings such as the Council are particularly conducive.
 2. For an early description of this practice, see Noël 1963, 21; and Bähr 1963, 92–100. 
COREPER was divided into two parts with equal rights.
 3. The B/A ratio fell dramatically during the decade from about 1.4/1 in 1964 to 
0.6/1 in 1969 (data drawn from the Council of Minister’s archives [CM2]).
 4. The German term Ständige Vertreter (permanent representative) was perverted 
into Ständiger Verräter (permanent traitor [of the treaty’s spirit]). See Bähr 1963, 64.
 5. COREPER did not discuss agriculture unless it strongly affected other policies 
(Neville-Rolfe 1984, 208).
 6. Own data on A and B points drawn from CM2 archives.
 7. For example, Luns (quoted in Kranz 1982, 418) admitted to the European Parlia-
ment that “we nonetheless [despite the empty chair crisis] took numerous votes.” Accord-
ing to an unofficial statistic (Torrelli 1969, 86), majority decisions were taken in 10 percent 
of the cases formally subject to majority voting. However, De Ruyt (1989, 116) speaks of 
only six to ten majority decisions between 1966 and 1974.
 8. Dewost (1980b, 293) acknowledges that the observed trend mainly took place in 
the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy, and to some extent 
in the Common Commercial Policy (Ungerer 1989, 98). Because the Common Fisheries 
Policy is partly funded through the Common Agricultural Policy, the Council often dis-
cusses both policies together.
 9. The Single European Act also added several escape clauses to guarantee that gov-
ernments’ interests would be adequately protected (Dehousse 1989, 118–21). At the same 
time, the Council began in December 1989 to asterisk those items on the agenda for which 
the treaty provided majority voting (Westlake 1995, 134).
10. For example, data provided by the German permanent representative (Ungerer 1989, 
98; European Communities 1988) at the time show that the total number of majority deci-
sions in fact fell from ninety-six in 1987 to seventy-eight in 1988 to sixty-one in 1989 (Engel 
and Borrmann 1991, 147). Data for the years 1990–1992 are unfortunately not available.
11. However, Mattila (2009, 846) finds that this might have changed with the accession 
of the new member states in 2004.
12. Discriminating between policy areas is extremely difficult, because it is quite normal 
for the Council to rubber-stamp decisions that are entirely foreign to its specific jurisdic-
tion if an agreement on this matter has already been reached in the Council substructure. 
Thus, the Council of Ministers of Transport would adopt as an A-point a legal act on the 
environment that technically belongs to the jurisdiction of Ministers of the Environment.
13. In fact, the member states established yet another layer of government experts. The 
so-called Antici Group coordinates meetings of the European Council and the Permanent 
Representatives. The Mertens Group coordinates meetings of the deputy permanent rep-
resentatives (Westlake 1995, 293; de Zwaan 1995, 100).
14. Compulsory aspects mainly concerned agriculture spending and financial obli-
gations to third countries, which accounted for about 80 percent of the budget. The 
 European Parliament’s power over the compulsory aspects of the budget was minimal: it 
suggested modifications to a Commission proposal, which the Council could easily scrap 
by a qualified majority. For noncompulsory expenditure, Parliament could reject the bud-
get in toto, in which case a version of the previous budget would come into effect and the 
procedure would start all over again.
15. The seeds for this development had been sown with the establishment of the EU’s 
system of “own resources” (consisting of tariff revenues and member state contributions) 
and, with the 1970 Treaty of Luxembourg and the 1975 Treaty of Brussels, an increase of 
Parliament’s budgetary powers (Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton 1992, chap. 12).
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16. The European Parliament has made limited use of its prerogative to reject propos-
als. It has succeeded in doing so in only seven cases. See European Parliament 2009b, 165.
17. This is one of the reasons why its actual implications for the interinstitutional 
balance of power have been subject to hot academic disputes. See the debate in Tsebelis 
1994; Garrett, Tsebelis, and Corbett 2001; and Crombez, Steunenberg, and Corbett 2000.
18. Parliament also changed its internal rules of procedure in 1994 so as “to bring 
additional pressure to bear on the Commission to accept parliamentary amendments” 
(Westlake 1994b, 93–94; see also Judge and Earnshaw 2008, 48).
19. As a member of the European Parliament explains, “In theory the Council is meant to 
wait for the European Parliament’s opinion in the first reading before working on its common 
position. In practice, the Council working groups tend to operate in parallel with—but sepa-
rately from—the European Parliament, and much of the detailed work has often been carried 
out before the European Parliament has completed its first reading” (European Parliament 1998).
20. Similarly, two close observers of the European Parliament, Michael Shackleton and 
Tapio Raunio (2003, 185), warn that “if trilogues become generalized as the normal way 
of doing legislative business, it would be difficult not to conclude that Parliament was 
becoming something akin to [a member state], accepting the kinds of norms and rules 
that apply in the Council.”
CHPATER 5
 1. The Council could then change the Commission’s decision again by a qualified 
majority. On the origins and decision-making practices of these committees, see Nielsen 
1971, 551–53.
 2. This interpretation is contested. See Kortenberg 1998, 319.
 3. The Court defined the terms “implementation” and “specific cases” very broadly in 
Case 16/88, Commission v Council (Spence and Edwards 2006, 251).
 4. This flexible interpretation of the treaty was sanctioned by further Court judg-
ments (Türk 2009, 56).
 5. See, e.g., Franchino 2007. The Commission’s discretion decreased substantially 
in subsequent years (Engel and Borrmann 1991, 138; Dogan 1997, 39–40). The Court 
confirmed the legality of these practices in a number of judgments. For example, when 
Parliament asked the Court for annulment of the Comitology decision on the grounds 
that it was incompatible with the spirit of the Single European Act, the European Court of 
Justice (1988) held that Parliament’s appeal was inadmissible; the Court did not address 
the substance of the complaint. In 1989, the Commission challenged a Council regulation 
on the grounds that it provided for a regulatory committee in an area where the Commis-
sion held exclusive powers. The European Court of Justice (1989), however, again found 
in favor of the Council in this question (Bradley 1992, 712).
 6. European Environment Agency, European Training Foundation, European Moni-
toring Center of Drugs and Drug Addiction, European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products, Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, Translation Center 
of the Bodies of the European Union, the Community Plant Variety Office, European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, the European Cen-
ter for the Development of Vocational Training.
 7. As a legal scholar put it, the “opaqueness of EU law has been deliberately taken to a 
new level in order to make an abstract theoretical point of typology to press the EU into a 
state-like federal model” (Hofmann 2009, 499).
CHAPTER 6
 1. The penalty would still induce private actors to spend resources on lobbying (Mitra 
2002) and to mobilize for defection where they would otherwise have invested in adjustments 
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to economic change (Staiger and Tabellini 1987, 824; Kohler and Moore 2001, 53; Maggi and 
Rodriguez-Clare 1998; Goldstein and Martin 2000, 622; Pelc 2010, 636; Sykes 1991, 259).
 2. Similar models exist for decision making in the U.S. Congress (Krehbiel 1991), 
conflict mediation (Kydd 2003), and international organizations (Fang and Stone 2012).
 3. Although less common in international bargaining, the assumption of nearly com-
plete information is a plausible standard assumption in the context of the EU (see, e.g., 
Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 280).
 4. Tallberg’s theory begs one important question, namely why governments delegate 
these tasks to a cooperating partner rather than to an institutional actor when this gov-
ernment must be expected to exploit its privileged position for its own advantage. He 
speculates that the empty chair crisis, which affected the Commission’s status in decision 
making, worked against the Commission and in favor of the Council presidency as the 
member states’ preferred mediator (Tallberg 2006, 58).
CHAPTER 7
 1. See also Edwards and Wallace 1978, 59; and Wallace and Edwards 1976, 537. On the 
relationship between the Council Secretariat and the presidency, see Ludlow 1995, 149–56.
 2. See also Wallace 1985b, 16: “Chairmen need to be familiar with the detailed pos-
tures of each government and thus to spend a considerable amount of time identifying the 
reasoning behind publicly enunciated positions. This may require either spending time in 
advance of meetings gathering intelligence from the members of Permanent Representa-
tions, from the Commission and the Council Secretariat, or direct consultations in the 
capital of other governments to clear the ground for the final stage of negotiations.”
 3. In 1975, for instance, this unspoken law led the Irish Council president, Garrett 
Fitzgerald, to announce that he would use this prerogative to break with the Council’s 
practice of consensus-seeking. The attempt failed, however, and was not repeated by his 
Italian successor. See Fitzgerald 1991, 147–48; and Agence Europe 1975.
 4. German car manufacturers initially found support for their opposition to the direc-
tive from the two largest groups within the European Parliament, the conservative Euro-
pean People’s Party and parts of the Party of European Socialists (Agence Europe 2000a; 
European Voice 1999c). In its final vote, Parliament added various amendments that were 
intended to lower carmakers’ expected costs (Financial Times 1999). The Council largely 
stood by its common position, and the Commission declared that it did not approve of 
Parliament’s amendments (European Voice 1999b). Council and Parliament found an 
agreement in a conciliation committee, which modified the original text (Agence Europe 
2000b). The Council approved the final directive at its meeting in July 2000.
CHAPTER 8
 1. The draft Working Time Directive can be considered a proper Commission initia-
tive. At the Strasbourg summit in December 1989, all member states except the United 
Kingdom accepted the Social Charter as a nonbinding declaration, and the European 
Council (1989) vaguely called “upon the Council to deliberate upon the Commission’s 
proposals in the light of the social dimension of the internal market.”
 2. The revolt was prominently backed by former prime minister Margaret Thatcher, 
who had opposed the Maastricht Treaty all along on the grounds that it supposedly trans-
formed the EC into a centralized, socialist megastate.
 3. After the Working Time Directive’s adoption, the United Kingdom brought an 
action against the Council before the European Court of Justice that challenged the legal 
base of the directive, pleaded that the directive disregarded the principle of proportional-
ity, and argued that it had no objective connection with its purported aims of improving 
safety. It also complained that the Commission’s neglect of the governmental advisory 
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Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health constituted a procedural defect serious enough 
to render the directive null and void (European Court of Justice 1996; Gray 1998, 344–56). 
However, the Court ruled that the Working Time Directive was valid and merely scrapped 
the Sunday clause on the grounds that there was no obvious connection between workers’ 
health and safety and being given Sunday as a day off.
 4. In 2004, the Commission submitted a proposal for a new directive to amend 
the current rules in light of recent developments and the judgments. The Council and 
the European Parliament, however, were unable to reach an agreement (European 
Communities 2000a, consolidated in European Communities 2000b). At the time of writ-
ing, the directive was still under review at the  Commission.
CONCLUSION AND EXTENSION
 1. The famous Law Merchant (a private judge that adjudicated commercial disputes 
in the Middle Ages), for example, enabled long-distance trade by keeping records of trad-
ers’ reputation for honoring their obligations (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990, 3).
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Glossar y of Institutions, Treaties, and Procedures
Agencies Bodies set up by the European Union to carry out specific technical, scientific, 
or administrative tasks. Although some existed in the 1970s, agencies became espe-
cially popular in the 1990s as an alternative way of implementing EU policies.
Cabinets Personal offices of the commissioners that give political guidance and commu-
nicate with the Commission administration. Today, only three out of six members of 
a cabinet can be of the same nationality as the commissioner.
Chiefs of government The heads of state and government (prime ministers and presi-
dents) of the member states who meet periodically as the European Council to set the 
direction of the European Union.
Co-decision procedure (Ordinary Legislative Procedure) Created by the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the first version of the co-decision procedure was meant to enhance the 
European Parliament’s power by giving it veto over the Council’s decisions. Because 
it was quite complicated, the Treaty of Amsterdam simplified this procedure (“co-
decision 2”) and extended its application to more policy areas in the treaty. The Treaty 
of Lisbon increased its application even further and renamed it the “Ordinary Legisla-
tive Procedure.”
Comitology A process in which the Commission, before taking implementing actions, has 
to consult with representatives of the member states through committees.  Depending 
on the procedures, the committees’ advice can be more or less binding.
Community Method The European Union’s generic way of decision making. This legisla-
tive procedure is initiated by a proposal for a legislative act from the Commission. After 
official submission, the Council and the European Parliament may jointly adopt or 
amend it. Legal acts are typically implemented by the European Commission, national 
administrations, or both.
Consultation procedure Initially, the predominant legislative procedure, according to 
which the Council asks for the Parliament’s opinion on the Commission’s legislative 
proposal before adopting or amending it. Today, it applies only to a limited number of 
legislative areas, such as market exemptions.
Cooperation procedure Created by the Single European Act, this was the predominant 
legislative procedure until the Treaty of Maastricht introduced “co-decision.” Accord-
ing to this procedure, the Council had to attain unanimous agreement in order to 
adopt legislative proposals to which the European Parliament objects. The cooperation 
procedure was more and more replaced by co-decision until the Lisbon Treaty finally 
abolished it.
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) The Committee of Permanent 
Representatives comprises the member states’ ambassadors to the EU and prepares 
the decisions of the Council of Ministers. It works in two configurations: COREPER II 
consists of the ambassadors and deals with political and institutional matters, whereas 
COREPER I consists of deputy permanent representatives and deals with technical 
matters. Issues on which COREPER attains a consensus are referred to the Council 
as A-points, which the ministers typically adopt en bloc without further discussion. 
Other, more controversial issues enter the Council’s agenda as B-points.
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Council of Ministers The Council of the EU comprises ministers from the member gov-
ernments and meets in various issue-specific formations (e.g., Council of Ministers of 
the Environment). Its role in legislation is to adopt or change, jointly with the Euro-
pean  Parliament, the Commission’s legislative proposals. The position of president of 
the EU Council rotates among the member states every six months. Not to be confused 
with the European Council, which is composed of the chiefs of government and has 
no role in legislation.
Enlargement Describes the accession of new member states to the European Union. 
There have been seven enlargements so far: Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
 Kingdom in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden in 1995; Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania in 2007; and 
Croatia in 2013.
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Founded in 1957 alongside the EEC. 
Its institutions were merged with those of the European Economic Communities and 
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1965.
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Established by the 1951 Treaty of Paris, 
it centralized the governance of war-relevant sectors in order to prevent military 
mobilization in the future. When the Treaty of Paris expired in 2002, the European 
Community absorbed the European Coal and Steel Community’s activities and 
resources.
European Commission The EU’s principal supranational bureaucracy. It consists of a 
political level, composed of the Commission president and a college of commissioners, 
and an administrative level (the “services”), staffed with permanent civil servants and 
composed of various departments (the directorate generals). The Commission sets the 
legislative agenda by submitting proposals for legal acts. It also helps implement EU 
law by making secondary rules.
European Council The regular meetings (“summits”) between the chiefs of government. 
It was not until the Treaty of Lisbon that the European Council was mentioned as 
an official institution. Although it has no official role in legislation, it is supposed to 
define the EU’s general political direction and priorities. The Lisbon Treaty also cre-
ated the position of a full-time president of the European Council, which is currently 
held by Herman Van Rompuy. Not to be confused with the Council of the EU, which 
comprises ministers and has an official role in legislation.
European Court of Justice (ECJ) The highest court in the European Union and part of 
the system of EU courts, the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is tasked with 
interpreting EU law and ensuring its general application across the member states. 
Since most EU law is to be transposed into national law, the preliminary reference 
procedure allows national courts to ask the ECJ to clarify the interpretation of EU law 
and whether it conflicts with national laws.
European Economic Community (EEC/EC) Established by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
aimed at creating a common market among its member states. Its institutions were 
merged with those of the Euratom and the ECSC in 1965 (see Merger Treaty). The 
Maastricht Treaty renamed it the European Community. The European Union legally 
absorbed the EC with the Treaty of Lisbon.
European Parliament (EP) Starting out as a consultative assembly composed of national 
parliamentarians, its role in the legislative process has increased steadily over time. 
Since 1979, its members are directly elected every five years by universal suffrage. 
Its 754 seats are distributed among the member states proportional to their popula-
tion. For example, German citizens are represented by ninety-nine members of the 
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 European Parliament. The members of the European Parliament are organized into 
seven parliamentary groups, including the conservative European People’s Party, the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, the Alliance of Liberal and Demo-
crats, the Greens, and various Euroskeptic groups.
European Union (EU) Established in 1992 with the Treaty on European Union (see Treaty 
of Maastricht). Initially, the EU was a political umbrella for the three communities and 
two policies outside of these communities, namely, Justice and Home Affairs and a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union legally absorbed the com-
munities with the Treaty of Lisbon.
Expert groups Informal groups comprised of government experts or private experts that 
consult with the Commission in its preparation of legislative proposals.
Merger Treaty Signed in 1965, entered into force in 1967. The Merger Treaty created a 
single Council and Commission to serve all three European communities, namely, 
the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and 
Euratom.
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) On most issues, the Council may make decisions by 
majority voting. Each country is allocated a number of votes roughly equivalent to 
its population. Today, a qualified majority is reached if a majority of member states 
approves and this majority comprises at least 70 percent of the votes cast. The voting 
weights and voting threshold have changed with the accession of new member states. 
From 2014 on, a qualified majority vote requires approval by 55 percent of the mem-
bers of the EU Council, who must represent 65 percent of EU citizens.
Single European Act (SEA) Signed in 1986, entered into force in 1987. It notably extended 
qualified majority voting in the Council to articles pertaining to the creation of the 
Single Market, and created the cooperation procedure that gave the European Parlia-
ment more powers.
Treaty of Amsterdam Signed in 1997, entered into force in 1999. Notably, it created the 
“Co-decision II” legislative procedure to replace the more complicated “Co-decision 
I” procedure.
Treaty of Lisbon Signed in 2007, entered into force in 2009. Notably, it increased the 
European Parliament’s involvement in legislation by extending the “Co-decision II” 
procedure (renamed Ordinary Legislative Procedure). It also recognizes the European 
Council as an official EU institution and creates a permanent (full-time, five-year 
 tenure) president for this institution.
Treaty of Maastricht Formally the Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992, entered 
into force in 1993. It established the European Union as the political umbrella for 
the European Community and two other policies, namely the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. Notably, it established the Economic 
and Monetary Union (including the euro) and created the “Co-decision I” legislative 
procedure, which gave the European Parliament more say in legislation.
Treaty of Nice Signed in 2001, entered into force in 2003. It slightly changed the composi-
tion of the Commission and redefined the voting system in the Council.
Treaty of Rome Signed in 1957, entered into force in 1958. It set up the European Eco-
nomic Community and Euratom next to the European Coal and Steel Community.
Trilogue Informal meetings between the chairperson of COREPER, the European Parlia-
ment’s rapporteur, and the European Commission. The purpose of these contacts is 
to get an agreement that both the Council and the European Parliament can accept 
without having to go through all stages of the legislative process.
Working Groups Meetings of COREPER are prepared by Council working groups com-
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